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ABSTRACT

Dynamic analysis is an important technique used in malware analysis and is
complementary to static analysis. Thus far, virtualization has been widely adopted for
building fine-grained dynamic analysis tools and this trend is expected to continue. Unlike
User/Kernel space malware analysis platforms that essentially co-exist with malware,
virtualization based platforms benefit from isolation and fine-grained instrumentation
support. Isolation makes it more difficult for malware samples to disrupt analysis and
fine-grained instrumentation provides analysts with low level details, such as those at the
machine instruction level. This in turn supports the development of advanced analysis tools
such as dynamic taint analysis and symbolic execution for automatic path exploration.
The major disadvantage of virtualization based malware analysis is the loss of semantic
information, also known as the semantic gap problem. To put it differently, since analysis
takes place at the virtual machine monitor where only the raw system state (e.g., CPU and
memory) is visible, higher level constructs such as processes and files must be
reconstructed using the low level information. The collection of techniques used to bridge
semantic gaps is known as Virtual Machine Introspection.
Virtualization based analysis platforms can be further separated into emulation and
hardware virtualization. Emulators have the advantages of flexibility of analysis tool
development and efficiency for fine-grained analysis; however, emulators suffer from the
transparency problem. That is, malware can employ methods to determine whether it is

executing in an emulated environment versus real hardware and cease operations to disrupt
analysis if the machine is emulated. In brief, emulation based dynamic analysis has
advantages over User/Kernel space and hardware virtualization based techniques, but it
suffers from semantic gap and transparency problems.
These problems have been exacerbated by recent discoveries of anti-emulation malware
that detects emulators and Android malware with two semantic gaps, Java and native.
Also, it is foreseeable that malware authors will have a similar response to taint analysis.
In other words, once taint analysis becomes widely used to understand how malware
operates, the authors will create new malware that attacks the imprecisions in taint
analysis implementations and induce false-positives and false-negatives in an effort to
frustrate analysts.
This dissertation addresses these problems by presenting concepts, methods and
techniques that can be used to transparently and precisely analyze both desktop and
mobile malware using virtualization. This is achieved in three parts. First, precise
heterogeneous record and replay is presented as a means to help emulators benefit from the
transparency characteristics of hardware virtualization. This technique is implemented in a
tool called V2E that uses KVM for recording and TEMU for replaying and analysis. It was
successfully used to analyze real-world anti-emulation malware that evaded analysis using
TEMU alone. Second, the design of an emulation based Android malware analysis
platform that uses virtual machine introspection to bridge both the Java and native level
semantic gaps as well as seamlessly bind the two views together into a single view is
presented. The core introspection and instrumentation techniques were implemented in a
new analysis platform called DroidScope that is based on the Android emulator. It was

successfully used to analyze two real-world Android malware samples that have
cooperating Java and native level components. Taint analysis was also used to study their
information ex-filtration behaviors. Third, formal methods for studying the sources of
false-positives and false-negatives in dynamic taint analysis designs and for verifying the
correctness of manually defined taint propagation rules are presented. These definitions
and methods were successfully used to analyze and compare previously published taint
analysis platforms in terms of false-positives and false-negatives.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that malware (malicious software) costs United States consumers $2.3
billion and led to the replacement of 1.3 million personal computers (PCs) in 2010 [1].
Cybercrime, fueled by malware, was also estimated to have had a world-wide financial
impact of $118 billion [2] in the same year. As adoption of mobile platforms increased, so
has the prevalence of mobile malware. According to McAfee, approximately 450 mobile
malware samples, 400 of which target the Android platform, were identified in the 4th
quarter of 2011 [3]. This is a 3.5x increase from the 3rd quarter and is expected to grow in
2012 [4]. The increase in the number of malware samples is also accompanied with new
forms of fraud. lookout, a mobile security firm, has pointed out that “the most prevalent
Toll Fraud malware family [FakeInst] has netted an approximate $10 million for its
makers” from September 2011 to June 2012 [5].
To mitigate the impacts of malware, anti-virus companies and researchers have used
static and dynamic analysis tools to understand malware behavior so that countermeasures
can be developed. In a survey of dynamic malware analysis techniques and tools, Egele et
al. described the differences between static and dynamic analysis tools and outlined five
dynamic analysis techniques (Function Call Monitoring, Function Parameter Analysis,
Information Flow Tracking, Instruction Trace and Autostart Extensibility Points) that
have been implemented using three different strategies (User/Kernel Space, Emulator and
Virtual Machine) [6]. Of the techniques, taint analysis and instruction tracing provide the
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most detailed information; however, there are limitations. The effectiveness of taint
analysis is limited by the precision of taint propagation rules and while it is trivial to
generate an instruction trace in an emulator, emulators lack transparency (and thus can be
detected and evaded), and introduce semantic gaps.
This dissertation addresses these limitations and shows a fine-grained dynamic malware
analysis platform that is transparent and supports precise taint analysis is feasible. The
thesis is transparent malware analysis platforms with precise taint tracking rules can be
realized using virtualization technologies. Three arguments are used to support this
hypothesis: hardware virtualization can be used to make emulation transparent, semantic
gaps can be bridged and the precision of taint propagation rules can be formally analyzed.

Transparency Emulators are designed to imitate the behavior of another system. For
example, the CPU emulator in QEMU [7, 8] is capable of emulating x86, ARM and other
CPU architectures on top of different host architectures (e.g., x86 on x86 and x86 on
ARM). If the CPU emulator is perfect, then the imitated behavior exactly mirrors that of a
real hardware CPU and the emulator is considered transparent. However, transparency is
difficult to achieve in practice due to emulation bugs, different CPU models and
errata [9–12].
This dissertation proposes precise heterogeneous record and replay (PHRR) as a new
technique to make emulation based dynamic analysis more transparent. The key idea is to
separate a malware’s execution from the analysis task. The malware is allowed to execute
in a hardware virtualized environment where the above mentioned transparency issues due
to emulation do not exist since execution takes place on a real CPU. The execution is

3

Process
1

...

Process
n
System Calls

Guest Operating System
(Linux)
x86 Instructions

QEMU x86 Emulator
(Dynamic Analyzer)

CPU

Memory

Disk

Fig. 1.1.: A high level architectural diagram of an emulation based dynamic malware
analysis platform.

recorded such that all inputs and any potentially deviant behavior between the emulator
and the real CPU are logged. In this manner, the emulator can better imitate the real
CPU during analysis. Precise heterogeneous record and replay is implemented in a tool
called V2E that uses the Kernel Based Virtual Machine (KVM) [13] as the recorder and
TEMU [14–16] as the replayer. The details are presented in Chapter 3.

Semantic Gaps The semantic gap problem arises when analysis takes place at a lower
abstraction layer than the analysis target resulting in a loss of higher level details. Take
the emulation based dynamic analysis platform depicted in Figure 1.1 as an example. The
solid arrows in the figure represent the interfaces between the different abstraction layers.
Processes use system calls to interact with the operating system and the operating system
uses x86 instructions to access hardware resources. These x86 instructions are emulated,
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meaning the emulator mediates all accesses to hardware resources by the guest operating
system and executes the guest instructions on its behalf. If emulation was not used, then
the operating system will have direct access to the resources (dashed arrows).
It is clear from the figure that system calls are the interfaces between processes and the
operating system, and not between the operating system and the emulator. Hence, an
analyzer situated at the emulator that seeks to log all system calls made by “Process 1”
will have difficulties. Since the emulation layer can only access the raw CPU and memory
states, the concept of a process (an operating system construct) is limited to the value of
the CR3 register, which contains the physical address of the top level page table. Also,the
concept of Linux system calls is limited to the int 0x80 instruction that is used to invoke
system calls. Additionally, while the CR3 values can be used to distinguish between
different processes, specific information such as which CR3 value represents “Process 1” is
not available at the emulation layer. To retrieve this information, and thus bridge the
semantic gap, researchers have proposed Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) techniques
that can identify and interpret specific data structures from raw memory [17–19]. While
these techniques have proven useful for bridging the semantic gap between the emulator
and the guest operating system, Android, a mobile platform, has multiple gaps that must
be bridged.
Unlike traditional desktop systems where applications run directly on top of the
operating system, Android applications run in a Java Virtual Machine - known as the
Dalvik Virtual Machine - and use JNI (Java Native Interface) to interface with native
libraries. Consequently, Android malware can contain Java and native components that
cooperate to achieve a common goal. Therefore, there are two levels of semantic
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information that must be reconstructed in order to adequately analyze Android malware.
First is the native level that includes the Linux kernel and second is the Java level that is
interpreted using the DVM.
Bridging these two gaps involves understanding the different kernel data structures used
to store pertinent information (e.g., processes) and the data structures and logic of the
DVM (e.g., Java objects). These details along with the design of a new emulation analysis
platform that seamlessly binds the two views together so that a sample’s Java execution,
native execution and interactions between them can be studied are presented in Chapter 4.
These ideas are implemented in a new analysis tool name DroidScope, which is also
discussed in the same chapter.

Precise Taint Analysis Dynamic taint analysis is designed to track information flows
through data items of interest and is a key binary analysis technique [6]. In taint analysis,
data items are labeled as “tainted” or “untainted” and this taint (label) is propagated from
data item to data item as the program being analyzed is executed. The rules that
determine when and how taint is to propagate are defined in a taint propagation policy.
Taint analysis is supported by both V2E, through TEMU, and DroidScope.
The propagation policies have been widely researched with different design patterns
that vary taint-granularity (e.g., byte versus bit tainting [both TEMU and DroidScope
labels taint per byte of data]), analysis-granularity, (e.g., propagating through ARM
instructions like DroidScope or an Intermediate Representation [IR] like TEMU), and
special case support (e.g., TEMU has a special rule to propagate taint through the bit shift
operations without introducing false-positives while DroidScope does not). The
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relationships between these design parameters and the accuracy (a measure of
false-negatives) and precision (a measure of false-positives) of taint analysis are analyzed in
Chapter 5 using formal methods.
In particular, a formal model of dynamic taint analysis is defined based on the concept
of information flow or noninterference [20]. The model is then used to prove that
propagating taint at the byte-level can introduce false-positives when compared to
propagating taint at the bit-level and similarly, propagating taint through an IR can
introduce false-positives when compared to propagating taint through the native
instruction the IR is used to emulate. Methods for automatically generating a default
policy without false-negatives and for determining the accuracy and precision of manually
defined taint propagation rule are also presented.

Summary In short, this dissertation presents concepts, techniques, methods and proofs
that can be used to design and build transparent and precise malware analysis platforms.
DroidScope illustrates that emulation based fine-grained binary analysis can be performed
on both mobile and desktop malware by bridging the two semantic gaps in Android, V2E
shows that emulators can be made more transparency using hardware virtualization, and
Chapter 5 provides insights into the fundamental sources of imprecision in dynamic taint
analysis designs and methods for building and verifying precise taint propagation rules and
taint analysis platforms.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Background information on malware
analysis, virtualization, and taint analysis is presented in Chapter 2. V2E and DroidScope
are presented in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The formal model for understanding the

7
relationship between dynamic taint analysis implementations and precision, and its
application towards analyzing the precision of previously published taint analysis
implementations are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 summarizes the results. Future
work is discussed throughout the dissertation.

8

2. BACKGROUND
2.1

Virtualization

Virtualization is a computing concept where a device, component, or system is
simulated for use by another device, component or system. To clarify the concept, Smith
and Nair [21] state that “a discussion of [Virtual Machines] is also a discussion about
computer architecture in the pure sense of the term.” Then “architecture, as applied to
computer systems, refers to a formal specification of an interface in the system” that can
be implemented using multiple abstraction layers, each with its own interface (i.e.,
sub-architecture).

Fig. 2.1.: Computer System Architecture [21]
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Fig. 2.2.: Process VM [21]

For example, a notional computer system architecture is depicted in Figure 2.1 [21].
While the computer system architecture consists of many different interfaces, four are
notable. The Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) divides the hardware and software layers.
It is further separated into the privileged system ISA (3) and unprivileged user ISA (4).
The Application Binary Interface (ABI) is used by user programs to access system
resources directly using the user ISA and indirectly using the system call interface (2).
Finally, the Application Programming Interface (API) (1) abstracts away some details of
the ABI through the use of libraries.
Given the multiple abstraction layers, a virtual machine for a particular abstraction
layer is defined as the simulation of the interface beneath it. This definition is shown in
Figure 2.2 [21] where a process virtual machine uses the “virtualization software” to
simulate the ABI or API layers that the process uses. The figure also shows the
virtualization software separating the host from the guest. More specifically, the
virtualization software runs on top of the host and the guest runs on top of the
virtualization software.
Special consideration is given to system virtual machines (Figure 2.3) that virtualize
the ISA because they have been heavily researched since the 1960’s and are used in this
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Fig. 2.3.: System VM [21]

dissertation. In this case, the virtualization software is known as a the Virtual Machine
Monitor or VMM; it is also known as a hypervisor. There are two research directions,
emulators and virtual machines. Goldberg [22] defined emulators as efficient “simulators
for dissimilar machines” and virtual machines as “efficient simulators for multiple copies of
a machine on itself”. Therefore, what distinguishes an emulator from a virtual machine is
the fact that virtual machines simulate themselves, while emulators simulate other
machines.
This distinction between emulators and virtual machines is important; however, the
definitions have not been universally applied. For example, the Java Virtual Machine [23]
and Dalvik Virtual Machine [24] are emulators according to the definitions, but are known
as virtual machines. Since emulators can be considered as a special type of virtual
machine [25], virtual machine will henceforth be used to describe the generic concept.
Hardware virtualization and hardware virtual machines will be used to describe virtual
machines that simulate themselves. In short, emulators and hardware virtual machines are
two different types of virtual machines.
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2.1.1

Hardware Virtualization

There are three properties of hardware virtualization: efficiency, resource control and
equivalence [26]. Efficiency requires the guest-issued instructions in the user ISA (interface
(4) in Figure 2.1) to be executed directly on hardware and resource control dictates that
the guest-issued instructions in the system ISA (3) must be mediated by the VMM.
Equivalence requires that any program should have the same execution behavior in the
virtual machine as it would on real hardware1 ; this is also known as transparency.
Machines with these properties have been developed in the past [22], but it was only until
recently that hardware virtualization for the x86 and ARM architectures became available.
The x86 architecture uses a ring-based access control model to separate the user ISA
from the system ISA. Since the system ISA is associated with the most privileged ring
(Ring 0), the resource control property requires the VMM to either run at Ring 0 while the
guest executes at a lower protection level or the VMM to reside in a more privileged
ring [27]. The first solution is not ideal since privileged guest instructions must be trapped
and emulated [28], which reduces performance. The second solution is realized by
introducing a new guest execution mode (non-root mode in Intel platforms [29] and guest
mode in AMD platforms [30]) with its own distinct set of protection rings and CPU
states [27]. A similar technology has been introduced for the ARM architecture [31]. Intel
nomenclature will be used in the rest of this dissertation for consistency; however, the
concepts apply to AMD and ARM as well.
1

Timing and resource availability problems are assumed not to exist
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The relationship between root mdoe and non-root mode is similar to the one between
the Operating System (OS) and a process. In order to execute a guest, the VMM
(executing in root mode) first instantiates a Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS)
(one per guest) that is used to maintain the state of the guest CPU (i.e., the non-root
mode state) as well as control guest access to resources. Once instantiated and loaded, the
VMM can use the vmlaunch instruction to enter non-root mode for the first time.
The guest continues to execute in non-root mode until an access violation (as
configured in the VMCS) occurs which leads to a VMExit. As part of the VMExit event,
the non-root mode CPU state and exit reason(s) are saved into the VMCS and the CPU is
transitioned back into root mode. The VMM can then read the exit reason using the new
vmread instruction, address the violation, update the guest CPU state (in the VMCS)
using the new vmwrite instruction as necessary and continue executing the guest using the
vmresume instruction. vmresume will load the guest CPU state from the VMCS and
transition back into non-root mode. More detailed information can be found in Intel’s
Software Developer’s Manual, Volume 3C [32].

Two-Dimensional Paging Virtual memory is a virtualization technique that exposes a
consistent representation of memory to processes [21] and even to guests in virtual
machines [25]. Paging and segmentation are two virtual memory implementations that are
supported by the x86 architecture in a hardware Memory Management Unit (MMU).
Segmentation is controlled through special registers, which have been virtualized as part of
the Intel VT [27, 29] and AMDV [30] hardware virtualization extensions.
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Paging is implemented using memory-resident page tables that map virtual addresses to
physical addresses. Since physical memory is shared between the guest and the host, access
to the page tables by the guest must be mediated by the VMM (the resource control
property), which can degrade performance. The concept of Two-Dimensional Paging
(TDP) was introduced to reduce the number of transitions from non-root mode to root
mode due to guest page faults [33].
Two page tables are used in TDP, one for the host and one for the guest. A first level
page table is used by the guest to maintain mappings between its virtual addresses (guest
virtual addresses or GVA) to its physical addresses (guest physical addresses or GPA). The
guest has full control over this page table and handles the corresponding page faults. A
second level page table is used to translate the guest physical addresses to host physical
addresses (HPA). Page faults at this level (TDP faults) are handled by the VMM in root
mode. In a way, the guest physical addresses are host virtual addresses (HVA).
During execution in non-root mode, a GVA will first be translated into a GPA using
the first level page table. If a page fault occurs, then the guest OS’s page fault handler will
be invoked to handle the fault. If the translation is successful, then the GPA will be
translated into a HPA using the second level page table. If a TDP fault occurs, then the
CPU will automatically transition from non-root mode into root mode where the VMM
can handle the fault. Once handled, the VMM will transition the CPU back into non-root
mode to continue executing the guest.
TDP has been implemented as Extended Page Tables in Intel [29], Nested Page Tables
in AMD [34] and System MMU in ARM v7-A architectures [31].
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2.1.2

The QEMU Emulator

QEMU [7, 8] is a whole-system emulator that includes a number of subsystems: CPU
emulator, emulated devices, generic devices, machine descriptions, debugger and user
interface. Its many subsystems have been used as the basis for a number of commercial
virtualization software products including KVM, Xen [35, 36], VirtualBox [37], and the
Android emulator [38]. Hence, QEMU is considered to be mature; emulation bugs are rare.
The full documentation can be found on the project’s webpage at http://www.qemu.org.
Further discussions on QEMU will be focused on the CPU emulator subsystem. For
brevity, QEMU will refer to the CPU emulator unless otherwise noted.
QEMU uses Dynamic Binary Translation (DBT) to emulate different instruction set
architectures (e.g., x86, ARM and PowerPC). In brief, software emulation based on DBT
works as follows. When the emulator is about to execute a block of guest code for the first
time, it translates that code block into a piece of translated code in the host’s ISA. The
translated block is also stored into a code cache to improve performance. When the same
code block needs to be emulated in the future, the emulator skips the translation
procedure, directly fetches the translated code from the code cache and executes it. Older
versions of QEMU (version 0.9.1 and older) used a target-specific translator called
DynGen [7] that directly translates guest instructions into host instructions. Newer
versions use TCG (Tiny Code Generator), which first translates guest instructions into an
intermediate representation (TCG-IR), then compiles the TCG-IR blocks into host
instructions for execution.

15
In either case, special care is needed to emulate memory accesses. The softmmu is a
software implementation of the Memory Management Unit, which uses the guest’s page
tables to translate guest virtual addresses to guest physical addresses. To speed up the
address translation, the software Translation Look-aside Buffer (TLB) is implemented as a
cache for the address translation results. Since QEMU is a user-space program, the guest’s
physical memory is mapped into the QEMU process’ virtual memory space. Thus, as an
optimization, QEMU’s software TLB caches GVA to HVA (in the QEMU process’ context)
translations instead of GVA to GPA translations.
QEMU is designed to be fast. Consequently it deviates from a real CPU in at least the
following ways. First, a block-by-block translation procedure is introduced; this is in
contrast to the instruction-by-instruction procedure used in real hardware. This translation
procedure is normally invisible to the emulated execution, except when the block being
translated crosses the page boundary and the following page is not present in the page
table. This naturally leads to a page fault; however, there is a timing difference. The page
fault occurs at the first instruction of the block in QEMU instead of at the instruction that
crosses the page boundary - the expected behavior - in real hardware.
Second, for efficiency, QEMU performs a lazy calculation of flags: a flag is calculated
only when it is needed. Take the following x86 instructions for example: “cmpl $1, %eax;
jz 0x401020;”. On real hardware, the zero flag will be set or cleared after the cmpl
instruction is executed. That is, if the eax register is 1 then the ZF bit in the EFLAGS
register will be set. If eax is not 1 then ZF will be cleared. In QEMU, EFLAGS is not
calculated when the first instruction executes. Additionally, on the second instruction, only
ZF is calculated to determine which branch to take, the other flags are not calculated until
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they are needed or at the end of a block. This lazy approach is good for efficiency but can
be exploited to detect emulation.
Third, again for efficiency, interrupts are checked and served only at the block boundary.
In contrast, on real hardware, interrupts may happen at any time. As a result, timing
differences due to interrupt handling can be observed using a sequence like “rdtsc; mov
%eax, %ebx; rdtsc;.” Since the rdtsc instruction stores the current time stamp counter
(a count of the number of clock cycles since the CPU has been reset) into the eax register,
the sequence effectively stores the before and after counts into the ebx and eax registers
respectively. By looping the sequence until the number of CPU cycles is greater than a
relatively large threshold (e.g., the number of cycles to execute an interrupt handler), the
presence of an interrupt in between the instructions can be detected. An emulator that
only issues interrupts at the block boundary will remain in the loop endlessly, whereas a
real CPU will eventually exit when an interrupt occurs within the sequence.
In addition to the above discrepancies that are unique to dynamic binary translation,
several more are common due to emulation difficulties. First of all, some special-purpose
instructions (e.g., System Management Mode and Trusted Execution Technology
instructions) are hard to emulate and thus have not been implemented in software. As an
example, QEMU 0.9.1 did not simulate the privileged “Resume from System Management
Mode” instruction rsm. As a result, a malware sample that execute an rsm instruction will
receive an illegal instruction exception, which is incorrect.
Accurate CPU timestamp emulation is difficult as well. For simplicity, QEMU fetches
the timestamps from the host. On the one hand it will address the interrupt detection
example discussed above, but on the other hand it introduces a different detection
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technique. Since guest instructions are translated into one or more host instructions,
emulation consumes more CPU cycles than real hardware. The slowdown can also be used
for emulation detection.
Finally, the logic of checking for and raising exceptions in the hardware is fairly
complex and thus the software emulation of this logic is often error-prone [9].

2.1.3

The Kernel Based Virtual Machine (KVM)

KVM is a virtual machine monitor that has been integrated into the Linux Kernel since
version 2.6.20 and supports a number of hardware virtualized architectures including Intel
VT, AMDV and ARM virtualization. Unlike other VMMs (such as VirtualBox and Xen),
KVM is more of an accelerator than a full fledge virtualization solution. It abstracts away
the details of the different virtualization extensions and exports a uniform interface
through the “/dev/kvm” device. It is up to a user-space application to manage the guest
resources. In this way, user-space virtualization solutions such as QEMU can use KVM to
attain efficiency, resource control and equivalence. The notional architecture is depicted in
Figure 2.4.

Fig. 2.4.: System Virtual Machine using KVM and QEMU
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Fig. 2.5.: Memory translation in QEMU without KVM (a) and with KVM and TDP (b)

When KVM is paired with QEMU (the system emulator), the CPU emulator, software
MMU and soft TLB are effectively disabled. The CPU emulator is no longer needed
because guest instructions execute natively on real hardware in non-root mode and the
software MMU and TLB are replaced with TDP. Using TDP with QEMU introduces a
complication though.
Since the guest’s physical memory space is mapped into the QEMU process’ virtual
memory space (i.e., GPA to HVA), it is incompatible with the EPT tables that translates
GPA to HPA. The multi-stage process depicted in Figure 2.5 is used to address this issue.
First, the QEMU process reports the mappings (the table with solid lines) between GPAs
and HVAs to KVM (the table with dotted lines). Then, when a TDP fault occurs, KVM
takes the TDP faulting address (a GPA) and translates it into the corresponding HVA (2).
The HVA is subsequently translated into a HPA using the QEMU process’ page table and
the new GPA to HPA entry is added to the EPT table (3).
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MMU-Notifiers Since QEMU runs as a user level process, its memory can be remapped
and swapped to disk by the kernel. Consequently, this leads to inconsistencies in the EPT
tables since they continue to the old physical page frame until updated. KVM uses
MMU-Notifiers to prevent these kinds of problems. MMU-notifiers are callback functions
that kernel modules (such as KVM) can register with the Linux MMU subsystem. In this
way, the registered modules are notified of any changes to the page tables before the
changes are committed. In the case of KVM, the MMU-notifier callback functions ensure
that the EPT tables are consistent with QEMU’s page tables.

2.2

Dynamic Malware Analysis

Malware analysis is an important step towards defending against malware. Given a
piece of unknown malware, the objective of malware analysis is to reverse engineer it and
quickly reveal its inner workings so that countermeasures can be implemented. Malware
analysis techniques can be separated into two categories depending on whether the sample
is executed during analysis. It is not executed in static analysis and is executed in dynamic
analysis. Egele et al. [6] outlined the differences between static and dynamic analysis and
provided motivations for the latter.
In general, static analysis has the advantage of code coverage, but obfuscation
techniques can be used to hide the code and thus make static analysis less productive. On
the other hand, dynamic analysis has the advantage of being unaffected by obfuscation
since the code must be de-obfuscated during execution. However, it has the disadvantage
of only being able to analyze the execution path taken - that is, it lacks code coverage.
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Researchers have presented techniques for exploring multiple execution paths at runtime,
but they are not perfect solutions [39–41]. In the end, static and dynamic analysis are
complementary techniques that are used together. This dissertation focuses on dynamic
analysis.
There are three different implementation strategies, User/Kernel Space, Emulator and
Hardware Virtualization2 , each with their advantages and disadvantages [6].
DynamoRIO [42], Pin [43, 44], Valgrind [45] and SR-Dyninst [46] are powerful dynamic
instrumentation tools for analyzing user-level programs. They cannot be used to analyze
kernel malware. Cobra [47] is a malware analysis platform implemented in a Windows
kernel module. It uses a technique called localized execution to instrument and inspect
malware behavior. The localized execution technique is, in spirit, similar to dynamic
binary translation.
The advantage of virtualization based analysis over User/Kernel Space implementations
is isolation. Since the analysis tools are implemented at the VMM and the samples execute
in the less privileged guest, virtualization isolates the tools from the samples. This allows
the tools to analyze privileged malware (ones that execute in the guest kernel) while at the
same time making it difficult for the malware to disrupt analysis [6].
The main disadvantage is the loss of semantic contextual information since the analysis
component is moved out of the box. Virtual Machine Introspection [17–19] has been used
to bridge the semantic gap. Many virtualization based analysis platforms have been
implemented using emulation [41, 48–59] and hardware virtualization [60, 61]. These
platforms provide the basic functionality to introspect (i.e., read and interpret the guest
2

“Virtual Machine” is replaced with “Hardware Virtualization” as discussed in Section 2.1
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state) and instrument (i.e., intercept and write the guest state) the malware samples
executing within the virtual machine. Analysis plugins that implement different dynamic
analysis techniques (e.g., Function Call Monitoring, Function Parameter Analysis,
Information Flow Tracking, Instruction Trace and Autostart Extensibility Points) are
loaded onto the platforms to perform the desired analysis function.
Between the two virtualization based implementation strategies, emulation has the
additional benefits of flexibility for analysis plugin development and efficiency for
fine-grained analysis. In hardware virtualization, the VMM is required to be a privileged
program so it can manage privileged system resources such as the TDP page table.
Emulators such as QEMU can be implemented in user-space. Thus, the analysis plugins
built on top of emulators can benefit from user-space libraries making them more flexible.
As an example, the Linux kernel does not have an interface to read and write files from
kernel [62, 63]. In V2E, the log is written to disk by a user-space program through the use
of a shared memory buffer between the VMM’s (kernel’s) memory space and the program’s
memory space.
Emulators are also more efficient for fine-grained analysis such as instruction tracing [6].
Tracing an instruction using hardware virtualization requires a transition from non-root
mode to root mode and then back for every single instruction - a technique known as single
stepping - which can degrade performance. A test of single stepping in KVM showed an
approximately 3000 times slowdown in performance.
There is a major disadvantage of emulation though. Emulators lack transparency.

22
2.2.1

Transparency

Since it is extremely difficult (if not completely infeasible) to emulate every aspect of
real hardware, malware can take advantage of these discrepancies to detect the emulated
environment and stay dormant to avoid analysis. Some of the problems were raised in the
QEMU section, but the general problem of emulation detection and mitigation techniques
has been investigated extensively [9–12].
EmuFuzzer [10] and PokeEmu [9] are two noteworthy projects that sought to discover
emulation bugs. EmuFuzzer discovered bugs in a randomized fashion using fuzz testing and
PokeEmu is a follow-on work that discovers them systematically. PokeEmu uses symbolic
execution [64] to explore all instruction emulation paths in two different emulators and
generate a set of input-output behaviors that covers 95% of x86 instructions emulated. The
set was then used to automatically generate a collection of programs that, given the same
input, produces different output when executed on different emulators and real hardware.
Over sixty thousand such programs were generated to identify differences between QEMU
and real hardware. The differences were found in registers, memory, floating point registers
and exception behavior; however, it is unknown whether all of the differences can be
corrected in QEMU. It follows that the transparency problem remains unless all of these
differences can be patched.
To tackle the problem of transparency from a different perspective, Dinaburg et al. [60]
formally defined transparency/equivalence, proved that, except for timing differences,
hardware virtualization achieves perfect transparency and implemented a new analysis
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platform called Ether. However, Ether, being a hardware virtualization based
implementation, is not as flexible or efficient as emulation based implementations.
In order to successfully emulate anti-emulation malware, Balzarotti et al. [65] used an
automatic method to detect the anti-emulation behavior by comparing how a piece of
malware behaves on real hardware and how it behaves in an emulated environment.
Similarly, Kang et al. [66] used a differential analysis method that compares two execution
traces, one from Ether and the other one from QEMU. By performing trace alignment, this
technique is able to automatically detect the root cause for the divergence and generate a
patch (e.g., disable the emulation-detection code) for the malware. The iterative nature of
this approach limits its scalability though. New traces and patches must be generated for
each and every anti-emulation check.

2.3

Android

Android is a popular mobile system that is installed in millions of devices and
accounted for more than 50% of all smart phone sales in the third quarter of 2011 [67]. It
has been the target of most mobile malware [3] and recent research has shown that
malicious applications exist in both the official and unofficial marketplaces with a rate of
0.02% and 0.2% respectively [68].
Figure 2.6 illustrates the architecture of the Android system from the perspective of a
system programmer. At the lowest level, the Android system uses a customized Linux
kernel to manage various system resources and hardware devices. System services, native
applications and Apps (short for applications) run as Linux processes. In particular,
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Fig. 2.6.: Overview of Android System

“Zygote” is the parent process for all Android Apps. Each App is assigned its own unique
user ID (uid) at installation time and group IDs (gids) corresponding to requested
permissions. These uids and gids are used to control access to system resources (e.g.,
network and file system) like on a normal Linux system.
All Apps can contain both Java and native components. Native components are simply
shared libraries that are dynamically loaded at runtime. The Dalvik virtual machine
(DVM), part of a shared library named libdvm.so, is then used to provide a Java-level
abstraction for the App’s Java components. At the same time, the Java Native Interface
(JNI) is used to facilitate communications between the native and Java sides. As an aside,
multiple layers of abstraction for Apps is not limited to Android. Windows Store
applications have a similar structure. Those applications can be implemented in C++, C#
or other languages in the .NET Framework [69]. C++ programs are compiled into native
code while C# programs are interpretted using the Common Language Runtime (a virtual
machine similar to JVM [70, 71]).
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To create a Java component, an App developer first implements it in Java, compiles it
into Java bytecode, and then converts it into Dalvik bytecode. The result is a Dalvik
executable called a dex file. The developer can also compile native code into shared
libraries (.so files) with JNI support. The dex file, the shared libraries and any other
resources, including the AndroidManifest.xml file that describes the App and its requested
permissions, are packaged together into an apk file for distribution.
For instance, DroidKungFu is a malicious puzzle game found in alternative
marketplaces that has both native and Java components [72]. Its Java component
exfiltrates sensitive information and awaits commands from the bot master. Its native
component is used as a shell to execute those commands and it also includes three resource
files that are encrypted exploits targeting known vulnerabilities - adb setuid exhaustion and
udev [73] - in certain versions of Android.

Android Software Development Kit (SDK) Like Linux, there are Android ports for
both the ARM and x86 ISAs. Android Apps that only have Java components do not have
to worry about the underlying architecture since all Java code is interpreted using the
Dalvik Virtual Machine. Native components must be compiled for use on the target ISA
though.
The entire process of developing, targeting and testing Android applications is
supported by the Android Software Development Kit or SDK [74]. Noteworthy components
of the SDK are the Android emulator and prebuilt virtual Android devices. Cross compilers
for compiling the native components into their respective target ISAs are included as well.
The Android emulator is based on newer versions of QEMU that use the TCG. A virtual
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Android device is a virtual machine configured with virtual sensor devices (e.g., GPS) and
a build of the Android software platform. The prebuilt virtual devices represent generic
phone configurations based on the ARM and x86 ISAs. A software developer can always
create virtual Android devices with different profiles such as one for an ARM based tablet.
Nonetheless, the Android emulator is used to emulate different virtual Android devices to
facilitate application testing and debugging. In short, emulation based Android analysis is
already provided as part of the SDK. What is missing is the ability to analyze malware.

2.3.1

Android Malware Analysis

Like malware analysis on the desktop environment, Android malware analysis
techniques can fall into two categories: static and dynamic. For static analysis, the
sample’s dex file can be analyzed by itself or it can be disassembled and further decompiled
into Java using tools like dex2jar and ded [75]. Standard static program analysis techniques
(such as control and data flow analysis) can then be performed. As static analysis can give
a complete picture, researchers have demonstrated this approach to be effective for many
malware samples [68, 76].
However, static analysis is known to be vulnerable to code obfuscation techniques. In
fact, the Android SDK includes a tool named Proguard [77] for obfuscating Apps and so
obfuscated Apps should be common. Android malware may also generate or decrypt native
components or Dalvik bytecode at runtime making static analysis of these dynamic
components difficult. Indeed, DroidKungFu dynamically decrypts the exploit payloads and
executes them to root the device. Moreover, researchers have demonstrated that bytecode
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randomization techniques can be used to completely hide the internal logic of a Dalvik
bytecode program [78]. Static analysis also falls short for exploit diagnosis, because a
vulnerable runtime execution environment is needed to observe and analyze an exploit
attack, and pinpoint the vulnerability. All in all, like for analyzing desktop malware, static
analysis is insufficient by itself.
The Android SDK includes a set of tools, such as adb and logcat, to help developers
debug their Apps. With JDWP (Java Debug Wire Protocol) support, the debugger can
even exist outside of the device. However, just like how desktop malware detects and
disables debuggers, malicious Android Apps can also detect the presence of these tools, and
then either evade or disable the analysis. The fundamental reason is that the debugging
components and malware reside in the same execution environment with the same
privileges. Once again, virtualization based malware analysis has the advantage of isolation.
Despite the fact that Android is based on Linux, it is not straightforward to take the
same desktop analysis approach used for Linux and apply it to Android malware due to the
semantic gap problem. In Android, there are two levels of semantic information that must
be rebuilt. In the lower level, Android is a Linux operating system where each App is
encapsulated into a process. These processes can execute native code and this level is
called the native level. Within each App process, a virtual machine (known as the Dalvik
Virtual Machine) provides a runtime environment for the App’s Java components. This
second level is called the Java level.
Previous Virtual Machine Introspection research [17–19] only supports introspecting the
native level but not the Java level components. Therefore, an emulation based dynamic
analysis platform for Android malware must reconstruct semantic knowledge at two levels:
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1) native level semantics that understand the activities of the malware process and its
native components; and 2) Java level semantics that comprehend the behaviors in the Java
components.
TaintDroid [79] and DroidBox [80] (based on TaintDroid) are examples of dynamic
analysis tools for analyzing the Java components of Android Apps. TaintDroid is
implemented as a modified Dalvik Virtual Machine. When installed onto a virtual Android
device, it can be used to complement currently available emulation based analysis
platforms for desktop malware. In this way, both the Java and native executions can be
analyzed. The limitation is that they must be analyzed separately. Neither tool has
information about the other and thus cannot collaborate. There are two approaches to
surmount this limitation. Either a new messaging infrastructure is created between
TaintDroid and the emulator or a single platform is introduced to not only bridge the two
semantic gaps but also seamlessly bind the two views with the execution context so that
malware with cooperating native and Java components can be analyzed at once.
Bouncer [81] is a recently announced dynamic analysis tool used by Google to test
Android Apps prior to accepting them into the official Android Market. Oberheide et
al. [82] determined that Bouncer is based on the Android emulator, but the details on what
it is capable of (e.g., whether it seamlessly binds the Java and native contexts together for
analysis) remains unknown. Bouncer is proprietary.
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2.4

Taint Analysis

Taint analysis is one of the fundamental dynamic analysis techniques [6] and has been
demonstrated to be crucial in many malware analysis projects [49, 51, 66, 83]. It is also
known as dynamic information flow tracking, taint tracking, definedness tracking, and data
flow and control flow tracking. The technique is based on noninterference [20] and has been
used in many different research areas such as policy enforcement, exploit diagnosis,
malware analysis, vulnerability analysis, test case generation [64], memory analysis [84, 85]
and information flow quantification [86].
In taint analysis, data is labeled as either tainted or untainted and taint propagates
from one data item to the next if information flows from a tainted source to the destination
data item. Taint analysis has been implemented as a source translator [87–90] (e.g.,
compiler), a library [91–93] (e.g., Java String), in an instrumentation library [84, 94–97]
(e.g., PIN), in a virtual machine or interpreter [79, 98–101] (e.g., Dalvik VM), in processor
emulators [16, 56, 59, 102–104] (e.g., QEMU), and even in hardware [105–111]. Common to
all of these taint propagation tools is the use of a taint propagation policy that governs
what data is tainted, how the labels are represented and when data should be tainted. In
other words, a taint propagation policy is a set of rules that define when and how taint
should be propagated.
Taint propagation policies have been heavily researched. There are three common
design considerations: analysis-granularity, taint-granularity and special case support.
Analysis-granularity determines which type of operations propagates taint. One taint
analysis implementation might propagate taint at the C statement level while another
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propagates taint at the x86 instruction level. The advantage of the x86 instruction level
implementation is it can track taint through all x86 programs (including those compiled
from C programs); however, the disadvantage is the loss of high level semantic information
(i.e., the semantic gap problem).
The range of analysis-granularity designs in the literature matches well with the
different levels of programming languages. Researchers have defined propagation policies
for high-level languages such as C [87] and Java [91–93, 99], scripting languages such as
PHP [89], PERL [101] and JavaScript [90, 100], low level languages such as x86
assembly [56, 84, 94, 103, 104] and even at the gate level [108].
It is also common practice to implement taint propagation through an intermediate
language [56, 59, 84, 94, 104] with simpler semantics and a reduced instruction set than
through the language or instruction set (e.g., x86 and ARM) the IR emulates. The
emulation code can range from a single instruction, to a basic block of instructions, to
functions and beyond.
Taint-granularity determines the kind of data that is labeled. For example, in x86
tainting, data can be labeled at the 32-bit word-level, the byte-level or bit-level among
others. While labeling taint at the 32-bit word-level will decrease label storage
requirements, it is insufficient for distinguishing taints between the 32-bit eax register and
the two 16-bit sub-registers ah and al that compose eax. In the literature, policies have
been defined at the operand level [87, 105], 32-bit word-level [59, 111],
byte-level [56, 59, 88, 95–97, 106, 107, 109, 110], and bit-level [84, 108].
Other taint analysis applications, such as the ones on Java String objects, apply
different taint-granularities as well. Like how the eax register consists of the ah and al
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sub-registers, Java Strings consist of UTF-16 characters. Consequently, Java String
propagation policies have been defined at the character level [91, 92] and at the object
level [93, 99], similar to the 16-bit versus 32-bit levels mentioned above.
Not all implemenations are equal. Some implemenations might have support for
floating point operations while others do not or some might have special rules for
propagating taint through the bit shift operations while otheres do not. These special
considerations are instances of the special case support design parameter. Of particular
interest is whether the taint propagation rules are state aware. State awareness is a
measure of how much state information is used to determine the taint propagation rules.
For example, the rules in a state agnostic taint tracker are functions of the operations - as
defined by the analysis-granularity - only and not the operand values. The benefit of state
agnostic policies is the rules can be defined off-line which in turn reduces the need to
calculate taint at runtime, improving performance. However, the drawback is it can lead to
false-positives. While dynamic taint analysis implementations are rarely state aware, many
previously published trackers do implement special rules for handling special cases to
reduce false-positives (see Section 5.5.2).
False-positives, false-negatives, over-tainting, under-tainting, accuracy and precision are
different metrics that have been used to analyze and compare the effectiveness of different
taint analysis platforms. These terms are informally defined below. It should be clear from
the definitions that controlling false-positives and false-negatives is a goal of taint analysis.
In this regard, previous research have only focused on reducing these metrics on a
case-by-case basis using empirical studies. Therefore, a challenge of taint analysis is how to
systematically control false-positives and false-negatives.
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Over-tainting Given two taint propagation policies TA and TB , TA over-taints TB if there
is a rule that propagates taint in TA but not in TB .
Under-tainting Given two taint propagation policies TA and TB , TA under-taints TB if
there is a rule that propagates taint in TB but not in TA .
False-positive A rule is a false-positive if it propagates taint when taint should not be
propagated.
False-negative A rule is a false-negative if it does not propagate taint when taint should
be propagated.
Accurate A taint propagation policy is accurate if it does not contain any false-negatives.
Precise A taint propagation policy is precise if it is accurate and does not contain any
false-positives (i.e., it does not contain false-positives or false-negatives).

2.4.1

Challenges

In addition to false-positives and false-negatives, two other major challenges of taint
analysis are sanitization and control-flow tainting [64]. Sanitization uses specially defined
rules to remove taint labels (i.e., label them as untainted) in certain special cases and is
necessary to reduce over-tainting due to false-positives. These rules are either introduced
for practicality (i.e., the analyst decides to ignore certain tainted data) or as means to
reduce false-positives due to imprecise policies. Schwartz et al. [64] used the b = a ⊕ a
statement that exclusive-ors a with itself and stores the result into b as a common example
of sanitization for reducing false-positives. In the example, b should be sanitized even if a
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1.
2.
3.
4.

if (x == 0)
y = 0;
else
y = 1;

//
//
//
//

1a. if (x == 0)
2a.
y = 0;
3a. else
4a.
y = 0;

Fig. 2.7.: Control-flow tainting example.

was labeled as tainted, because no matter what the value of a is, b will always be 0. Thus a
policy that propagated taint from a to b will require an additional sanitization step to
handle this special case. A state agnostic policy with a simple propagation rule that states
“the output operand of ⊕ is tainted if either of the input operands are tainted” is an
example of such a policy.

Control-flow tainting Information flows can be separated into explicit flows that result
from data dependencies and implicit flows that result from control dependencies. Take the
C source code in Figure 2.7 as an example. It is clear that the final value of y depends on
the value of x, meaning there is information flow from x to y. Furthermore, the flow is
implicit since there are no direct data dependencies between x and y. It is also clear that
there is no information flow from x to y (not even implicit flow) in the commented source
code since y always equals to 0, irrespective of the value of x. While the difference in
information flow behavior between the un-commented and commented code are clear using
static analysis, it is not clear during dynamic analysis.
Dynamic analysis is limited to the single path that is executed; there is incomplete
information about the program. Hence, either statements 1 and 2 are executed or
statements 1 and 4 are executed. If the “if” path (statements 1 and 2) was taken, then it
remains unknown whether the “else” path contains statement 4 or 4a. Similarly, if the
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“else” path was taken, then it remains unknown whether the “if” path contains statement
2, 2a or even 2b: y = 1;. All in all, control flow tainting is a fundamental limitation of
dynamic taint analysis and has been proven. Volpano [112] proved that “there is no
monitor-enforced policy that is sound and complete for secrecy.” Soundness and
completeness are measures of false-negatives and false-positives respectively, and dynamic
taint analysis platforms are monitors that enforce the noninterference policy. Therefore,
dynamic taint analysis will either have false-positives or have false-negatives.
Given this result, a number of taint analysis platforms that support control flow
tainting relies on static analysis to reduce false-positives. Bao et al. [113] used static
analysis to first identify “strict control dependence” relationships , and then used them to
reduce false-positives due to control flow tainting. A method to approximate strict control
dependence using dynamic instrumentation was also presented. Chang et al. [88] first
conducted general data flow analysis on a program statically and used the results to direct
information flow tracking at runtime. In DTA++, Kang et al. [104] used off-line analysis to
identify “culprit” branches and limit control flow propagation to those branches. This
increased the precision of implicit flow tracking as compared to Dytan [94] which used a
purely dynamic approach.
This dissertation studies purely dynamic taint analysis, but it does not imply that
control flow tainting is no longer a challenge. Control flow issues can still arise depending
on the analysis-granularity. Take x86 level taint analysis for example. The bsf
(Bit-Scan-Forward) x86 instruction is a simple ALU (Arithmetic Logic Unit) instruction
that uses a while loop to iterate through the bit positions (0 to 31) of a 32-bit register to
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find the position of the first ‘1’ bit. This results in potential implicit flows that must be
identified when defining the propagation rule for bsf.

Tainting and Noninterference While this dissertation focuses on monitors that
enforce the noninterference policy (i.e., information flow), not all taint analysis platforms
strictly adhere to this policy. Of the taint trackers surveyed in Chapter 5, nineteen enforce
noninterference and only a handful use specially designed policies that do not. In
Leakpoint, Clause et al. [85] defined a taint propagation policy for pointer arithmetic that
is only loosely based on information flow. In empirical testing, Leakpoint was shown to be
just as effective in identifying memory errors as Memcheck [84] which is based on
information flow. Furthermore, researchers have used mixed taint- and
analysis-granularities in a single implementation in an attempt to address over-tainting as
a result of imprecise taint propagation rules. For example, Zhu et al. used a byte-level
taint granularity for data in user-space and an object-level granularity for the same data in
the kernel [96]. Chin and Wagner defined special propagation rules when dealing with Java
String specific issues such as encoding and locales [92] and function summaries are widely
used to summarize the taint propagation behavior within commonly used functions (e.g.
libraries [56, 96]) and effectively sanitize taints. Slowinska and Bos discussed the sources of
false-positives and false-negatives in pointer tainting [114].

2.4.2

Noninterference

The noninterference property was first described by Goguen and Meseguer [20] to
analyze the information flows between users in a multi-user system. In the simple form of
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noninterference used in this dissertation, there are two users in a shared system, sender and
receiver that can issue commands. Since the system is shared, both the sender’s commands
and the receiver’s commands can alter the system state. Thus, there is an opportunity for
the sender to send information to the receiver through the shared system state. The
noninterference property states that given an initial state and a sequence of commands
that is an interleaving of the sender’s and receiver’s commands, sender is noninterfering
with receiver if and only if the output seen by the receiver at the end of executing the
sequence is the same if an alternate sequence that only contains the receivers commands
was executed instead. In other words, the commands issued by the sender do not affect the
output seen by the receiver. There is information flow from the sender to the receiver if
and only if the sender interferes with the receiver.
Since taint tracking is designed to analyze the information flow between two data items
and not users in a multi-user system, the noninterfering data problem can be mapped into
a noninterfering users problem by coupling data-items to users. Analogously, given an
initial state and a sequence of commands, there is information flow from the sending data
item in the system state to the receiving data item in the system state if and only if
changing the value of the sending data item results in a change in the value of the receiving
data item after the sequence of commands are executed. It is the value of the data item
that changed, not teh commands.

Design Considerations and Information Flow Analysis-granularity, taint-granularity
and state awareness are the three common design considerations discussed in the previous
section. The same parameters can be linked to the noninterference model above. A taint
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propagation policy consists of a set of rules that enforce the noninterference property.
Then, given a chosen analysis-granularity, the rules correspond to the different operations.
Using the x86 instruction granularity as an example, each x86 instruction will have a
corresponding rule in the policy. Then, since the instructions are independent from each
other, each rule will enforce the noninterference property. In other words the rules are in
the form of “the output operand(s) is tainted if and only if there is information flow from a
tainted input to the output operand(s).” This in turn means that sequence of commands
consists of only the instruction itself. In the case of the b = a ⊕ a example above, the
corresponding 32-bit x86 instruction is xor dst,src. There will be a rule that states “dst
is tainted if and only if there is information flow from src to dst and src is tainted or
from dst to dst and dst was tainted.”
This rule assumes that the taint-granularity has been set at the 32-bit word-level which
is not necessarily the case. If taint was labeled per byte, then there might be four rules of
the form “the lowest byte of dst is tainted if an only if there is information flow from any
tainted bytes of src to the lowest byte of dst or from any tainted bytes of dst to the
lowest byte of dst.” Similarly, none of these rules were functions of the initial state and are
thus state agnostic rules. A state aware rule might state “if src and dst refer to the same
data item then dst should be untainted, else follow the normal rules.”

2.5

Summary

In summary, virtualization can be separated into emulation and hardware
virtualization, where the latter has three distinct properties, efficiency, resource control and
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equivalence. Implementing a dynamic malware analysis platform using virtualization
benefits from the isolation property where it is difficult for the malware sample to disrupt
analysis, even privileged kernel malware. The main disadvantage is the semantic gap
problem where higher level abstractions, such as processes and threads, are lost. The
semantic gaps can be bridged using virtual machine introspection techniques; however, the
Android platform contains two levels of semantic information, native and Java, that must
be rebuilt prior to analyzing Android malware.
Between emulation and hardware virtualization, the main advantages of emulation are
flexibility and efficiency. As a result it is simple to implement an instruction tracer using
emulation whereas it is more difficult using hardware virtualization. The main
disadvantage is the lack of transparency.
Taint analysis is a fundamental dynamic analysis technique with three main challenges,
false-positives and negatives, sanitization and tracking implicit flows. There are three
common design parameters, taint-granularity, analysis-granularity and special case support
that contribute to the problems.
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3. MAKING EMULATORS TRANSPARENT
3.1

Introduction

The main advantages of emulation based dynamic binary analysis are flexibility and
efficiency for code instrumentation, but the main disadvantage is the lack of transparency.
It is extremely difficult (if not completely infeasible) to emulate every aspect of real
hardware and thus malware can take advantage of these discrepancies to detect the
emulated environment and stay dormant to avoid analysis. Researchers have investigated
this problem extensively and identified a large number of different detection
methods [10–12]. Furthermore, the measurement study in Section 3.5.2 shows that
anti-emulation malware have become a prevalent threat in the wild.
To address the transparency issue, Dinaburg et al. used hardware virtualization to
develope a system called Ether [60]. Since the malicious code is executed on real hardware,
this approach can achieve ideal transparency. However, Ether is not the ultimate solution.
Being a hardware virtualization based analysis platform, it lacks the benefits of efficiency
and flexibility.
This chapter proposes precise heterogeneous record and replay (PHRR) as an
alternative method for addressing the transparency issue. The method involves recording
malware execution using hardware virtualization and then replaying the executing on an
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emulation based malware analysis platform so as to attain the advantages of flexibility,
efficiency and transparency.
Regular record and replay systems targeted at the execution of a single user-level
process [115–119] and a whole virtual machine [120, 121] can be found in the literature.
However, they cannot be directly used for malware analysis. In most cases, record and
replay take place on the same type of system. In the case of emulator based record and
emulator based replay, transparency is still an issue. Alternatively, if hardware
virtualization is used for both record and replay, then the advantages of emulation based
analysis are lost.
The idea of heterogeneous replay was first proposed and implemented in
Aftersight [122], which records virtual machine execution from VMware and replays it in
QEMU for heavyweight analyses (such as bug detection) on production workloads. In
contrast to Aftersight, the record and replay method presented in this Chapter needs to
work under the malicious context: malware tries to detect every possible heterogeneous
property between the recorder and replayer.
One challenge of precise heterogeneous replay is in striking a balance between the
recorder and the replayer. On one hand, if the recorder does not record enough events and
states, the replayer cannot precisely reconstruct the execution. On the other hand, if the
recorder gathers complete information for every single instruction or event and leave an
easy task to the replayer, the recording performance would degrade. To strike the right
balance, various operations and instructions are classified into different categories according
to the technique used to ensure precise replay without sacrificing too much performance.
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Precise heterogeneous record and replay was implemented in a prototype system called
V2E. The recorder has been implemented in KVM [13], and TEMU (a dynamic binary
analysis platform [15]) has been modified to precisely replay the execution. With minor
changes, the existing analysis plugins (such as taint analysis, unpacker, and tracing) work
as designed, achieving the advantages of transparency and greater analysis efficiency. Since
analysis is separated from execution, the same scheme can be applied to other emulation
based binary analysis platforms as well. Recording is not limited to KVM and replaying is
not limited to TEMU.
To determine the effectiveness of PHRR, V2E was evaluated using both synthetic and
real world anti-emulation malware samples. These same samples were successfully recorded
and replayed on the modified TEMU revealing behavior hidden from the original TEMU
platform.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section lists the design goals
that are essential for in-depth malware analysis and gives an overview of the approach.
Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 describe the design and implementation of the recording
component and replay component respectively. Section 3.5 presents the experimental
results. Section 3.6 discusses the limitations of the current implementation. Finally, some
intermediary conclusions are drawn in Section 3.7.

3.2

Design Goals & Approach

The design goals for in-depth malware analysis and approach to address them are
presented in this section.

42
3.2.1

Design Goals

As discussed previously, the following design goals are essential for in-depth malware
analysis:

• G1: Transparency. The presence of the analysis environment should remain
invisible to malware, voiding its intent to escape investigation. This will be provided
by precise heterogeneous record and replay.
• G2: Flexibility. It should be relatively simple to add custom instrumentation on
malicious code execution. In many cases, this instrumentation can be heavyweight,
such as dynamic taint analysis and instruction-level tracing. This is a characteristic
of emulation based analysis platforms.
• G3: Efficiency. The efficiency for malware analysis is two-fold: 1) it should be
efficient enough to monitor computation intensive and highly interactive malware;
and 2) performance overhead for heavy code instrumentation should be acceptable.
This is another advantage of emulation based analysis.
• G4: Adjustable View. A benefit of record and replay is one can be selective about
what to record and therefore control what is replayed and analyzed. This can
improve performance. Given that malware can present itself in various forms, such as
user process, shared library, dynamically injected code, kernel module, etc., this goal
expresses the desire to be able to adjust the analysis focus to concentrate on
malware’s behavior instead of the execution of the rest of the system.
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3.2.2

Architecture

The overall architecture is depicted in Figure 3.1. The malware sample under
investigation is loaded into and executed in the guest system using hardware virtualization
to achieve transparency (G1). Although hardware virtualization may still be detected
under certain circumstances [11] and a remote time source can be used to measure real
timing differences [123], as hardware virtualization has been widely deployed on production
systems, detecting hardware virtualization environments becomes increasingly irrelevant.
Ether demonstrated that hardware virtualization can achieve transparency in a practical
sense [60].
The guest system is partitioned into two realms or domains. The malware resides in the
recording realm and the rest of the guest system (such as the guest OS and the other
applications) remains in the main realm. Depending on where the malware is present, a
user process, a shared library, a kernel module, or any combination of them can be put into
the recording realm for a closer look at the malware’s behavior. Such a separation fulfills
the adjustable view design goal (G4). It also partially addresses the efficiency issue (G3)
because irrelevant system execution is excluded from the recording realm and consequently
from the log. Some analysis techniques (such as Panorama [56] and HookFinder [54]) do
need to observe the entire system execution. In this case, the recording realm includes the
entire guest system, falling back to whole-system recording. The design is not optimized
for whole-system recording though and this support is left as future work.
The log obtained from the recorder is fed into the replayer. Using dynamic binary
translation, the replayer is able to offer acceptable performance for fine-grained code

44

Guest

Main
Domain

Analysis
Plugin
I

Recording
Domain

HVM Recorder

Record
Log

Transparent Recording

Analysis
Plugin
II

Analysis
Plugin
III

DBT Replayer
Precise Replay

Fig. 3.1.: Architecture Overview

instrumentation and thus achieves analysis efficiency (the second part of G3). The replayer
design facilitates any existing malware analysis platforms that are based on dynamic
binary translation. Therefore, the existing analysis plugins on these analysis platforms can
continue to work with minimum changes. It addresses the instrumentation support goal
(G2).

3.2.3

Precise Heterogeneous Record and Replay

The claim is: malware execution can be recorded in a transparent and efficient manner
using hardware virtualization, and the recorded execution can be precisely replayed using
dynamic binary translation. That is, at every single execution time-step, the program state
in replay is exactly the same as in recording in spite of the fact that the malware execution
is trying to detect various discrepancies between real hardware and the emulated system.

Semi-Formal Definition Let S be the set of all program states (including CPU
registers and memory). Then, at each time t, St represents the state at that time and S0 is

45
the initial state. Let I be the set of all possible inputs and thus It specifies the input at
time t and may be null to indicate no input occurs at that time.
A transition function f : S × I → S is used to characterize the real hardware machine:
St = f (St−1 , It−1 ). Similarly, there is a transition function f 0 for the emulated machine:
St0 = f 0 (St−1 , It−1 ). Suppose that f 0 = f , then given S0 and the inputs I the whole
execution can be replayed precisely as recorded. However, according to automata theory,
determining if f 0 = f is equivalent to the problem of determining whether two Turing
machines are equal, which is known to be undecidable [124]. It then follows that in
practice, they are assumed not to be equal, that is f 0 6= f , because it is nearly impossible
to correctly emulate some aspects of hardware.
Given that the transition functions are different, the states St and St0 are also expected
to be different given the same input and previous state. Therefore, in addition to recording
S0 and inputs I, for any moment in time u where Su 6= Su0 , the state change
∆u = Su − Su−1 is recorded as well. Note that the state change is not defined as
∆u = Su − Su0 because recording and replaying are done separately. This means that it is
not necessarily possible to calculate Su0 while the program’s execution is being recorded.
The new transition function fr0 is defined as:

0
, It−1 , ∆t ) =
St0 = fr0 (St−1




0
 St−1
+ ∆t

if ∆t 6= null



0
 f 0 (St−1
, It−1 )

Otherwise

In other words, during replay, whenever a state change ∆t has been recorded for time i, the
0
state is directly updated such that St0 = St−1
+ ∆t . There is no need to apply the transition
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0
function. It is important to note that the references to St−1
can be replaced by St−1 since

they are equal. The claim is: with (S0 , I, ∆) and fr0 , St0 = St always holds true for all time t
until the program ends. The induction proof is outlined below.
Basis: The base case is clear since S00 = S0 .
Induction: For the induction case, assume that the relationship holds at time t:
0
= St+1 . There are two cases. In the first case
St0 = St . It remains to be shown that St+1
0
0
where ∆t+1 6= null, St+1
= St0 + ∆t+1 , which can be rewritten as St+1
= St0 + St+1 − St .
0
= St+1 . In the second case where ∆t+1 = null, then by definition
Given that St0 = St , St+1
0
of fr0 , St+1
= f 0 (St0 , It ). By designing the recorder such that ∆t+1 = null implies
0
. Details on how this can be achieved are presented next.
f (St , It ) = f 0 (St , Tt ), St+1 = St+1

From Theory to Practice. The previous discussion shows that the key to successful
record and replay is to determine when to use f 0 and when to apply ∆. In other words, if
one is confident that certain instructions and events can be correctly emulated in software,
then simply emulate them. Otherwise, the state changes should be recorded and then
applied during replay.
Fortunately, for general instructions like data transfer (e.g., mov, push, pop), control
transfer (e.g., call, ret, jz, jmp), and integer arithmetic (e.g., add, shl), it is fairly easy
to emulate them correctly in software because their semantics are simple and remain the
same across processor series.1 Moreover, these instructions are the vast majority in
program execution. As a result, the efficiency of both recorder and replayer can be ensured.
1

Note that these common instructions may still cause discrepancies in exceptions, which are handled separately.
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This is a valid assumption for the mature QEMU emulator, because these common
instructions are tested over and over again in many different application contexts.
External interrupts, memory-mapped I/O (MMIO), port I/O, direct memory access
(DMA), and timestamp counter are inputs I to the guest system. Like other deterministic
replay systems [118, 120, 122], these events are recorded if they occur in the recording realm
only.
Software exceptions, model-specific registers, and the cpuid instruction are not
generally treated as inputs in previous replay systems. However, it is extremely difficult to
emulate them correctly. Software exceptions are triggered when certain condition checks
fail in the processor. It is fairly complicated to emulate all these condition checks in the
exact same way as in the real processor, not to mention that a specific processor may have
CPU bugs that raise incorrect exceptions [9, 10]. The behaviors of model-specific registers
and the cpuid instruction are processor specific as well. Overall, it is a daunting task to
correctly emulate all the specifics of just the common CPU series. Therefore, exceptions,
model-specific registers and cpuid are recorded as state changes ∆.
Floating point instructions and SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) instructions
(e.g., MMX and SSE) are generally difficult to emulate correctly as well. It is possible to
also record the results of these instructions as ∆. However, for programs that heavily
perform these operations, the performance for both record and replay may greatly degrade
(one ∆ event is needed per instruction). Alternatively, these instructions are directly
passed to the hardware processor during replay. This solution assumes that the replayer is
running on a machine supporting the same set of floating point and SIMD instructions.
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Operation Type
Solution
Data Transfer / Control Transfer /
Emulate
Integer Arithmetic
Interrupts / MMIO / Port I/O / DMA / TSC Replay as I
Exceptions / System Registers / CPUID
Replay as ∆
Floating Point / SIMD Instructions
Pass through
Table 3.1: Operations and Corresponding Solutions.

This assumption can easily hold by running the recorder and the replayer on the same kind
of machines or even the same machine.
As a summary, Table 3.1 lists the special operations and their corresponding solutions:
emulate, replay, or pass-through. It needs to be emphasized that a platform following this
design principle does not immediately become completely transparent. Emulation bugs or
missing inputs and state changes cannot be precluded. Once identified though, these bugs
can be fixed and the transparency of the platform will be further improved.

3.3

Transparent Recorder

For successful replay, S0 , I and ∆ need to be captured in a transparent and efficient
manner. How this is goal is achieved using hardware virtualization is described in this
section.

3.3.1

Mediating Recording Realm

In order to monitor malware in various forms, including kernel modules, shared libraries
and processes, the recording realm is defined at the page-level granularity and the
interaction between the recording realm and the rest of the system needs to be mediated.

49
In hardware virtualization, Two Dimensional Paging (TDP) is a memory virtualization
mechanism. While the conventional page table pointed by CR3 in the guest is used to
translate a Guest Virtual Address (GVA) into its Guest Physical Address (GPA), the
second-layer page table maintained by the hypervisor translates the Guest Physical
Address into the Host Physical Address (HPA). The maintenance of the second-layer page
table is invisible to the guest and is used to mediate the recording realm.
Specifically, two TDP tables are created to partition the guest physical memory into two
memory spaces, one for the recording realm and the other for the rest of the guest system the main realm. The code pages that belong to the monitored malware will be loaded into
the recording realm, such that the interactions between the monitored malware and the rest
of the system can be mediated by TDP page faults and other VMExit (transitions from the
guest to the hypervisor) events. These VMExit events are invisible to the guest system.
This TDP-based recorder design is flexible enough to monitor a small code module, a
full user process, and even the entire guest system, depending on what pages are loaded
into the recording realm.

3.3.2

Basic Scheme

In the basic design, the two guest physical memory spaces are mutually exclusive. That
is, each individual guest physical page can only be present in either the recording realm or
the main realm, but not both. This basic design ensures mediating all the inputs and
events for the recording realm is simple.
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1. int adore_root_filldir(void *buf,
char *name, int nlen, loff_t off,
ino_t ino, unsigned x)
2. {
3.
struct inode *inode = NULL;
4.
int r = 0;
5.
uid_t uid;
6.
gid_t gid;
7.
8.
if ((inode=iget(
root_sb[current->pid% 1024],
ino)) == NULL)
9.
return 0;
//lines 10 to 20 are
omitted for brevity
21. }

d88888550 <adore_root_filldir>:
550: push %ebp
551...56C: //set up stack,
//%eax = current @L8
56C: mov
0x6c(%eax),%edx
//%edx=pid @L8
56F: xor
%edi,%edi
571: test %edx,%edx
573: mov
%edx,%eax
575: jns
57d <adore_root_filldir+0x2d>
577: lea
0x3ff(%edx),%eax
57D: push $0x0
57F: push $0x0
581: and
$0xfffffc00,%eax
586: sub
%eax,%edx
588: pushl 0x1c(%ebp) //push ino @L8
58B: pushl x0(,%edx,4)
//push root_sb[...] @L8
// call iget @ line 8
592: call 593 <adore_root_filldir+0x43>
//The rest is omitted for brevity.

(b) disassembly

(a) C source
Fig. 3.2.: adore root filldir

A simplified adore-ng rootkit [125] is used as an example to illustrate this basic scheme.
The C source code and the corresponding disassembly are shown in Figure 3.2. In brief,
the original pointer to root filldir has been replaced by a pointer to
adore root filldir to hide certain files. Suppose the execution of this kernel rootkit is to
be recorded. Initially the code page of this kernel module is moved from the main realm to
the recording realm. It may be treated as S0 . Figure 3.3 (A) illustrates this situation.
When the guest system is about to call root filldir, the execution is redirected to
adore root filldir, with virtual address 0xd88888550 and physical address 0x16876550.
Since the physical page 0x16876000 is not present in the main realm any more, this control
flow transition will trigger a TDP page fault which results in a VMExit. The recorder
located in the hypervisor captures this TDP page fault and switches the memory space to
the recording realm, which is shown in Figure 3.3 (B). In addition, the current CPU state
(all the registers and flags) is recorded, as input I0 .
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On fetching the first instruction in adore root filldir, two more TDP page faults are
triggered for the page table directory page (PD) and the page table entry page (PTc)
respectively. This is because the TLB has been flushed during the realm switch, and the
CPU needs to look up the physical address of the first instruction using the page tables.
These two pages are also moved into the recording realm and their contents recorded as
another input. This is the desired behavior, because the replayer will need the page table
pages for address translation. Moreover, by including the page table pages, the problem of
page swapping and re-mapping in the guest is automatically handled in both recorder and
replayer. Figure 3.3 (C) shows this moment.
This first instruction (push %ebp) writes onto the stack. As the stack page is absent in
the recording realm, this operation triggers TDP page faults for the stack page (MS) and
the corresponding page table pages (PD and PTs). as shown in Figure 3.3 (D). In this
example, PD has already been moved into the recording realm, so no TDP page fault
happens for PD.
Then the execution continues without causing any VMExits until 0xd888856c. This
instruction (mov 0x6c(%eax), %edx) reads from a data page (D), which is not present in
the recording realm. Similarly, this data page (D) and its corresponding page table page
(PTd) are moved into the recording realm and recorded (see Figure 3.3 (E)).
The execution further proceeds to the instruction located at 0x169f7592. It calls iget,
a kernel function. A TDP page fault is raised because the jump target is absent in the
recording realm. The faulting EIP shows that it does not belong to the malware module.
So, the recorder switches back to the main realm (see Figure 3.3 (F)). In addition, a
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“JumpOut” event is recorded at this point, indicating that the execution has transferred
out of the recording realm.
The iget kernel function now resumes its execution in the main realm. While it
accesses the parameters, another TDP page fault occurs because the stack page (MS) has
been moved to the recording realm. So the stack page (MS) and the corresponding page
table pages (PD and PTs) are moved back into the main realm. This behavior is also
desired, because the next time when the recording realm reads one of these pages, it will be
captured and the new page content recorded as a new input. Figure 3.3 (G) illustrates this
situation.
When iget finishes and returns, a TDP page fault occurs because the jump target is
not present in the main realm. Thus, the memory space is switched back to the recording
realm, which is shown in Figure 3.3 (H). The CPU state is recorded and execution resumes
in the recording realm. The subsequent execution of adore root filldir follows a similar
cycle.

3.3.3

Other Inputs

The previous example only shows how to capture inputs from CPU states and memory.
Other kinds of inputs need to be handled as well. To handle control transitions such as
interrupts and exceptions using the same basic scheme, the Interrupt Descriptor Table
(IDT) is prevented from being present in the recording realm. Any interrupt or exception
will force a lookup into the IDT which will in turn trigger a TDP page fault. This fault is
treated as a control transition and a new CPU state is recorded when the execution returns
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to the recording realm. When executing in the recording realm, instructions like cpuid,
rdmsr, in and rdtsc need to be recorded as inputs I and state changes ∆ as well. With
hardware virtualization support, the VMCS is configured to trap these instructions back
into the hypervisor where their results are recorded. DMA transfers may change memory
pages in the recording realm without CPU intervention. When DMA writes into a page
resident in the recording realm, that page needs to be recorded as a new input. The DMA
controller is emulated in software. So this DMA write can be intercepted and recorded as
input.

3.3.4

Optimizations

The basic scheme enforces two mutually exclusive realms. In many cases, this is
unnecessarily expensive. If the two realms alternately reads a shared page, then the basic
scheme will repeatedly remove that page from the recording realm, and later move it back
and record it even if the page contents have not changed. Several optimizations are
employed to allow these two realms to share pages.

Sharing Data Pages. To enable sharing of data pages, a ”Remove-On-Write” (ROW)
principle, which is similar to Copy-On-Write, is used. More specifically, the two realms are
allowed to share pages, but these pages are set to be read-only. When one realm attempts
to write to a page, a TDP write violation will be triggered and that page is then removed
from the other realm. This optimization works especially well for the page table pages,
because both realms need these pages for address translation, and these pages seldom
change.
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Sharing Code Pages. When recording a full process, a problem that can arise is when
both realms need to access shared library code pages. These code pages will be moved back
and forth between the main realm and the recording realm, according to the basic scheme.
Similar to sharing data pages, these code pages are present in the both realms and are
initially marked to be read and execute only. While it improves performance, this
optimization can disrupt the realm transition detection logic outlined above during context
switches. That is, if shared library pages are executable in both the main and recording
realms, the kernel is executing in the main realm (process level recording), there is a
context switch to the recorded process and the process resumes at one of the shared
libraries, then the TDP page fault will not occur. This results in the monitored program
executing in the main and not the recording realm. To prevent this problem, the NX
(Non-Executable) bits for these code pages are manipulated to capture the moment when
execution transitions into these code pages in the monitored process.
More specifically, context switches are monitored by intercepting CR3 writes (once
again by configuring the VMCS). When the execution context switches to the recorded
process, the main realm is switched to the recording realm as normal. However, there is a
gap between this context switch and the user-level execution, because the context switch is
performed in the kernel space and the execution will continue in the kernel space for a
while before it transitions to the user space. In order to capture the entry point to the user
space, all of the pages in the recording realm are marked as Non-Executable. Although the
kernel execution will trigger TDP page faults and in turn these pages will be loaded into
the recording realm, these pages are not recorded. Essentially nothing is recorded until a
TDP execute violation with the faulting EIP in the user space is detected. This is the

56
entry point back into the recorded program. The pages loaded during the kernel execution
are removed so transitions back into the kernel can be detected later. The pages marked
NX will be restored as well.

3.3.5

Bridging the Semantic Gap

Analysts usually specify which malware to monitor by its executable name, whereas the
recording realm operates directly on guest physical pages. Therefore,there exists a
semantic gap, which is bridged using VMI. More specifically, system calls are intercepted
and kernel data structures in the guest system are parsed to extract the OS-level
semantics, such as the process list and the module memory map. By this way, the process
name is mapped to the corresponding CR3 value, and module names to their virtual
memory ranges. Then guest virtual addresses can be translated into guest physical
addresses using the guest page tables.
The mapping from guest virtual to guest physical address may change over time due to
page swapping. The newly mapped physical page will be captured and recorded when it is
accessed later, but the physical page that is no longer mapped needs to be removed from
the recording realm immediately. To do so, page table changes that affect the pages in the
recording realm are captured and recorded. According to the data page sharing
mechanism, the page table pages associated to the recording realm are shared in both
realms and set to be read-only. Therefore, any changes to these page table pages will be
trapped to the hypervisor. Checking which page table entry has been modified reveals
which guest physical page needs to be removed from the recording realm.
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3.3.6

Shadow Time Stamp Counter

As extra TDP page faults and other VMExits are needed for recording malware
execution, malware may detect the underlying recording behavior by examining the
advance of the Time Stamp Counter (TSC). This can be done by using the rdtsc
instruction to read the TSC model-specific register. A shadow TSC is used to hide this
artifact.
The shadow TSC is an estimate of how much time the guest actually runs. It is not
perfect. It is calculated as follows: Let ti be the value of the host TSC before vmresume is
executed. Let ti be the value of the host TSC right before the transition into non-root
mode, and to be the value of the host TSC right after the CPU returns to the host. Then,
let te and tx be the time it takes to enter the guest and exit to the host and tg be the actual
execution time for the guest, then to − ti = te + tx + tg . To approximate te + tx , the VMCS
is configured to enable rdtsc exiting (i.e, a VMExit occurs whenever the guest executes
rdtsc. A guest program that loops rdtsc is then executed to obtain the average of te + tx .
This estimate of the total entry and exit times is then used to calculate the time spent
executing the guest while recording. More specifically, ti and to are captured and tg is
calculated as tg = to − ti − (te + tx ). tg is added tot he shadow TSC, which is returned to
the guest whenever the guest queries the TSC. Due to unnecessary TLB flushes when
transitioning between the guest and host modes, te + tx must be adjusted to account for
TLB misses. This includes the misses due to the page table, code and data pages access,
plus interrupts. Effectively, there are different te + tx averages for the different conditions.
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3.3.7

Implementation

The recording component is implemented in the KVM module in Linux Kernel version
2.6.32. The code base of KVM is well organized. While vmx.c and svm.c contain the
hardware specific code for Intel and AMD virtualization extensions respectively, mmu.c
contains the memory management unit code that is common to both architectures. Within
mmu.c is the tdp page fault function that is called by both VMX and SVM, and is where
the realm control and enforcement logic is implemented. All memory based inputs are
handled at this location. All non-memory based inputs to the recording realm are handled
in the architecture specific implementation files.

Memory Management. KVM uses MMU-notifiers to learn of changes to the host
process’ (e.g., QEMU’s) page table. Once a change is detected, KVM determines whether
the old physical page (e.g., the one that has been swapped out) is pointed to by the current
TDP page table and if so, make the necessary changes. Similarly, the recorder registers its
own MMU-notifiers so changes to the page table are reflected in both the main and
recording realm TDP page tables.

Logging. Being a kernel module, KVM should not directly write to files. To enable
logging, a user-level program is used to commit the changes to a log file. KVM and the
user-level program communicate using a shared memory queue that is mapped into the
user-level program’s virtual memory space. More specifically, the recorder exposes a
filed-based interface through the “/proc” file system. The user-level program opens the file
and writes to and reads from it to send and receive messages to and from the recorder.
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Given a new log entry (e.g., a new page input), the recorder will first copy the contents
into the shared queue in the user-level program’s memory space and then send a message
to the user-level program using the file interface. Since file reads and writes by the
user-level program are blocking, the file based scheme is self-synchronizing.
In V2E, a page that has been loaded into the recording realm is fully and completely
recorded. Obviously, this is only necessary when the page is recorded for the first time.
When the page is modified in the main realm and loaded back again, it is possible that
only a small portion of the page has changed (e.g., the stack should not change much
through function calls). At first glance, a simple optimization such as recording only the
differences or “diff” of the old and new pages is desireable, however, evaluations showed
that this is unnecessary. The I/O bandwidth available on the test system was not
saturated. Thus, to improve performance, the recorder does not calculate the differences at
runtime. The log file is simply compressed after the fact to reduce storage requirements.

Event Landmark. Synchronization is an important aspect of record and replay systems.
Nondeterministic events, such as interrupts, must be replayed at exactly the same moment
in the program’s execution during replay otherwise the two executions will diverge. The
problem is exacerbated in precise heterogeneous record and replay, because previously
deterministic events are now nondeterministic. Take exceptions as an example. In PHRR,
the replayer is required to exhibit the same exception behavior as the recorder. If there is
an error where the emulator does not throw an exception while real hardware does, the
recorded exception must still be replayed at the right moment. In effect, this exception is
nondeterministic.
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Previous systems used the branch counter as a landmark. The branch counter
increments when a branch instruction is committed (i.e., actually taken and not
speculatively taken). By recording the number of branches committed thus far and the
current EIP value for an important event that must be replayed (e.g., an external
interrupt), the replayer can replay the same event at the same point during the program’s
execution.
In V2E, only the CPU state (including the EIP, registers and flags) is used as the
landmark. It is a simple scheme and is not as accurate as the branch counter, because two
execution points may happen to have the same CPU state. It has been sufficient in
practice though. There are a large number of events (e.g., memory accesses and control
transitions from and to the recording realm) that need to be recorded in precise
heterogeneous record and replay. Each event serves as a synchronization point and so the
role of the landmark not as important as in the other replay systems that synchronizes
more seldomly. To put it differently, the landmark only needs to be accurate between two
synchronization points, because the synchronization points themselves serve as landmarks.
In the end, branch counter based landmarks is left as future work.

3.4

Precise Replayer

The purpose of the replayer is twofold: precisely replay the execution and events as
recorded using hardware virtualization, and support emulation based malware analysis.
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3.4.1

Dynamic Binary Translation and QEMU

In brief, QEMU uses dynamic binary translation to emulate one instruction set
architecture (e.g., x86) on top of another (e.g., ARM). In DBT, a block of guest code is
translated prior to being executed. The translated blocks can be cached for efficiency. The
hardware memory management unit is emulated in software as is the translation look aside
buffer.
While QEMU uses different techniques, such as lazy flags calculation, to improve
efficiency, the same techniques can be used for emulation detection. The recorder was
designed to capture all of the important events during the program’s execution and the
replayer must not only replay the events precisely as recorded, but some of the
optimizations must also be disabled to facilitate precise replay.

3.4.2

Changes for Precise Replay

Considering the challenges in software emulation and dynamic binary translation,
several design changes in the work flow of software emulation are used to ensure precise
replay. Particularly, the dynamic binary translator in QEMU is modified to comply with
the following design changes.

New Translation Logic. Instructions are classified into three categories during dynamic
translation: general-purpose, FPU, and others. General-purpose instructions include data
transfer, control transfer, and integer arithmetic. They are translated according to their
simple semantics. To avoid discrepancies in flag calculations, lazy flag calculation is

62
disabled. That is, the EFLAGS register is immediately calculated after each instruction.
Since exceptions are recorded and will be replayed, the logic for checking and raising
exceptions is unnecessary and is completely removed except for page faults. Page faults are
used for synchronization.
Floating point and SIMD instructions execute directly on the hardware FPU. To ensure
correctness, these instructions are translated into wrapper functions that pass the
operations directly to the real FPU using the state from the emulated virtual machine. For
example, in QEMU’s software emulation approach, a floating point instruction fadd %st1,
%st0 would be translated to call a helper function helper fadd ST0 STN to emulate this
instruction in software. In the pass through approach, a piece of assembly code
( asm ("fadd %st(1), %st(0)")) is directly inserted instead of the call to the helper
function. As this instruction takes two FPU registers, the instruction can be passed directly
to the FPU. On the other hand if the instruction takes any operands from memory or the
general-purpose registers, the operands need to be copied from the guest environment to
the host and vice versa. For example, the instruction fadds %0xc(%ebp) adds a memory
operand with st(0) and stores the result back into st(0). Since this memory operand is
located in guest memory, it is first copied into a temporary location on the host before the
floating point operation executes natively on the host. This behavior is shown in the
following code snippet where ldl(A0) is a function that returns the contents of the guest
memory located at the GVA within A0 (i.e., A0 = %0xc(%ebp) in the example).
unsigned long temp = ldl(A0);
__asm__("fadds %0;" : : "m" (float)temp));
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These natively executed FPU instructions may raise exceptions - host exceptions and
not guest exception - as well. To prevent the exceptions from disrupting the host QEMU
process, exception handlers are registered to catch and ignore them. Any exceptions that
should be handled by the guest would have been recorded. The goal of the replayer is to
replay the events, including exceptions, precisely as dictated by the log.
All remaining instructions are translated into “nop”, expecting that the results of these
instructions are correctly replayed from the log. That is, no translated code will be
generated except to advance the program counter to the next instruction.
To address the page boundary issue described in Section 2.1.2, the DBT translation
logic is altered slightly. Translation never crosses the page boundary. If the program
counter crosses a page boundary during translation, then the current code block is ended
and the instruction starts the next block. In this manner, the first instruction of the next
block is guaranteed to be the instruction that crosses the page boundary. As a result, the
page fault that results due to DBT (emulation) and the page fault that results during
instruction fetch (real hardware) occur at the same location. Note that this increments the
branch counter and needs to be taken into account if the branch counter based event
landmark is used.

Replay Logic. As page-level recording is based on TDP, the same second level page
table mechanism is needed in software emulation to correctly replay logged events on
demand. A physical page container is introduced for this purpose. This physical page
container indicates if a physical page has been loaded from the log and thus is present. In
essence, the physical page container replicates the TDP page table of the recording realm
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during replay. When the replayed execution accesses a page that is absent in the physical
page container, it implies that there was a TDP page fault during recording. Consequently,
the missing memory page is loaded from the log and the CPU state updated at the right
moment.
In addition, the current CPU state is compared with the landmark of the next log event
at the end of every instruction. If the landmark matches, the logged event is replayed. This
event may be a control transition caused by interrupts or exceptions, a state change made
by special-purpose instructions, or a realm change. These were captured as “JumpOut”
events.

3.4.3

Example Walk-through

The same adore-ng example is used to walk through the replay logic. As the first log
event, the code page MC is loaded in the physical page container. This initial state is the
same as that of the right column in Figure 3.3(A).
Then the second event is the CPU state for the entry point of adore root filldir.
The replayer updates the CPU state accordingly. The code block starting with the EIP at
0xd8888550 needs to be translated and put into the translated code cache before it is
executed. This translation triggers a page table lookup to translate the EIP virtual address
into a physical address. Consequently, the page table pages (PD and PTm) are loaded
from the log on demand, because they are not present in the physical page container.
When the translated code executes, the first instruction pushes onto the stack. At this
moment, the page fault triggers the page table page PTs to be loaded from the log during
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address translation and then the stack page MS is loaded for the memory write. Similarly,
the page table page PTd and the data page D are loaded at the right moments.
At the end of the call instruction at 0xd8888592, which jumps to the kernel function
iget, a control transition happens. This JumpOut log event is followed by several events
for removing pages (MS, PD, PTs) and culminates with a CPU update event. The page
removal events in conjunction with the CPU update event represents the execution of iget
in the main realm, which has been skipped. Consequently, the current program state is
that of the instruction at 0xd888885a7, when iget just returned back into the recording
realm (the right column of Figure 3.3 (H)). As this point, the software TLB is also flushed,
because changes may have been made to the page table during the skipped execution.
Replay continues until all entries in the log are consumed. As this example describes
the basic scheme, quite a few pages (such as page table pages) are removed and then
loaded back later. Given a log recorded using the optimizations discussed in Section 3.3.4,
the replay will proceed more efficiently.

3.4.4

Implementation

The replayer is implemented on TEMU, a dynamic analysis platform in the BitBlaze
binary analysis infrastructure [15]. TEMU is based on QEMU version 0.9.1 and the
changes described above were integrated into TEMU as well.
With the modifications to TEMU, existing analysis plugins should work automatically,
except for a small change. Each regular TEMU plugin needs to check if the current
execution is within the context of interest (e.g., if the current process is the malware’s
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process). However, for a plugin that works with replay, all execution is of interest. This is
ensured by the recorder, so context checking in plugins is removed.
Two plugins were modified for experimentation. The first plugin is an unpacker, which
is the implementation of Renovo [55]. The second is an instruction tracing tool called
tracecap, which performs taint analysis and dumps detailed information for each
instruction.

3.5

Evaluation

In order to assess the effectiveness of PHRR, V2E was evaluated in two ways. First,
existing emulation detection techniques in the literature were studied and the effectiveness
of V2E against these methods was examined. This test is focused on verifying
transparency. Second, real-world malware samples were gathered, anti-emulation ones
identified and subsequently studied using the two TEMU plugins. This latter test is
focused on ensuring that transparent emulation based malware analysis is indeed feasible.
Experimental setup. The host machine has a Core i7 860 Quad Core processor with
4 GB of memory running Ubuntu 10.04 and kernel version 2.6.32.29 modified with the
recorder logic. The guest systems are Windows XP SP2, Ubuntu 9.04 and Redhat 7.

3.5.1

Study of Existing Anti-emulation Attacks

To evaluate if V2E can defeat published anti-emulation methods, a list of such
techniques was found in the literature [11, 12, 66] and then categorized based on how
emulation differs from real hardware. Descriptions of these methods are listed in Table 3.2.
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Description
Defeated?
cpuid returns processor specific information. QEMU returns generic inX
formation. [12]
rdtsc returns the contents of the TSC, and can be used to measure elapsed
X
time. [11, 12, 66].
cmpxch8b conditionally writes to the memory operand, but a #GP excepX
tion is always generated if the memory operand is not writable. QEMU
only raises #GP when the memory is written indeed. [12]
A double fault exception is generated if the #GP handler can’t be reX
trieved from the IDT when a #GP occurs. QEMU generates #GPs repeatedly. [12]
Writing to reserved MSRs should generate #GP, but QEMU does not. [11]
X
A #GP is generated if the instruction length is more than 15 bytes, but
X
certain prefixes like rep can break this rule in QEMU. [11, 66]
If the alignment check flag is set, then an alignment exception is thrown
X
when an unaligned memory address is accessed. This exception is not
thrown in QEMU. [11]
CPU bugs or errata results in behavior that are either unexpected or does
X∗
not follow the published logic, thus the emulator does not handle these
like specific hardware would. [11]
MSR fingerprinting uses the rdmsr safe macro to find the MSRs supX
ported by the CPU. The list of MSRs can be used to help determine the
CPU model. [11]
The fnstcw instruction pushes the FPU Control Word register onto the
X
stack. As it turns out, bit 3 of this register is reserved in Intel’s implementation but is always 1. QEMU always returns 0. [66].
icebp is an undocumented instruction that simply raises an exception. In
X
QEMU this instruction hangs the emulator. [66]
rep stosb can be used to overwrite a range of memory with nop. When
N/A
paired with a jmp to nowhere, QEMU and single stepping will throw a
segmentation fault. Hardware executes successfully. [12]
Table 3.2: Survey of Emulation Detection Techniques.
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Among these detection methods, six of them, including “cmpxch8b”, “double fault”,
“reserved MSR”, “instruction length”, “alignment checking” and “invalid opcode”, cause
aberrant exception behavior. As V2E replays the exceptions from real hardware, these
detection methods should be defeated. Defeating exception based emulation-detection was
verified using synthetic sample programs of the instruction length and invalid opcode
methods. The sample programs simply implement the methods as published. They were
executed in QEMU, real hardware and V2E, and the expected exception behavior in V2E
was verified manually.
“cpuid”, “MSR fingerprinting” and “rdtsc” return deviated values. These values are
hardware specific and thus hard to emulate correctly and completely. PHRR defeats these
methods by recording the values the real hardware. These methods were also verified using
synthetic samples and real-world malware samples.
“fnstcw” causes a deviated state in the FPU. V2E passes FPU/MMX/SIMD
instructions directly onto hardware, so these deviations disappear in V2E. This was verified
using several real-world samples.
The “CPU errata” method needs special consideration. If a CPU bug causes a totally
unpredictable result, then it would be extremely hard to handle. However, the CPU bugs
used for emulation detection in the literature [11] all cause incorrect exceptions. These
CPU bugs can be handled correctly by PHRR, because exceptions are recorded and
replayed. It is difficult to ascertain how prevalent non-exception based CPU bugs are. In
general, the effectiveness of this detection method is limited, since CPU bugs are specific to
a CPU family.
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The “rep stosb” detection method exploits a cache coherency bug for self-modifying
code in earlier Intel processors. This bug has been fixed in all current Intel processors.
Therefore, this method is no longer relevant.

3.5.2

Analyzing Malware on Existing Malware Analysis Platforms

To determine how effective existing malware analysis platforms are at handling
real-world malware, 150 real-world malware samples were collected from a live malware
repository (http://malc0de.com/database) and security researchers. These samples were
then tested on three malware analysis platforms: Anubis [126], CWSandbox [127], and
TEMU [15]. While Anubis and TEMU are based on software emulation, CWSandbox uses
API hooking.
Of the 150 samples, 51, 88, and 14 crashed or exhibited no behaviors in Anubis,
CWSandbox, and TEMU respectively. Note that all these samples run properly in KVM,
which means that they intended to escape from either of these analysis platforms.
Interestingly enough, the 14 samples that are resistant to TEMU also evaded Anubis and
CWSandbox. Evidently, anti-emulation malware has already become a prevalent threat.

3.5.3

Analyzing Real world Malware with V2E

To evaluate how well V2E handles real-world malware, the 14 anti-emulation samples
were executed and recorded using V2E. A time-out threshold of 2 minutes was chosen to be
consistent with the settings of Anubis and CWSandbox. For each sample, V2E was

exe sz
105KB
105KB
106KB
115KB
103KB
110KB
23KB
39KB
245KB
243KB
119KB
108KB
280KB
101KB

log sz
29.07MB
28.46MB
30.75MB
35.93MB
29.95MB
30.13MB
2.44MB
3.25MB
55.36MB
37.48MB
676KB
2.00MB
3.30MB
7.10MB

Tracing
runtime # ins
2h19m 1347M
2h18m 1346M
2h19m 1349M
2h20m 1366M
2h19m 1348M
2h19m 1350M
46.8s 7.73M
99.7s 16.8M
27m15s 248M
1150s 175M
55.7s 9.55M
23.2s 4.09M
54.8s 9.51M
294.4s
43M

Table 3.3: Analyzing Real-world Emulation-Resistant Malware with V2E

MD5SUM
27eb815f101a9295fbb601986f393d01
43de1618764daf7e5887bd8ac9cadb52
03f322365b844d8faf9236aab34b4214
4f12dfb4b613abc4ddf56d087223a868
f01cdf6e5052aeb5c6510bd8f8d88636
f068b4362c646dae42cc3b1b8fe20c12
1686739bc81a407dd9944e2d9bbcf2e1
0b8b2c0926630c69a6c75bba67b24a3e
c5ff7232868333107fa3efe895f12361
36e5fdcdbe0bcdc59ea001b162bfb97d
c1a66699820fdeb7242e884e6d2f8bcb
dabec78d489f1e783fb23d6e726bd1a4
ef0458e196fbd1b4cc1613ba2ca3c43b
7ce6cd9837e1a7837c2b491c21ff5b69

Null
runtime
76.76s
76.69s
77.09s
78.87s
77.21s
77.2s
0.65s
0.97s
29s
20.91s
0.57s
0.19s
0.36s
34.35s

Unpacking
runtime dumps
96.5s
78
96.09s
79
97.02s
79
98.8s
57
98.94s
81
97.17s
77
0.71s
8
1.2s
55
39.33s
39
30.56s
22
0.66s
10
0.22s
1
0.46s
1
35.4s
30
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configured to record the entire user-level process and spawned child processes if any.
Networking was also disabled to prevent malicious behavior from escaping the virtual
machine sandbox.
V2E was able to record and replay the malicious behaviors of all these samples. In
particular, three settings were used to test replay: 1) replay with no plugin provides a
baseline for the replay performance; 2) replay with tracing produces a complete and
detailed instruction trace for the recorded execution; and 3) replay with unpacking extracts
hidden code and data from the packed malware. A summary of the results is presented in
Table 3.3. For each sample, the MD5 hash, executable size, and size of the recorded
execution log are listed first followed by the runtime for replay with no plugins. With
regards to tracing, the instruction count and the runtime for tracing are listed in separate
columns. As for unpacking, the number of memory dump files and the runtime for
unpacking are shown.
The following observations can be made from Table 3.3. First, the execution logs (after
compression) are fairly small (up to 55MB). It is worth noting that unlike the logs in the
other execution replay systems, these logs are self contained with all necessary code and
data included. They can be directly fed into the replayer for in-depth malware
investigation and no other environmental setup (e.g., virtual machine images and
configurations) is needed.
Second, due to the efficiency of dynamic binary translation, the baseline performance of
the replayer (with no plugin) ranges from less than 1 second to 79 seconds. This is
satisfactory since the malware sample was allowed to execute for 120 seconds (2 minutes)
on real hardware. The very short replay runtime (less than 1 second) on some samples
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indicates that these samples are mostly idle. This is reasonable because many of the
samples are bots and networking is disabled during recording. Note that some samples are
very computation-intensive with over 1.3 billion instructions executed within 2 minutes.
Third, the unpacker built on top of the replayer demonstrated good efficiency. It was
able to finish replaying 2-minute execution logs in up to 99 seconds, and at the same time
successfully extract hidden code and data from the packed malware samples. Interestingly
enough, all of the samples are packed. Without V2E’s support, it was not possible to
unpack them successfully using TEMU. Finally, tracing is substantially more heavyweight
than unpacking, because it has to disassemble each instruction, fetch instruction raw bytes
and operands, and write these details into a file. The instruction traces completed within a
reasonably short period (from tens of seconds to a couple of hours).
It is reasonable, because it is possible to configure the tracer to skip over certain
instructions. To do so, the analyst can first replay a sample with the unpacker and
determine the instruction at which unpacking finishes. Given that emulation detection
methods are employed prior to unpacking (otherwise it will not serve its purpose of evading
analysis), this can be considered the start of interesting behavior that should be further
analyzed. The replayer can then be configured to only trace the instructions beyond that
point. Applying this method to the six large samples resulted in a 99% reduction in the
instruction trace size.
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3.5.4

Recorder Performance

The malware evaluation provided some insights into the replayer’s performance.
Without ground knowledge about the real-world malware, it is difficult to accurately
measure the performance of the recorder. Instead, the performance is estimated using
controlled and synthetic experiments.

Recording adore-ng. The adore-ng rootkit is used to estimate recorder performance
under frequent realm switches. The rootkit was installed into the Redhat 7 guest and
exercised by decompressing the Linux kernel source with about 17,000 files. Since adore-ng
intercepts file based system calls, there is at least one realm change per file. The workload
took 3s without recording and 52s when recording was enabled, generating a 14MB
execution log. A roughly 17x slowdown seems high, but is reasonable for this workload
with frequent context switch between the rootkit and the rest of the kernel.

Recording Internet Explorer. Internet explorer was used to test how well V2E
performs while recording a highly complex, computation-intensive, and interactive
application. The load time of IE with and without recording was measured in this
experiment. Without recording, IE started up and loaded the MSN homepage in 2.5s. With
recording, it took 13.8s (about a 5x slowdown) and resulted in a 52MB execution log. The
recording performance impact is expected to decrease as IE continues to run, because more
pages (e.g., shared libraries) should remain stable in the recording realm. Despite this, a 5x
slowdown is reasonable, since IE was still very responsive to user inputs while recording. It
is worthwhile to note that the IE log did not replay successfully. This could be due to the
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CPU based landmark or unknown emulation bugs, but the real reason remains unknown.
Since the malware recorded and replayed correctly, fixing the error is left as future work.

Comparing with Single Stepping. Single stepping was implemented in KVM and a
synthetic program that executes a loop with 8 million instructions were used to assess
performance overhead. On KVM, it took approximately .008s vs. 25s when single stepping
was disabled and enabled respectively. That is more than a 3000x slowdown. In contrast,
the same 8 million instructions were recorded with negligible performance penalty (i.e., the
recording time was approximately .008s). The baseline replay runtime was 0.3s, and it took
only 0.8s to perform unpacking analysis and 48s to obtain the complete instruction trace.

3.6

Discussion

The limitations and potential evasion techniques are discussed in this section.

Bugs in Common Instructions. To achieve transparency, common instructions are
assumed to emulate correctly. This assumption does not necessarily have to hold. If
malware exploits a previously unknown emulation bug in common instructions, then replay
will not be successful. Once the replay failure is found; however, the bug can be identified
and its emulation code fixed.

Attacking the Landmarks. As mentioned in Section 3.3.7, the landmark mechanism is
not perfect because the CPU state is not a unique identifier of an execution point. A
malware author may take advantage of this limitation to force an imprecise replay.
Resolving the issue by implementing a branch counter landmark is left as future work.
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Multi-core Support. The current implementation of V2E only supports a single-core
guest environment. Newer versions of QEMU supports multi-core guests and emulation
based malware analysis platforms that support multi-core guests are expected in the
future. Since TDP is used to separate the main and recording realms and each virtualized
core has its own VMCS and TDP page table, recording malware execution on multi-core
environments is feasible by design. Implementation is left as future work as well.

Denial-of-Service Attack. It is feasible for malware to induce a large number of exits
(e.g., TDP page faults and exceptions) to the hypervisor, so as to launch a denial-of-service
attack on the recorder. In addition, malware could detect the analysis environment by
measuring this slowdown using an external clock. In general, this kind of limitation is not
unique to V2E; it is also shared by other platforms (like Ether). Analysts will have to
implement case-by-case solutions once they actually arise.

3.7

Conclusion

Precise heterogeneous record and replay and its implementation in V2E were presented
in this chapter. In PHRR, a malware sample is allowed to execute under hardware
virtualization where its actions are recorded for replay and further analysis. By analyzing
and categorizing the expected differences between emulation and hardware virtualization, a
recorder that not only captures all inputs, but also all deviant behaviors was designed. A
corresponding dynamic binary translation based replayer that precisely replays the
recorded events was also designed to ensure that, despite being emulated, the sample will
execute exactly as it did under hardware virtualization.
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In V2E, the recorder was implemented in KVM and the replayer in TEMU.
Subsequently, a number of synthetic and real-world samples were used to determine
whether PHRR as implemented in V2E is sufficient to help TEMU become transparent
while maintaining its emulation based malware analysis advantages of efficiency and
flexibility. V2E was successful in defeating previously published emulation detection
techniques as well as 14 real-world malware samples that have previously evaded emulation
based analysis. Furthermore, tests on recorder and replayer performance returned
acceptable results. The recorder exhibited an approximately 17x performance degradation
for a rootkit sample that caused many realm switches.
In summary, V2E showed that precise heterogeneous record and replay can help
currently available emulation based dynamic binary analysis tools achieve transparency.
The next focus of this dissertation is to ensure that emulation based dynamic binary
analysis of mobile platforms is also feasible. Techniques for bridging the two semantic gaps
for Android malware analysis and their implementation in DroidScope are presented in the
next chapter.
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4. EMULATION-BASED ANDROID MALWARE ANALYSIS
4.1

Introduction

Emulation based malware analysis has the advantages of isolation over user/kernel
space based implementations, and flexibility and efficiency over hardware virtualization
based ones. The major disadvantages are transparency and semantic gaps.
The previous chapter showed that precise heterogeneous record and replay is a viable
technique to help emulators become more transparent, and therefore, the disadvantage due
to transparency is reduced. Furthermore, virtual machine introspection techniques have
proven to be effective in bridging the semantic gap between the emulator (or virtual
machine monitor) and the guest operating system. This also lessens the disadvantage due
to semantic gaps.
The semantic gap problem has resurfaced with the advent of mobile, and Android in
particular, malware. There are two levels of semantic information that must be rebuilt.
Android applications can contain native and Java components that cooperate in order to
achieve a common goal; the Java components are interpreted by the Dalvik Virtual
Machine, a Java Virtual Machine.
While traditional VMI techniques can successfully bridge the native level semantic gap
(e.g., identify processes), new methods are needed to reconstruct the Java level semantic
information (e.g., which Java method is being executed). Ideally, the two levels of semantic

78
information are also bound together so that the native and Java components’ execution
and interactions between them can be analyzed using one single tool. The details on how
this is achieved are presented in this chapter.
The general architecture of a new emulation-based Android malware analysis platform
is described in Section 4.2. This architecture is implemented in a tool named DroidScope.
The architecture includes an Instrumentation Interface that analysts can use for plugin
development. The details on how the interface maintains efficiency and flexibility are
presented in Section 4.3. The architecture also includes two virtual machine introspection
libraries, one for the native context and one for the Java context. The details on the
different data structures needed for VMI are presented in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 for the
native and Java contexts respectively. The techniques are implemented in DroidScope and
several plugins were also implemented to evaluate the effectiveness of this new analysis
platform. These plugins are also evaluated in terms of performance and ability to analyze
real-world Android malware with cooperating Java and native components. The plugins
and results are presented in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Limitations are discussed in Section 4.7
and an intermediary conclusion drawn in Section 4.8.

4.2

Architecture

Figure 4.1 depicts the architecture of an emulation based analysis platform for Android
malware. The design is implemented as a tool named DroidScope and thus for brevity,
DroidScope will be used to refer to both the architecture and the implementation.
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Fig. 4.1.: DroidScope Overview

Like other emulation based malware analysis architectures, the entire Android system
(including the malware) runs on top of an emulator - the Android emulator in this case -;
the analysis is completely performed from the outside. In this case, DroidScope is built on
top of the QEMU based Android emulator that ships with the Android SDK (Software
Development Kit) to ensure the best compatibility with virtual Android devices. There are
important components to the architecture: native-level view, Java-level view and the
Instrumentation Interface (II).
The native-level view includes a machine-level view that exposes low level information
such as instructions and raw memory access to the analyst and an OS-level view that
rebuilds OS constructs such as processes and system calls. The Java-level view uses VMI to
interpret the internal state of Java components including Java objects in memory and the
state of the Dalvik Virtual Machine (a Java Virtual Machine). The Instrumentation
Interface abstracts away the details of how intrumentation (i.e., the technique used to
execute analysis code alongside guest code) takes place so the analyst can focus on what to
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do with instrumentation (e.g., implement an instruction tracer). The interface also includes
access to a library of VMI related functions so the analyst can readily access the two
reconstructed views.
To complete the overall emulation-based analysis platform, the figure also depicts a
number of plugins that can be built on this new architecture. An API tracer can be
implemented to monitor the malware’s activities at the API level. This can then be used to
reason about how the malware interacts with the Android runtime environment. Since
Android envrionment includes both the Java framework as well a native libraries, the API
tracer should not only monitor how the malware’s Java components communicate with the
Android Java framework and how the native components interact with the Linux system
but also how Java components and native components communicate through the JNI
interface. This is possible since the native and Java level views are available to the API
plugin at all times. This plugin can be used to illustrate VMI as well as the flexibility
aspect of emulation based malware analysis.
The native instruction tracer and Dalvik instruction tracer are plugins for looking into
how a malicious App behaves internally by recording detailed instruction traces. The
Dalvik instruction tracer records Dalvik bytecode instructions for the malware’s Java
components and the native instruction tracer records machine-level instructions for the
native components (if they exist). The instruction tracers can be used to illustrate how
efficient emulation based analysis is.
Taint analysis is one of the other fine-grained analysis techniques that are suitable for
implementation in an emulation based analysis platform. The taint tracker plugin is an
implementation of this technique. Since taint analysis is an important dynamic analysis
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technique, the core taint propagation logic is implemented as an internal-plugin that is part
of the Instrumentation Interface. The taint tracker plugin is simply a wrapper. This means
that other plugins, such as the Dalvik Instruction Tracer can also use taint analysis to
enrich the traces. It is worth noting that, by design, dynamic taint analysis is implemented
at the machine code level only. It is assumed that with semantic knowledge at both native
and Java levels, information leakage in Java components, native components, or even
collusive Java and native components and be revealed. This assertion is verified to be true
for arithmetic operations in the next Chapter.

4.3

Instrumentation Interface

The Instrumentation Interface serves as the interface between plugins and DroidScope’s
internal logic and the analysis plugins. It serves two main purposes, export the virtual
machine introspection functions and methods to the plugins and allow plugins to easily
instrument or intercept the malware sample’s execution. Virtual machine introspection
requires instrumentation support so important points of a guest’s execution can be
detected and analysis can be conducted. The changes made to the Android emulator for
instrumentation is discussed next.

4.3.1

Basic Instrumentation

Recent versions of QEMU, like the one the Android emulator is based on, use the Tiny
Code Generator (TCG) to compile guest code blocks into host code blocks. The execution
flow is as follows: 1) a basic block of guest instructions is disassembled and translated into
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an intermediate representation called TCG-IR; 2) the TCG-IR code block is then compiled
down to a block of host instructions and stored in a code cache; and 3) control jumps into
the translated code block and guest execution begins. Subsequent execution of the same
guest basic blocks will skip the translation phase and directly jump into the translated
code block in the cache.
The crux of code instrumentation lies in the technique used to ensure that the program
analysis code executes alongside the guest’s code. This implies that there must be a way
insert program analysis code into the translated code blocks used in step 3 above. To do
so, extra TCG-IR instructions are inserted during the code translation phase (step 1), such
that this extra analysis code is executed in the execution phase (step 3). For example. in
order to monitor context switches, several TCG-IR instructions are inserted to call a helper
function whenever the translation table registers (ARM system control co-processor
c2 base0 and c2 base1 in QEMU) are written to. The logic for identifying the switched-out
process or switched-in process can then be implemented in the helper function.

Instrumentation Callbacks The problem with directly inserting analysis code into
helper functions is it limits the flexibility of analysis plugins. This can be better illustrated
using instruction level instrumentation where a helper function is called whenever a guest
instruction is executed. It is conceivable that two different analysis plugins will require
instruction level instrumentation. For example, an instruction tracer plugin will have logic
that disassembles each instruction and writes the contents to a log. Whereas, a control flow
graph generator plugin will have logic that checks whether the instruction is a branch
instruction and if so, add an extra node and/or edge to the control flow graph. In the basic
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scheme, the logic for both plugins will be implemented in the same helper function
coupling their functionalities. A bug in one plugin will affect the other.
A better solution is to abstract away the details of adding the instrumentation code and
export an event based callback interface. In this design, the plugin logic is implemented in
separate and distinct functions. Each plugin can then register a callback such that their
respective functions are called whenever an instruction is executed. The plugins can also
unregister the callbacks when their jobs are complete. Thus, the purpose of the helper
function is to search through the registered callback functions and issue the appropriate
calls. This is a role of the Instrumentation Interface.

4.3.2

Application Programming Interfaces

Abstracting away the details of inserting instrumentation code is only one function of
the II. The other functions are to expose the native and Java level views to analysis
plugins. All of the different functions can be categorized into three different Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) to mirror the different context levels of an Android device:
the native or machine API, the OS or Linux API and the Java or Dalvik API. These APIs
can also be further separated into two sub-categories. Analysts can register event based
callbacks using the Events sub-API so they are notified of when certain events of interest
take place. They can then use the Query and Set sub-APIs to interpret and potentially
change the guest’s state using VMI. Table 4.1 summarizes these APIs. The details are
presented in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2. A short description is provided below.
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NativeAPI
Events

instruction begin/end
register read/write
memory read/write
block begin/end

LinuxAPI

Query & Set

context switch
system call
task begin/end
task updated
memory map updated
memory read/write query symbol database
memory r/w with pgd get current context
register read/write
get task list
taint set/check

DalvikAPI
Dalvik instruction begin
method begin

query symbol database
interpret Java object
get/set DVM state
taint set/check objects
disable JIT

Table 4.1: Summary of DroidScope APIs

At the native level, one can register callbacks for instruction start and end, basic block
start and end, memory read and write, and register read and write. One can also read and
write memory and register content. As taint analysis is implemented at the machine code
level, one can also set and check taint in memory and registers.
At the OS level, one can register callbacks for context switch, system call, task start,
update (such as process name), and end, and memory map update. One can also query
symbols, obtain the task list, and get the current execution context (e.g., current process
and thread).
At the Dalvik level, one can instrument at the granularity of Dalvik instructions and
methods. One can query the Dalvik symbols, parse and interpret Java objects, read and
modify DVM state, and selectively disable the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler in the DVM for
certain memory regions. Through the Dalvik-view, one can also set and check taint in Java
Objects as well.
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4.3.3

Instrumentation Optimization

A general guideline for performance optimization in dynamic binary translation is to
shift computation from the execution phase to the translation phase. For instance, if the
analyst one needs to instrument a function call at address x using basic blocks, then one
should insert the instrumentation code for the block at x when it is being translated
instead of instrumenting every basic block and look for x at execution time.
This guideline is followed as part of the new analysis platform. Consequently, the
instrumentation logic becomes more complex. When registering for an event callback, one
can specify a specific location (such as a function entry) or a memory range (to trace
instructions or functions within a particular module). Therefore, the instrumentation logic
and the APIs support single value comparisons and range checks for controlling when and
where event callbacks are inserted during the translation phase.
The instrumentation logic is also dynamic, because analysts can register and unregister
a callback at execution time. For example, when the virtual device starts, only the
OS-view instrumentation is enabled so the Android system can start quickly as usual.
When the analyst starts analyzing an App, instrumentation code is inserted to reconstruct
the Dalvik view and to perform analysis as requested by the plugin. When instrumenting a
function return, the return address will be captured from the ARM link register, r14, at
the function entry during execution, and a callback registered at the return address. After
the function returns, this callback is removed since it has served its purpose. Then when
the analysis has finished, other instrumentation code is removed as well.
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In order to support dynamic instrumentation, QEMU’s translated code cache must be
flushed whenenver a new callback is registered or un-registered. However, flushing the
whole cache means that all previously translated code blocks, even ones that are unaffected
by the changes in callback registration, will need to be translated again. This introduces
unnecessary performance overhead. Thus, by design, the instrumentation logic should only
flush (i.e., invalidate) the translated blocks that are affected by the change. For example,
when the analyst removes the callback for the function return, only the translated block
that starts at the return address and blocks that point to it are invalidated. The rest of the
cache is left intact.

4.3.4

Taint Analysis

Taint analysis is an important dynamic analysis technique and has been implemented
as part of many different analysis platforms. Therefore, support for taint analysis is
included as part of the Instrumentation Interface. A simple taint analysis design is used. In
this design, each byte of data is labeled either as tainted or untainted and taint propagates
through native instructions only. It is assumed that since native instructions are used
emulate Dalvik bytecode, tracking taint through native instructions should be sufficient for
tracking taint trough the bytecode. This assumption needs to be verified. Furthermore, the
design is simple since the taint propagation policy uses a simple “or” rule. That is, the
result of an operation is tainted as long as any of the operands are tainted.
While setting and checking the taint of native objects is straight forward, setting and
checking Java objects involves some understanding of how Java objects are represented in
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memory (see Section 4.4.2). Briefly, tainting an object involves first separating the real
data (e.g., an objects fields) from the metadata (e.g., a field’s name) and then labeling the
real data as tainted. Checking taint is done in a similar manner.

4.4

Bridging the Semantic Gaps

This section discusses the methodology for rebuilding the two levels of semantic views.
Details for rebuilding information about processes, threads, memory mappings and system
calls at runtime are described first (the OS-level view) followed by details about the Dalvik
Virtual Machine and rebuilding the Java or Dalvik-level view.

4.4.1

Reconstructing the OS-level View

The native-level view is essential for analyzing native components. The machine-level
view provides insight into low-level execution details such as the native instructions being
executed. Since the details are defined as part of the Application Binary Interface and
Instruction Set Architecture documentation, it will not be elaborated further here. The
focus is on the OS-level view.
The basic techniques for reconstructing the OS-level view have been well studied for the
x86 architecture and are generally known as virtual machine introspection [17–19]. The
core idea is to understand which data structures contain pertinent information and how the
data structures can be reached and interpreted from the low level, raw, view of the virtual
machine’s state. This section focuses on the kind of information that is made available to
analysts through the II either in the form of new events or query and set functions.
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System Calls A user-level process has to make system calls to access various system
resources and thus obtaining its system call behavior is essential for understanding
malicious Apps. On the ARM architecture, the service zero instruction svc #0 (also known
as swi #0) is used to make system calls with the system call number in register r7. This is
similar to x86 where the int 0x80 instruction is used to transition into privileged mode
and the system call number is passed through the eax register.
To obtain system call information, additional TCG-IR instructions are inserted to call a
helper function whenever the special instructions above are translated (i.e., the special
instructions are instrumented). This helper function then dispatches the system call event
to functions that registered for the even using the II.
For example, a plugin that logs system calls can simply register for the event and when
notified, log the program counter of the caller and the system call number. For important
system calls (e.g., open, close, read, write and connect), the system call parameters and
return values can also be retrieved as well. The parameters are read them from the general
purpose registers and/or the stack and interpreted based on the published system call
interface. Block begin events are registered for the return address of the system call and
the return value is retrieved when the event callback function is notified.

Shadow Task List From the operating system perspective, Android Apps are user-level
processes. Therefore, it is important to know what processes are active and which one is
currently running. A shadow task list with select information about each task is
maintained to make this information readily available to analysis tools. The shadow task
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list can be accessed through the II. Analysts can also register for events based on whether a
new task has been added, removed or the details have changed.
The basic executable unit in the Linux kernel is the task, which is represented by the
task struct structure. A list of active tasks is maintained in a task struct list which is
pointed to by init task. To distinguish between a thread and a process, a task’s process
identifier pid as well as its thread group identifier tgid is retrieved from the guest’s
memory space. The pgd (the page global directory that specifies the memory space of a
process), uid (the unique user ID associated with each App), and the process’ name are
also maintained as part of the shadow task list. Additionally, experience has shown that
malware often escalates its privileges or spawns child processes to perform additional
duties. Thus, the shadow task list also contains the task’s credentials (i.e., uid, gid,
euid, egid as well as the process’ parent pid).
Special attention is paid to a task’s name since the comm field in task struct can only
store up to 15 characters. This is often insufficient to store the App’s full name, making it
difficult to pinpoint a specific App. This is also a simple example of how malware analysis
in desktops differs from mobile systems. To address this issue, the complete application
name is obtained from the command line string cmdline, which is pointed to by the
mm struct structure pointed to by task struct. Note that the command line string is
located in user-space memory, which is not shared like kernel-space memory where all the
other structures and fields reside. To put it differently, the guest virtual addresses in all
other structures and fields can be translated into guest physical addresses using the page
tables of any guest process. In contrast, the GVA for cmdline can only be translated into
the correct GPA using that process’ page table.
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According to the design of the Linux kernel, the task struct for the current process
can be easily located. The current thread info structure is always located at the (stack
pointer & 0x1fff), and thread info has a pointer pointing to the current task struct.
All active tasks are identified by iterating through the doubly linked task struct list. To
ensure that the shadow list is up to date, it is updated whenever the sys fork, sys execve,
sys clone and sys prctl system calls are executed.
Process Logger. Experience has shown that a history of all the threads and processes
in a system is useful for quickly understanding the parent and child relationships between
the different processes over time. Thus, a plugin that registers for the task begin and end
events and logs the detailed information about the process is implemented as part of the
OS-level view.

Memory Map A process’ memory map reveals how a process’ virtual memory space is
segmented and the intended purpose of each segment. This information is useful for
analysts and is needed for reconstructing the Java-level view. This is especially true for
newer versions of Android, such as Ice Cream Sandwich, with address space layout
randomization enabled by default. The virtual address of a library can be directly retrieved
from the memory map, even if the virtual address changes with each execution of a
program.
Similar to the shadow task list, a shadow memory map is built and made available to
analysts as part of the OS-level view. Plugins can also register for the memory map
updated event.
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The shadow memory map is buit by iterating through the list of virtual memory areas
by following the mmap pointer in the mm struct pointed to by the task struct. The
information gathered includes the address range, the permissions and the name of the file if
it is mapped. Also like the shadow task list, the shadow memory map information is
updated when a system call (sys mmap2) returns. Note that each process has its own
shadow memory map. Due to this, only the memory map for the currently executing
process is updated.

4.4.2

Reconstructing the Dalvik View

Reconstructing the Java or Dalvik view requires knowledge of how the DVM operates
as well as the shadow lists in the OS-level view. The goal of the Dalvik view is to allow
analysts to interpret Dalvik instructions, the current DVM machine state and even Java
Objects. The pertinent details are presented in this section. Note that the following
descriptions are primarily based on the ARM architecture. Some details on the x86
architecture are provided as needed. Furthermore, the descriptions are for Android
Gingerbread. While the concepts should remain the same, some details might differ from
version to version. This in turn means that the introspection implementations will need to
updated to match the changes in the future.

Dalvik Instructions and mterp The DVM’s main task is to execute Dalvik bytecode
instructions. In Gingerbread and thereafter, it does so in two ways: interpretation and
Just-In-Time compilation (JIT) [128].
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Opcode * 0x40
0x0 rIBase:dvmAsmInstructionStart
0x40
0x80

nop
move
move/from16

0x800
0x840

instance-of
array-length

ldrh r7, [r4, #2]!
and ip, r7, #255
add pc, r8, ip, lsl #6
push{r4,r5,r6,r7,r8,r9,sl,fp,lr}
sub sp, sp, #4
.
.
nop
nop
nop
lsr r3, r7, #12
lsr r9, r7, #8
ldr r0, [r5, r3, lsl #2]
and r9, r9, #15
cmp r0, #0
.
.
cmp r0, r1
beq<dvmAsmSisterStart+0xe4>
b<dvmAsmSisterStart+0xd0>

Fig. 4.2.: Dalvik Opcode Emulation Layout in mterp

The interpreter, named mterp, uses an offset-addressing method to map Dalvik opcodes
to machine code blocks as shown in Figure 4.2. Each opcode has 64 bytes of memory to
store the corresponding emulation code, and any emulation code that does not fit within
the 64 bytes use an overflow area, dvmAsmSisterStart, (see instance-of in Figure 4.2).
This design simplifies the emulation of Dalvik instructions. mterp simply calculates the
offset (opcode ∗ 64) and jumps to the corresponding emulation block.
This design also simplifies the reverse conversion from native to Dalvik instructions as
well: when the program counter (R15) points to any of these code regions, the DVM is
interpreting a Dalvik bytecode instruction. Furthermore, it is trivial to determine the
opcode of the currently executing Dalvik instruction. The formula is (R15 − rIBase)/64,
where rIBase is the virtual address of the beginning of the emulation code region. rIBase is
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dynamically calculated as the virtual address of libdvm.so (obtained from the shadow
memory map in the OS-level view) plus the offset of dvmAsmInstructionStart (a debug
symbol). The emulation code for Dalvik opcode number 0 (nop) can be used as a signature
to search for the start of the emulation section if the debug symbol is not available.
The Dalvik view registers for the block begin events in order to determine when a
Dalvik bytecode instruction begins and issue the corresponding Dalvik Instruction Begin
event that is part of the II. Since there are only 256 possible opcodes and each opcode takes
only 64 bytes, only the block begin events for the pages that contain the emulation code
are registered for. In other words, the instrumentation logic described previously will not
insert the TCG-IR to call the helper function for any other basic blocks except the ones
that contains Dalvik emulation code or were requested by other plugins. Furthermore, the
Dalvik view only registers for these events if there are plugins that registed for the Dalvik
instruction begin event. Once again, the event based callback interface is very dynamic.
Detecting the beginning of a method involves keeping track of whether the previous
Dalvik instruction was one of the invoke* instructions along with making consistency
checks (e.g., making sure it is in the same thread). Optimized block begin callbacks are
also used for this purpose.

Selectively Disabling JIT The Just-In-Time compiler was introduced to improve
performance by compiling heavily used, or “hot”, Dalvik instruction traces (consisting of
multiple code blocks) directly into native machine code. While each translated trace has a
single entry point, there can be multiple exits known as chaining cells. These chaining cells
either chain to other translated traces or to default entry points of the mterp interpreter.
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Fig. 4.3.: High Level Flowchart of mterp and JIT

Overall, JIT provides an excellent performance boost for programs that contain many hot
code regions, although it makes fine-grained instrumentation more difficult. This is because
JIT performs optimization on one or more Dalvik code blocks and thus blurs the Dalvik
instruction boundaries.
An easy solution would be to completely disable JIT at build time, but it could incur a
heavy performance penalty and more importantly it requires changes to the virtual device,
which can lead to transparency problems. Considering that analysts are often only
interested in the behavior of a particular section of Dalvik bytecode (such as the main
program but not the rest of system libraries), an alternative solution is to selectively
disable JIT at runtime. Analysis plugins specify the code regions for which to disable JIT
using the II and as a result only the Dalvik blocks in those regions incur the performance
penalty. All other regions and Apps still benefit from JIT.
Figure 4.3 shows the general flow of the DVM. It is similar to the dynamic binary
translation steps taken by QEMU. When a basic block of Dalvik bytecode needs to be

95
emulated, the Dalvik program counter is updated to reflect the new block’s address. That
address is then checked against the translation cache to determine if a translated trace for
the block already exists. If it does, the trace is executed. If it does not then the profiler
will decrement a counter for that block. When this counter reaches 0, the block is
considered hot and a JIT compilation requested. Compilation takes place in another
thread. To prevent thrashing, the counter is reset to a higher value and emulation using
mterp commences. As can be seen in the flow chart, as long as the requested code is not in
the code cache, then mterp will be used to emulate the code.
The dvmGetCodeAddr function is used to determine whether a translated trace exists. It
returns NULL if a trace does not exist and the address of the corresponding trace if it does.
Thus, to selectively disable JIT, the DVM is instrumented to set the return value of
dvmGetCodeAddr to NULL for any translated trace that needs to be disabled. In this case,
instrumentation involves registering a callback for when the function returns, and when it
does, alter the return value to NULL. This process is the same as the one used to update the
shadow lists in the OS-level view, except for the fact that the return value is changed in
this case.
It is imperative that changing the return value does not change the program’s original
flow. The following arguments are used to show that this is indeed true. They are based on
the source code for Android Gingerbread and so the validity of these arguments might have
to be revisited for other Android versions if the JIT logic changed.
First, if the original return value was NULL then the change will not have any side
effects. Second, if the return value was a valid address, then by setting it to NULL, the
profile counter is decremented and if 0 (i.e., the code region deemed hot again) another
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compilation request is issued for the block. In this case, the code will be recompiled taking
up space in the code cache. This can be prevented by not instrumenting the
dvmGetCodeAddr call from the compiler. In addition to preventing the translated trace
from being executed, setting the value to NULL also prevents it from being chained to other
traces. This is the desired behavior.
For the special case where a translated trace has already been chained and thus
dvmGetCodeAddr is not called, the JIT cache should be flushed whenever the disabled JIT
configuration changes (e.g., JIT for a new code region needs to be disabled). This can be
done by marking the JIT cache as full during the next garbage collection event, which
leads to a cache flush. Once again these changes are made from the VMM through
instrumentation. While this is not a perfect solution, it has been sufficient for the
evaluations. Full JIT support is left as future work.
In all cases, the only side effect is wasted CPU cycles due to compilation; the execution
logic is unaffected. Therefore, the side effects are inconsequential.

DVM State Figure 4.4 illustrates how the DVM maintains the virtual machine state.
When mterp is emulating Dalvik instructions, the ARM registers r4 through r8 store the
current DVM execution context. More specifically, r4 is the Dalvik program counter,
pointing to the current Dalvik instruction. r5 is the Dalvik stack frame pointer, pointing
to the beginning of the current stack frame. r6 points to the InterpState data structure,
called glue. r7 contains the first two bytes of the current Dalvik instruction, including the
opcode. Finally r8 stores the base address of the mterp emulation code for the current
DVM instruction. In x86, edx, esi, edi and ebx are used to store the program counter,
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InterpState
{
…
Jvalue retval;
...
Thread* self;
…
}

framework.jar@
classes.dex
low address

android.app.ContextImpl.SharedPreferencesImpl.getInt:(Ljava/lang/String;I)I:

Fig. 4.4.: Dalvik Virtual Machine State

frame pointer, mterp base address and the first two bytes of the instruction respectively.
The glue object can be found on the stack at a predefined offset. Dalvik virtual registers
are 32 bits and are stored in reverse order on the stack. They are referenced relative to the
frame pointer r5. Hence, the virtual register v0 is located at the top of the stack (pointed
to by the ARM register r5,) and the virtual register v1 sits on top of v0 in memory, and so
forth. All other Dalvik state information (such as return value and thread information) is
obtained through the glue data structure pointed to by r6.
By understanding how the DVM state is represented in the CPU registers and memory,
detailed information such as the current DVM program counter, frame pointer and all
virtual registers can be retrieved at runtime. The only requirement is knowing when the
mterp interpreter is executing. In the minimum, this is true whenever the instruction
pointer is pointing to the Dalvik bytecode emulation section.
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struct Object {
ClassObject* clazz;
u4
lock;
};

struct StringObject {
Object
obj;
u4
instanceData[1];
};

struct ArrayObject {
Object
obj;
u4
length;
u8
contents[1];
};

java.lang.String ClassObject
V3 (In 1)

char[] ClassObject

ClassObject*

lock

lock

ArrayObject*

align_pad

hashcode

0x0048 'H', 0x0045 'e'

offset (0)
count (5)

contents

instanceData

ClassObject*

0x006c 'l', 0x006c 'l'
0x006f 'o', 0x0000
0x0000, 0x0000

Fig. 4.5.: String Object Example

Java Objects Java Objects are described using two data structures. Firstly, ClassObject
describes a class type and contains important information about that class: the class name,
where it is defined in a dex file, the size of the object, the methods, and the location of the
member fields within the object instances. To standardize class representations, Dalvik
creates a ClassObject for each defined class type and implicit class type (e.g., arrays). For
example, there is a ClassObject that describes a char[] which is used by
java.lang.String. Moreover, if the App has a two dimensional array (e.g., String[][]),
then Dalvik creates a ClassObject to describe the String[] and another to describe the
array of the previously described String[] class.
Secondly, as an abstract type, Object describes a runtime object instance (i.e., the
member fields). Each Object has a pointer to the ClassObject that it is an instance of plus
a tail accumulator array for storing all member fields. Dalvik defines three types of Objects,
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DataObject, StringObject and ArrayObject that are all pointed to by generic Object*s. The
correct interpretation of any Object* fully depends on the ClassObject that it points to.
A simple String (“Hello”) is used to illustrate the interpretation process. Figure 4.5
depicts the different data structures involved as well as the struct definitions on top. The
String is referenced by the virtual register v3. Since Java references are simply Object*s,
v3 points to an Object. To determine the type of the object, the first 4 bytes of the object
is used to reach the ClassObject structure. This ClassObject instance describes the
java.lang.String class. Internally, Dalvik does not store the String data inside the
StringObject and instead use a char[]. Consequently, instanceData[0] is used to store
the reference to the corresponding char[] object and instanceData[3] is used to store
the number of characters in the String, 5 in this case.
Then, the String’s data is obtained by following instanceData[0] to the character
array. Once again the Object* within the new object must be used to correctly interpret it
as an ArrayObject. Note that since ARM EABI (Embedded Application Binary Interface)
requires all arrays to be aligned to its element size and u8 is 8 bytes in length, an implicit 4
byte align pad was inserted into the ArrayObject to ensure that the contents array is
properly aligned. Given the length of the String from the StringObject and the
corroborating length in the ArrayObject, the “Hello” String is found in the contents array
encoded in UTF-16.
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4.4.3

Symbol Information

Symbols (such as function name, class name, field name, etc.) provide valuable
information for human analysts to understand program execution. Thus, a symbol
database is maintained for access through the II. For portability and ASLR support, a
single database of offsets to symbols is used per module. At runtime, finding a symbol by a
virtual address requires first identifying the containing module using the shadow memory
map, and then calculating the offset to search the database.
Native library symbols are retrieved statically through objdump and are usually limited
to Android libraries since malware libraries are often stripped of all symbol information.
On the other hand, Dalvik or Java symbols are retrieved dynamically and static symbol
information through dexdump is used as a fallback. This has the advantage of ensuring the
best symbol coverage for optimized dex files and even dynamically generated Dalvik
bytecode.
More DVM data structures are used to retrieve symbols at runtime. For example, the
Method structure contains two pointers of interest. insns points to the symbol address (in
other words, the start of the method’s bytecode) and name points to the method’s name
(this field is located in the memory mapped dex file). Conveniently, the glue structure
pointed to by R6 has a field, method, that points to the Method structure for the currently
executing method.
There are times when this procedure fails though, e.g., if the corresponding page of the
dex file has not been loaded into memory yet. In these cases, the offset into the dex file can
be calculated using the shadow memory map and the information retrieved from a local
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copy of the corresponding dex file. If this fails as well, then the static symbol information
from dexdump is used as a last resort. This same basic method of relying on the DVM’s
data structures is used to dynamically retrieve class and field names as well.

4.5

Plugins

The architecture including the Instrumentation Interface, the OS-level view and Java or
Dalvik-level views were implemented in a tool named DroidScope. DroidScope is built on
top of the Android emulator that ships with the Android Gingerbread source. The Android
emulator is in turn based on QEMU version 0.10.50. This section discusses the plugins that
were implemented to illustrate the flexibility of analysis tool development.

4.5.1

Sample Plugin

Figure 4.6 presents sample code for implementing a simple Dalvik instruction tracer.
This is not a real plugin and the functions prototypes are not the ones found in the actual
DroidScope implementation. The init function at L19 will be called once this plugin is
loaded in DroidScope. The init function specifies which program to analyze by calling the
setTargetByName function. It also registers a callback module callback to be called when
module information is updated. module callback will check if the DVM is loaded and if so,
disable JIT for the entire memory space (L9 and L11.) It also registers a callback,
opcode callback, for Dalvik instructions. When called, opcode callback prints the opcode
information.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

void opcode_callback(uint32_t opcode) {
printf("[%x] %s\n", GET_RPC, opcodeToStr(opcode));
}
void module_callback(int pid) {
if (bInitialized || (getIBase(pid) == 0))
return;
gva_t startAddr = 0, endAddr = 0xFFFFFFFF;
addDisableJITRange(pid, startAddr, endAddr);
disableJITInit(getGetCodeAddrAddress(pid));
addMterpOpcodesRange(pid, startAddr, endAddr);
dalvikMterpInit(getIBase(pid));
registerDalvikInsnBeginCb(&opcode_callback);
bInitialized = 1;
}
void _init() {
setTargetByName("com.andhuhu.fengyinchuanshuo");
registerTargetModulesUpdatedCb(&module_callback);
}

Fig. 4.6.: Sample code for Dalvik Instruction Tracer

This sample code will print all Dalvik instructions for the specified App, including the
main program and all libraries. If the analyst is only interested in the execution of the
main program, he or she can add call the II function getModAddr(”example@classes.dex”,
&startAddr, &endAddr) at L10. This function locates the dex file in the shadow memory
map and stores its start and end addresses in the appropriate variables. The rest of the
code can be left untouched.

4.5.2

Analysis Plugins

To demonstrate the flexibility of analysis plugin development as well as DroidScope’s
ability to analyze Android malware, four analysis plugins have been implemented: API
tracer, native instruction tracer, Dalvik instruction tracer, and taint tracker.
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API tracer monitors how an App (including Java and native components) interacts
with the rest of the system through system and library calls. First all of the App’s system
calls are logged by registering for system call events. A whitelist of the virtual device’s
built-in native and Java libraries is then created to list all of the libraries that should not
be traced. As modules are loaded into memory, any library not in the whitelist is marked
for analysis. The invoke* and execute* Dalvik bytecodes are used to identify and log
method invocations, including those of the sample. Since this is a small number of
instructions, block begin events at the start of the instructions’ emulation code are used to
determine when these Dalvik bytecode instructions are being emulated instead of the
Dalvik instruction begin events. This improves performance.
The log contains the currently executing Java thread, the calling address, the method
being invoked as well as a dump of its input parameters. Since Java Strings are heavily
used, all Strings are converted into native strings before logging when possible. Then, the
move-result* bytecode instructions are instrumented to detect when system methods return
and gather the return values. Once again, block begin events are used in lieu of Dalvik
instruction begin events.
To log library calls from the App’s native components, block end events for blocks that
are located in the App’s native components are used. When the callback for a block end
event is invoked, the address of the next block is check to see whether it is within the
App’s native components. If not, then it signals a control flow transition from the App to
the system libraries, and so the event is logged.
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Native instruction tracer registers ARM or x86 instruction callbacks to gather
information about each instruction including the raw instruction, its operands (register and
memory) and their values. These are logged into files.
Dalvik instruction tracer follows the basic logic of the above example and logs the
decoded instruction to a file in the dexdump format. The operands, their values and all
available symbol information (e.g., class, field and method names), are logged as well.
Taint tracker utilizes the dynamic taint analysis APIs to analyze information leakage
in an Android App. It specifies sensitive information sources (such as IMEI, IMSI, and
contact information) as tainted and keeps track of taint propagation at the machine code
level until they reach sinks, e.g. sys write and sys send.
With the OS and Dalvik views, it further creates a graphical representation to visualize
how sensitive information has leaked out. Whenever taint is propagated, a node that
represents the currently executing function or method and nodes for the tainted memory
locations are added. Since methods operate on Java Objects, an attempt is made to
identify the containing Object and a node created for it instead of the simple memory
location. This is done for a method’s input parameters, the current object (i.e., “this”) and
returned objects.

4.6

Evaluation

The simplicity of the event based instrumentation interface and the analysis plugins
that were built using the Instrumentation Interface showed that DroidScope, like other
emulation based malware analysis platforms, is flexible for analysis plugin development.
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What remains to be show is that the infrastructure and plugins do not impose too much of
a performance overhead (i.e., is efficient) and that the plugins are capable of analyzing real
world Android malware with both Java and native components.
Seven benchmark Apps from the official Android Market are used to evaluate
introspection and plugin performance. The Apps are: AnTuTu Benchmark (ABenchMark)
by AnTuTu, CaffeineMark by Ravi Reddy, CF-Bench by Chainfire, Mobile processor
benchmark (Multicore) by Andrei Karpushonak, Benchmark by Softweg, and Linpack by
GreeneComputing. The results are presented in Section 4.6.1.
Two real world Android malware samples, DroidKungFu and DroidDream, are analyzed
using the developed plugins to evaluate capability. The detailed analysis results are
presented in Sections 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 respectively.

Experimental Setup All experiments were conducted on an Acer 4830TG with a Core
i5 @ 2.40GHz and 3GB of RAM running Xubuntu 11.10. The Android guest is a
Gingerbread build configured as “user-eng” for ARM with the Linux 2.6.29 kernel and uses
the QEMU default memory size of 96 MB. No changes were made to the Android source
unless otherwise noted.

4.6.1

Performance

To measure the performance impact of instrumentation, the analysis plugins were used
to analyze the various benchmark Apps while the Apps performed their tests. This was
repeated 5 times. The default Android emulator without any instrumentation is used as a
baseline. Also, since DroidScope selectively disables JIT on the Apps, the Android source
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Fig. 4.7.: Benchmark Results
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was configured to completely disable JIT to establish a NOJIT baseline. This is the only set
of performance tests that required changes to the Android source. The results are
summarized in the bar chart in Figure 4.7. Each tool is associated with a set of bars that
shows its averaged benchmark results (y-axis) relative to the baseline as a percentage. The
ARM Instruction Tracer results are excluded as they are similar to the taint tracker results.
Please note that the benchmarks are not perfect representations of performance as
evidenced by the > 100% results. For example, in CPUBenchmark the standard deviation,
σ, for Baseline, Dalvik tracer and Context Only is only 1%. This means that the results
are consistent for each plugin, but might not be across plugins. Furthermore, the Softweg
filesystem benchmarking results were removed due to high variability, σ > 27%.
It can be seen from Figure 4.7 that the overhead (Context Only) of reconstructing the
OS-level view is very small, up to 7% degradation. The taint tracker has the worst
performance as expected, because it registers for instruction level events. The taint tracker
incurs 11x to 34x slowdown, which is comparable to other taint analysis tools [56, 94] on
the x86 architecture. A special case is seen in the Dalvik instruction tracer result for
CaffeineMark. This result is attributed to the fact that the tracer dynamically retrieves
symbol information from guest memory for logging.
The benefits of dynamically disabling JIT is evident in some Java based benchmarks
such as Linpack, CFBench/Java and CaffeineMark. For those benchmarks, the API
tracer’s performance is greater than that of the NOJIT Baseline, despite the fact that
instrumentation is taking place. This difference is due to Java libraries, such as String
methods, still benefiting from JIT in the API tracer.
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4.6.2

Analysis of DroidKungFu

The DroidKungFu (DKF) malware contains three components. First, the core logic is
implemented in Java and is contained within the com.google.ssearch package. This is
the main target of the investigation. Second are the exploit binaries which are encrypted in
the apk, decrypted by the Java component and then subsequently executed. Third is a
native library that is used as a shell. It contains JNI exported functions that can run shell
commands and is the main interface for command and control. Unfortunately the
command and control server was unavailable and thus this feature was not analyzed.

Discovering the Internal Logic The investigation began with the API tracer plugin.
The plugin provides a high level view of how DKF interacts with the rest of the system.
Behavior analysis started with a search for system calls of interest in the log. One such call
is a sys open for a file named “gjsvro”. There was also a subsequent sys write to the file
from a byte array. Further analysis showed that this array is actually part of a Java
ArrayObject which was populated by the Utils.decrypt method, which is part of
DroidKungFu. Since decrypt takes a byte array as the parameter, a backwards search
through the log revealed that this particular array was read from an asset inside the App’s
package file called “gjsvro”. It means that during execution, DroidKungFu decrypts an
asset from its package and generates the “gjsvro” file.
Subsequent entries in the log showed DroidKungFu invoking Runtime.exec with
parameters “chmod 4755” and the name of the file, making “gjsvro” executable and setting
the setuid bit. After that, Runtime.exec is invoked again for “su” which led to a sys fork.
Furthermore, the file path for “gjsvro” was then written to a ProcessImpl OutputStream,
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getPermission {
if checkPermission() then doSearchReport(); return
if !isVersion221() then
if getPermission1() then return
if exists("bin/su" or "xbin/su") then
getPermission2(); return
if !isVersion221() then getPermission3(); return
}

Fig. 4.8.: getPermission Pseudocode

followed immediately by “exit”. Since this stream is piped to the child’s stdin, it is
evidence that the intention of “su” was to open a shell which is then used to execute
“gjsvro” followed by “exit” to close the shell. This did not work though since “su” did not
execute successfully.
Given the high level view provided by the API tracer, a more detailed analysis was
conducted using the Dalvik instruction tracer. The resulting trace showed that the decrypt
and Runtime.exec methods were invoked from a method called getPermission2, which was
called from getPermission following a comparison using the result of isVersion221 and
some file existence checks. To get a more complete picture of the getPermission method,
dexdump was used to disassemble the class file. The overview pseudocode is shown in
Figure 4.8 . The pseudocode shows that the different method invocations must be
instrumented and their return values changed in order to explore the getPermission1 and
getPermission3 methods.
With the Dalvik view support, the return values of the isVersion221 and exist methods
were modified and the remaining methods explored. They are essentially different ways to
obtain the root privilege on different Android configurations. getPermission1 and
getPermission2 only uses the “gjsvro” exploit. The main difference is that getPermission1
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uses Runtime.exec to execute the exploit while the other uses the “su” shell. On the other
hand, getPermission3 decrypts “ratc”, “killall” (a wrapper for “ratc”) and “gjsvro” and
executes them using its own native library. The native library’s behavior can be observed
from the API tracer log. The log showed the library using sys vfork and sys execve to
execute both the “udev” and “rage against the cage” (ratc) exploits.

Analyzing Root Exploits Since Gingerbread has already been patched against these
exploits, they never executed correctly. The patches were removed from the Android source
and a vulnerable virtual device created to further analyze the exploits. The steps used to
understanding ratc is described here, udev is analyzed in the same manner and its analysis
is therefore skipped.
Once again, analysis started with the API tracer. However, no malicious behavior was
evident in the log. There was some suspicious behavior in the process log provided as part
of the OS-view reconstruction though. In particular, the process log showed numerous ratc
processes (descendants of the original ratc process) being spawned, the adbd process with
uid 2000 ending, followed by more ratc processes and then by an adbd process with uid 0
or root. This signifies that the attack was successful. It is worth noting that the traditional
adb based dynamic analysis would fail to observe the entire exploiting process, because
adbd is killed at the beginning.
Further analysis of the logs and descendent processes showed that there are in fact
three types of ratc processes. The first is the original ratc process that simply iterates
through the /proc directory looking for the pid of the adbd process. Its child then forked
itself until sys fork returned -11 or EAGAIN. At this point it wrote some data to a pipe
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and resumed forking. In the grandchild process a call to sys kill is used to kill the adbd
process followed by attempts to locate the adbd process after it re-spawns.

Trace-Based Exploit Diagnosis of “ratc” An example of exploit diagnosis using the
ARM instruction tracer on ratc is presented in this section. These results corroborate with
publicly available information on ratc and the setuid exhaustion vulnerability.
By design, adbd is supposed to downgrade its privileges by setting its uid to
AID SHELL (2000), and yet adbd retained its root privileges after the attack. Thus, in an
effort to identify the root cause of the vulnerability, DroidScope was used to gather an
ARM instruction trace that includes both user and kernel code.
A simplified and annotated log is shown in Figure 4.9. In the log, the instruction’s
address comes first followed by a colon, the decoded instruction and then the operands.
The instructions are also indented to illustrate the relative stack depth.
The log begins when setgid returns from the kernel space and returns back to adb main
at address 0x0000c3a4. Almost immediately, the log shows setuid being called. After
transitioning into kernel mode, sys setuid is called followed by a call to set user. Later an
entry shows set user returning an error code 0xfffffff5 which is (-11 in 2’s complement or
-EAGAIN).
Tracing backwards in the log revealed that this error code was the result of the
RLIMIT NPROC check in set user. This reveals why setuid failed to downgrade adbd’s
privileges. Further analysis of the log showed that the return value from setuid was not
used by adbd nor was a call to getuid seen. The same applies to setgid. This indicates that
adbd failed to ensure that it was no longer running as root. Thus, the analysis shows that
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;;;setgid
0000813c:
00008140:
00008144:
;; Return

returns from kernel back to adbd
pop {r4, r7}
movs r0, r0
bxpl lr : Read Oper[0]. R14, Val = 0xc3a5
back to 0xc3a4 (caller) in Thumb mode

;;;adbd_main sets up for setuid
0000c3a4: movs r0, #250
0000c3a6: lsls r0, r0, #3 : Write Oper[0]. R0, Val = 0x7d0
;; 250 * 8 = 0x7d0 = 2000 = AID_SHELL
...
;;;Start of setuid section
;;; 213 is syscall number for sys_setuid
00008be0: push {r4, r7} : Write Oper[0]. M@be910bb8, Val = 0x7d0
;; push AID_SHELL onto the stack
00008be4: mov r7, #213
00008be8: svc 0x00000000
;; Make sys call
;;; === TRANSITION TO KERNEL SPACE ===
;;;sys_setuid then calls set_user in kernel mode
;;;inside sys_setuid
;; Has rlimit been reached?
c0048944: cmp r2, r3 : Read Oper[0]. R3, Val = 300 Read Oper[1]. R2, Val = 300
;;; RLIMIT(300) is reached and !init_user so return -11
c0048960: mvn r0, #10 : Write Oper[0]. R0, Val = 0xfffffff5
;; the return value is now -11 or -EAGAIN
c0048964: ldmib sp, {r4, r5, r6, fp, sp, pc}
;;;Return back to sys_setuid which returns back to userspace
;;; === RETURN TO USERSPACE ===
;;;setuid continues
00008bec: pop {r4, r7}
00008bf0: movs r0, r0 : Read Oper[0]. R0, Val = 0xfffffff5
;; -11 is still here
;;;Return back to adb_main at 0xc3ac (the return address) above
;;; Immediately starts other work, does not check return code
0000c3ac: ldr r7, [pc, #356] : Read Oper[0]. M@0000c514, Val = 0x19980330
Write Oper[0]. R7, Val = 0x19980330
;; 0x19980330 is _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION

Fig. 4.9.: Annotated adbd trace
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the vulnerability is due to two factors, RLIMIT NPROC and failure to verify successful
privilege downgrading.

Triggering Data leakage Reverting back to the default unchanged Gingerbread build,
the Dalvik instruction tracer and taint tracker were used to understand the information
leakage behavior in doSearchReport. As depicted in Figure 4.8, this involved instrumenting
checkPermission during execution of getPermission. The Dalvik instruction trace showed
doSearchReport invoking updateInfo, which obtained sensitive information about the device
including the device model, build version and IMEI amongst other things. Outgoing HTTP
requests, which failed because the server was down, were also observed. These HTTP
requests were then redirected to a specially created HTTP server by adding a new entry
into /etc/hosts.
getDeviceId()
String @ 0x40524e80
“123456789012345”
UrlEncodedFormEntity.<init>

String @ 0x4056a448
“imei=123456789012345&ostype=...”
AbstractHttpClient.execute()

byte[ ] @ 405967c0 / void* @ 405967d0
“POST /search/sayhi.php HTTP/1.1...”
sys_write(34, 0x405967d0, 397)

Fig. 4.10.: Taint Graph for Droid Kung Fu
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The taint tracker was used to further analyze this information leakage. A simplified
taint propagation graph is shown in Figure 4.10. Objects, both Java and native, are
represented by rectangular nodes while methods are represented by oval nodes. The figure
shows UrlEncodedFormEntity (the constructor) propagating the original tainted IMEI
number in the String @ 0x40524e80 to a second String that looks like an HTTP request.
The taint then propagated to a byte array at 0x405967c0 by AbstractHttpClient.execute. It
finally arrived at the sink at sys write. Note that sys write used a void* at 0x405967d0,
which is the contents array of the byte array Object (see the StringObject example in
Section 4.4.2). This is expected since JNI provides direct access to arrays to save on the
cost of a memory copy.

4.6.3

Analysis of DroidDream

Like analyzing DroidKungFu, the API tracer was used to get a basic understanding of
DroidDream, and then instruction traces were obtained and information leakage analyzed.
The logs generated by the API tracer and the OS-view, showed two DroidDream
processes. “com.droiddream.lovePositions,” the main process, does not exhibit any
malicious behavior except using Runtime.exec to execute “logcat -c” which clears Android’s
internal log. Again, this behavior indicates that traditional Android debugging tools fall
short for malware analysis.
“com.droiddream.lovePositions:remote,” the other process, is the malicious one. The
logs showed DroidDream retrieving the IMSI number along with other sensitive information
like IMEI, and encoded them into an XML String. Next, a failed attempt to open a
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getSubscriberId()
String @ 0x40522a10
“310260000000000”
Formatter.format()
String @ 0x40523288
“<?xml version="1.0" ...”
getBytes()
byte[] @ 0x405232a8

crypt()
ByteArrayInputStream
API Native Memory
sys_write(33, 405261a8, 257)

Fig. 4.11.: Taint Graph for DroidDream

network connection to 184.105.245.17:8080 was seen. This time, a different approach was
used to observe the networking behavior. The return values of sys connect and sys write
were instrumented to make DroidDream believe these network operations were successful.
Using the taint tracker, the IMSI was marked tainted and a taint propagation graphs
was obtained, which confirm that DroidDream did leak sensitive information from these
sources to a remote HTTP server. The simplified graph for leaking IMSI information is
illustrated in Figure 4.11. The graph was also annotated to include crypt which is the
DroidDream method used to xor-encrypt the byte array. The graph shows that
getSubscriberId was used to obtain the IMSI from the system as a String @ 0x40522a10.
The IMSI String, along with other information, were then encoded into an XML format
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[0x43328f40] aget-byte v2(0x01), v4(0x405232a8), v0(186)
Getting Tainted Memory: 0x40523372(0x2401372)
Adding M@0x410accec(0x42c5cec) len = 4
[0x43328f44] sget-object v3(0x0000005e), KEYVALUE// field@0003
[0x43328f48] aget-byte v3(88), v3(0x4051e288), v1(58)
[0x43328f4c] xor-int/2addr v2(62), v3(41)
Getting Tainted Memory: 0x410accec(0x42c5cec)
Adding M@0x410accec(0x42c5cec) len = 4
[0x43328f4e] int-to-byte v2(0x17), v2(23)
Getting Tainted Memory: 0x410accec(0x42c5cec)
Adding M@0x410accec(0x42c5cec) len = 4
[0x43328f50] aput-byte v2(17), v4(0x405232a8), v0(186)
Getting Tainted Memory: 0x410accec(0x42c5cec)
Adding M@0x40523372(0x2401372) len = 1

Fig. 4.12.: Excerpt of Dalvik Instruction Trace for DroidDream. A Dalvik
instruction entry shows the location of the current instruction in square brackets, the decoded
instruction plus the values of the virtual registers in parenthesis. A taint log entry is indented and
shows tainted memory being read or written to. The memory’s physical address is shown in
parenthesis and the total bytes tainted is represented by “len.”

using format. The resulting String was then converted into a byte[] @ 0x405232a8 for
encryption by crypt. The encrypted version was used to create a ByteArrayInputStream.
For brevity, a generic “API Native Memory” node is used to illustrate the taint further
propagating through memory until the eventual sink at sys write.
The crypt method was further investigated by augmenting the Dalvik instruction tracer
to track taint propagation and generate a taint-annotated Dalvik instruction trace. Not
only did the log entries show the byte array being xor-ed with a static field named
“KEYVALUE,” they also showed that the encryption was conducted on the byte[] in-place.
A snippet of the trace log is depicted in Figure 4.12.
DroidDream also includes the udev and ratc exploits (unencrypted), plus the native
library terminal like DroidKungFu. They were not further analyzed.
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4.7

Discussion

Limited Code Coverage Dynamic analysis is known to have limited code coverage, as
it only explores a single execution path at a time. To increase code coverage, one may
explore multiple execution paths as demonstrated in previous work [39–41]. Alternatively,
the experiments demonstrated that different paths can be explored by manipulating the
return values of system calls, native APIs and even internal Dalvik methods of the App.
This simple approach worked well, although a more systematic approach is desirable. One
method is to perform symbolic execution to compute path constraints and then
automatically explore other feasible paths. DroidScope does not yet support symbolic
execution and it is left as future work.

Detecting and Evading DroidScope

As with other emulation based malware

analysis platforms, transparency is an issue with DroidScope. More troubling are the
intrinsic differences between the emulated environment and mobile systems. Mobile devices
contain numerous sensors (e.g., GPS, motion and audio), with performance profiles which
might be difficult to emulate. While exploring multiple execution paths may be used to
bypass these types of tests, they might still not be sufficient. For example it was observed
that Android, as an interactive system, can be sensitive to the performance overhead due
to analysis. If the analysis takes too long, certain timeout events are triggered leading to
different execution paths or even the killing of the process being analyzed. The analyst
must be aware of these new challenges. Heterogeneous record and replay might be a
potential solution to this new class of transparency problems, but further investigation in
this area is needed.
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4.8

Conclusion

This chapter showed that the two levels of semantic information in Android platforms
can be effectively reconstructed from outside the virtual machine and seamlessly bound to
the execution so that cooperating Java and native components can be analyzed using one
single platform. Not only that, but this chapter also discussed the techniques used to build
a new, highly dynamic, emulation based malware analysis platform for analyzing Android
malware so that the advantages of flexibility and efficiency are preserved. The techniques
were implemented in DroidScope and verified by analyzing real-world malware. In short,
emulation based Android malware analysis is feasible.
With the results discussed in V2E and new ARM architectures supporting hardware
virtualization, it is foreseeable that DroidScope can achieve the same transparency
properties afforded by V2E. What remains of this dissertation is a fundamental
understanding of dynamic taint analysis so that its precision can be improved.
Additionally, the new found understanding will be used to determine whether DroidScope’s
assumption of tracking taint at the native instruction level, (e.g., ARM), is sufficient for
tracking information flows in both native and Java code is true.
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5. UNDERSTANDING DYNAMIC TAINT ANALYSIS
5.1

Introduction

Both V2E and DroidScope support dynamic taint analysis, albeit with slightly different
designs. What remains unknown is whether the propagation policies of these and other
taint analysis implementations are accurate and, if so, how precise. This chapter presents
results towards a better understanding of how the different design parameters of
taint-granularity, analysis-granularity and special case support affect false-positives and
false-negatives. Furthermore, methods for verifying the accuracy and precision of
implementations are also presented.
In an effort to focus the discussion, the models, definitions and examples will be framed
around taint analysis for bitvector machines. That is, the data items that are labeled
tainted or untainted can be represented as bitvectors, and the operations that propagate
the taints have bitvector operands. Both x86 and ARM are bitvector machines. While the
discussions are limited to bitvectors, the general concepts and observations are not.
Applications of the results to other machines, such as Java, are discussed briefly.
This chapter starts with the derivation of a model for analyzing the accuracy and
precision of taint propagation policies from the formal model of noninterference. The
commonly used terms of over-taint, under-taint, false-positive, false-negative, accurate and
precise are also defined against this model. These details are presented in Section 5.2. The
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relationship between the design parameters of taint-granularity, analysis-granularity and
special cases support and information flow is also discussed in the same section.
The sources of false-positives and false-negatives in practice, including the fundamental
relationships between the design parameters and false-positives, are discussed in Section
5.2.2. In brief, a taint analysis implementation with a coarser taint-granularity (e.g., 32 bit
word-level) can have more false-positives than an implementation with a finer
taint-granularity (e.g., byte-level). Similarly, propagating taint using an IR might also have
more false-positives than propagating taint through the native instructions. The methods
presented in this chapter can be used to verify that there are no false-positives.
To illustrate the benefits of a formal based approach, the information flow and
verification problems are formulated as satisfiability problems that can be solved using
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers. The Z3 SMT solver [129] is then used to
automatically generate a taint propagation policy that is guaranteed not to have any
false-negatives. This is done by first defining the behavioral semantics of 23 x86
instructions, and then using Z3 to calculate the information flows from input operands to
output operands at the bit level. The details are presented in Section 5.4.
In order the assess the quality of the automatically generated policy, it is scrutinized by
itself and then compared to the policies used in previously published taint analysis
platforms in terms of false-positives and false-negatives. Additionally, since some
implementations have special rules for reducing false-positives, they are verified for
correctness using the formal model. Comparison and verification are discussed in Section
5.5. Also discussed in the same section is DroidScope’s assumption that Dalvik-level
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tainting is unnecessary(Section 5.5.5). Finally, limitations are presented in Section 5.6 and
conclusions drawn in Section 5.7.

5.2

Formal Foundation

This section begins with the derivation of the formal model used to analyze taint
propagation policies. This model is used to analyze the information flows between data
items (e.g., input and output operands), and is based on noninterference. Once the model
is established, observations on how the design parameters of taint-granularity,
analysis-granularity and special cases support can be mapped to model are made.
Additionally, the taint analysis challenges outlined in the Background Chapter false-positives, false-negatives, sanitization, and implicit flows - are also mapped to the
formal model. In short, these challenges arise from the definition of noninterference; there
are fundamental limits to how precise a taint propagation policy can be.
This section concludes with a description of what a taint policy is and what it should
be. In particular, a “golden policy” is defined to enforce the noninterference property
exactly. This golden policy is then used to define the common terms of over-tainting,
false-positives, etc.
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5.2.1

Noninterference

Noninterference was first described by Goguen and Meseguer [20] to analyze the
information flows between users in a multi-user system. They defined a machine M that
consists of:

S : the set of machine states
s0 : the initial state
U : the set of users
C : the set of commands
(U × C) : the set of inputs
(U × C)∗ : the set of input sequences

For simplicity, (U × C)∗ is called a program and a sequence w ∈ (U × C)∗ an execution
path through the program. A sequence w is executed through the repeated application of
the state transition function do: S × U × C → S until all commands are processed.
Intuitively, there is no information flow from a sending user us to a receiving user ur (i.e.,
the sending user is noninterfering with the receiving user), if and only if the outputs
observed by ur are not affected by the actions of user us after executing the program
starting from an initial state s0 .
Goguen and Meseguer expressed this formally by defining [[w]]u as the output seen by
the user u ∈ U after w has been processed using the do function and PX (w) as the
subsequence of w where all commands by users X ⊆ U have been purged (removed).

123
Hence, for an initial state s0 , a set of users G is noninterfering with a second set of users G0
if and only if for all w in (U × C)∗ and all u in G0 , [[w]]u = [[PG (w)]]u .
Since taint tracking is designed to analyze the information flow between two data items
and not users in the system, the noninterfering data problem is mapped into a
noninterfering users problem by coupling data items to users. M 0 is used to represent the
noninterfering data machine. Also, the 32-bit x86 instruction add dst, src, is used as an
example to illustrate the core concepts. That machine will be signified by the +
superscript and framed for emphasis.
First, S 0 is defined as the Cartesian product of the set of states for each individual data
item Si . Thus, S 0 is a bitvector that is composed of other bitvectors. “Data item” is used
as a generic term for the machine’s memory and registers. Hence, given n data items:

S 0 = S = S1 × S2 × S3 × ... × Sn

For brevity, a set of aliases Ŝ = {1..n} such that i ∈ Ŝ will be used to refer to the ith data
item is used. Alias sets Sˆ1 ..Sˆn are used to refer to the individual bits of the data items.
That is, j ∈ Ŝi is used to refer to the j th bit of the ith data item.
The add instruction only has two operands, dst and src, with dst being both an input
and an output. The rest of the state is ignored since those data items are independent of
the add instruction (i.e., they do not affect the operation of the instruction). Thus, for the
example, S + can be simplified as:

S + = Sdst × Ssrc
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This item based definition can be used to determine if there is information flow between
data items s, r ∈ Ŝ. This is done by coupling s with a sending user us , r with a receiving
user ur and the processing of the program with a processing user up . In essence, us
communicates with ur , who can only observe the output value of r, by manipulating the
initial value of s. Thus, there is information flow from s to r in M if and only if there is
information flow from us to ur in M 0 . Consequently, there are three users with all
commands assigned to up :

U 0 = {us , ur , up }
(U × C) = (up × C)
(U × C)∗ = (up × C)∗

The example consists of a single command, add, and in instruction-level tainting (the
current focus) add is a simple operation. If an IR was used to emulate the instruction, then
the commands will contain the full IR instruction set and there will be longer and more
input sequences as well. Informally, ← is used as an operator that updates the state of the
left operand with the value of the right, and add(dst, src) is used to represent the function
that sums dst and src. Subsequently, the commands and sequences can be defined as:
C + = {dst ← add(dst, src)}
(U × C + ) = {(up , dst ← add(dst, src))}
(U × C + )∗ = {(up , dst ← add(dst, src))}
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To allow the sending user to manipulate the initial state or value of the sending data
item s, a value setting command, v ∈ V , is prepended to (U × C)∗ as represented by the ·
operator. Purging the sending user’s commands results in the original program.

V : the set of commands to assign values to Ss
C0 : V ∪ C
(U × C 0 ) = (us × V ) ∪ (up × C)
(U × C 0 )∗ = {(us , v) · w|v ∈ V, w ∈ (U × C)∗ }

In the example, assume that the information flows from src to dst are to be
determined. In this case, the receiving user will monitor the output of the operation (i.e.,
dst), and the sending user will manipulate the src operand.
[[w]]+
ur = [[w]]dst,s0
V + = {src ← i | i ∈ {0..232 − 1}}
(U × C + ) = {(us , src ← 0), (us , src ← 1), ...
, (up , dst ← add(dst, src))}
(U × C + )∗ = {(us , src ← 0) · (up , dst ← add(dst, src))
, (us , src ← 1) · (up , dst ← add(dst, src))
, ...}
Consequently, by prepending inputs (us , v) to (U × C)∗ , (U × C 0 )∗ is the set of new
sequences of inputs where the initial value of s is different in each case. Then, by defining
G = us and G0 = ur , the purge PG (w ∈ (U × C 0 )∗ ) results in the original sequences of
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commands (U × C)∗ in M . Given this setup and by the definition of noninterference, us is
noninterfering with ur if and only if

∀w ∈ (U × C 0 )∗ ,

[[w]]ur = [[PG (w)]]ur

Since there is a v ∈ V that assigns the initial value of s back into s (i.e., the value of s
was not changed by the input (us , v)), purging this value setting input has no effect on the
output value of r. Thus, the condition above simplifies into:

∀w, w0 ∈ (U × C 0 )∗ ,

[[w]]ur = [[w0 ]]ur

If the condition is satisfied, then the final value of r is independent of the initial value
of s. This is the definition for noninterfering data items. Consequently, the inverse
relationship is used to determine if there is information flow between two data items.
There is information flow from s ∈ Ŝ to r ∈ Ŝ by the sequence of inputs (U × C)∗ with
initial state s0 if and only if ∃w, w0 ∈ (U × C 0 )∗ such that [[w]]ur 6= [[w0 ]]ur .
For the bitvector machine, information flow can be further refined as a function of the
initial and end values of the sending and receiving data items and thus arriving at
Definition 5.2.1. The definition uses some additional notation which are introduce first.
The following description uses C-style bitvector operators. First V al(x, y) is a function
that maps the data item x ∈ Ŝ and value y ∈ Sx to a bitvector of the same length as s0
with bits corresponding to item x set to y. All other bits are 0. For the example,
V al(src, 0x00001234) → 0x0000000000001234. Then, M ask(x) = V al(x, Ones(x)) where
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Ones(x) is a bitvector of the same length as x with all bits assigned to 1. For the example,
M ask(src) → 0x00000000ffffffff. Finally s0 (x, y) denotes (s0 &(˜M ask(x)))|V al(x, y), where
the value of x has been changed to y in s0 .
The notation [[w]]r,s0 (s,x) , with s, r ∈ Ŝ and x ∈ Ss , is used as the output value of data
item r after processing a sequence w with initial state s0 where the value of data item s has
been changed to x. For example if S = S1 × S2 , with S1 = S2 = {0, 1} and s0 = (0, 0), then
s0 (1, 1) = (1, 0) and s0 (2, 1) = (0, 1).
Definition 5.2.1. For s, r ∈ Ŝ, there is information flow from s to r, represented by
s B0 r, if and only if ∃w ∈ C ∗ , [∃i, j ∈ Ss s.t. [[w]]r,s0 (s,i) 6= [[w]]r,s0 (s,j) ]
Definition 5.2.1 can be read as: for an initial state s0 there is information flow from s to
r if and only if there exists two values of s such that the values of r differ after processing
any path of the program. The users us and ur have been conveniently removed and as a
result the machine model for taint analysis only consists of S, s0 , C and C ∗ from the
original information flow machine model M . This shorter notation will be used in this rest
of this chapter.
In the example, given s0 = (dst0 , src0 ), [[w]]r,s0 (s,i) = add(dst0 , i). Then by Definition
5.2.1, it is obvious that there is information flow from src to dst since one can choose
i = 0x00000000 and j = 0x00000001 so that add(dst0 , i) 6= add(dst0 , j). This relationship is
not always so simple in practice though. Dynamic information trackers often have to make
certain design trade-offs to achieve different goals such as performance, storage overhead
and general applicability. Four major design parameters are highlighted in the observations
below.
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Observation 5.2.1. The data items were defined as the operands dst and src; however,
they can be defined as small as a single bit. This design parameter of choosing the data
item size is known as the taint-granularity and has implications on storage overhead and
performance.
For example, if byte-level tainting was used, then the set of states for dst will be a
product of four smaller sets, one for each byte: Sdst = Sdst3 × Sdst2 × Sdst1 × Sdst0 . The
same applies to Ssrc . In this case, there is no information flow from src0 to dst1 if the
initial state was s0 = (sdst3 , sdst2 , sdst1 ,0x0000, ssrc3 , ssrc2 , ssrc1 , ssrc0 ).
Observation 5.2.2. In the example, add is a basic or atomic instruction. What if the
instruction was more complex such as Bit-Scan-Forward (bsf)? Since bsf iterates through
the bit positions in search of the first 1-bit, C ∗ is expected to contain multiple sequences of
basic instructions. In this case, how is taint to be analyzed? Should bsf be analyzed as an
atomic instruction or should its taint propagation behavior be composed using those of the
basic instructions? This design parameter of choosing the smallest executable unit to
analyze is the analysis-granularity.
By definition, information flow is analyzed for the program as a whole; however, most
taint analysis implementations analyze information flow for each command in C and then
sequentially apply them to the individual inputs of the sequences in C ∗ . IR based tainting
is an application of this concept. For example TEMU [16] propagates taint through
QEMU’s internal IR instead of the native x86 instructions. Thus, one or more IR
instructions is used to emulate an x86 instruction. The taint propagation policy for x86
instructions are effectively simple compositions of the taint propagation policy for IR
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instructions. Tiwari et al. pointed out that false-positives can result from simple
composition in gate-level tainting [108].
Observation 5.2.3. Definition 5.2.1 is initial state aware, that is, information flow must
be analyzed for each and every initial state separately, an unlikely possibility in dynamic
taint analysis due to performance constraints. In practice, taint propagation rules are
initial state agnostic or state agnostic for short.
Due to the desire to minimize runtime overhead, taint propagation policies are
commonly defined off-line with one rule summarizing the flows for all initial states. This is
one fundamental source of the need for sanitization. For the b = a ⊕ a example, initial
state aware analysis will reveal that there is no information flow from a to b for this
particular set of initial states. Reflecting the state of practice, SB is used to denote the set
of initial state agnostic flows for C ∗ and is defined below. State awareness is a part of the
special cases design parameter described previously.
Definition 5.2.2. Using SBi as the set of all information flows for a program with an
initial state s0i - i.e., for a program C ∗ , SBi = {(s, r)|s, r ∈ Ŝ and s B0 r with initial state
s0 = i ∈ S} - SB =

S

SBi . That is, SB is the set of all information flows.

Since SB is initial state agnostic, it specifies that there is information flow from s to r
as long as there is an initial state such that there is information flow from s to r. It is clear
that the set union can be overly conservative and introduce false-positives.
Observation 5.2.4. The conservative nature of noninterference states that there is
information flow through a program as long as there is flow through one of its paths.
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As dynamic taint analysis can only “see” the path that is executed, this is a
fundamental problem that can’t be addressed through pure dynamic taint analysis.

5.2.2

Taint Propagation Policies

A taint propagation policy is a set of rules that determine when and how a data item
should be labeled or tainted. Since taint analysis is only concerned with information flows
from tainted data items, the rules are predicated on the fact that the flow source is tainted.
This section begins with the definition for a “golden” policy and then delves deeper into
the sources of over- and under-tainting.
Definition 5.2.3. For a particular choice of taint- and analysis-granularity, a “golden”
taint propagation policy TG is one that propagates taint exactly when there is information
flow from a tainted source and clears the taint otherwise. For s, r ∈ Ŝ, (s, r) ∈ TG if and
only if s is tainted and s B0 r
Ideally, taint analysis platforms will use the golden policy that is defined at the most
descriptive taint- and analysis-granularities. Jif [130], based on the JFlow language [131],
and FlowCaml [132] are examples of tools that analyzes information flow through whole
Java and ML programs respectively and applies the most appropriate golden policies. They
are both static analysis tools though. Using the perfect golden policy is impractical for
dynamic analysis. First, dynamic analysis is limited to analyzing the single path that is
actually executed. This leads to the loss of implicit control flow information since they are
due to paths that are not executed (a problem related to Observation 5.2.4). Second, the
taint-granularity is set to balance precision and performance in practice.
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Third, and perhaps more importantly, information flow is often tracked based on a
common set of low level commands (e.g., x86 instructions), and not the operations in which
the program’s logic was expressed. This decision is likely dictated by the need to analyze
programs whose components are written in different languages. For example, none of the
implementations surveyed propagates taint at the C++ level for a C++ program, at the C
level for standard libraries and at the x86 level for assembly code at the same time. As will
be discussed next, these practical choices in taint- and analysis-granularity can lead to
false-positives. Furthermore, the problem can surface in both dynamic and static analysis
tools if information flow is analyzed using an IR.

5.2.3

Over- and Under-tainting

In practice, taint propagation policies are only approximations of the corresponding
golden policy (i.e., the if and only if relationship is relaxed). Thus, there is a need to
objectively compare different policies. To this extent, the terms false-positive,
false-negative, accuracy, precision and over-taint are defined against a common standard.
For the purposes described in this chapter, the golden policy TG is used as the standard.
This implies that two policies compared using the definitions have the same taint- and
analysis-granularities or are at least comparable. Given the spirit of definitions, the golden
policy can also be defined based on an enumeration of all the acceptable false-positive and
false-negative cases. Effectively, this is the approach taken by most implementations.
However, this type of standard is fragile since what is acceptable can change.
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Definition 5.2.4. Given a policy T , (s, r) is a false-positive if ((s, r) ∈ T ∧ (s, r) ∈
/ TG )
and (s, r) is a false-negative if ((s, r) ∈
/ T ∧ (s, r) ∈ TG ).
Definition 5.2.5. A policy T is accurate if it does not contain any false-negatives and it is
precise if it is accurate and does not contain any false-negatives.
Definition 5.2.6. Given two policies, TA and TB , TA over-taints TB if
∃ (s, r), (s, r) ∈ TA ∧ (s, r) ∈
/ TB .
Definition 5.2.7. Given two policies, TA and TB , TA strictly over-taints TB if TA ⊇ TB .
Under-tainting is defined similarly to over-tainting and strictly over-taints is a new term
introduced to emphasize a special relationship. If neither TA nor TB contain any
false-negatives (i.e., are accurate), then TA over-taints TB means TA has false-positives that
TB does not. Furthermore, if TA strictly over-taints TB , then TB is more precise than TA
unless they are equal. In this case, the terms over-taints, more precise, and more
false-positives than can be used interchangeably.
Additionally, the pessimistic nature of noninterference ensures that if the policies are
based on or are verified against Definition 5.2.1 (i.e., (s, r) ∈ SB0 =⇒ (s, r) ∈ T ), then
there are no false-negatives. This concept is used as the basis for analyzing the precision of
previously published taint analysis platforms. The golden policy is also used as the basis
for discussing sources of over- and under-tainting in the next section.

5.3

Sources of Over- and Under-tainting

The observations made in the previous section suggested some fundamental sources of
false-positives and negatives in dynamic taint analysis platforms. This section focuses on
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showing how the design choices of taint-granularity, analysis-granularity and special cases
can impact precision.

5.3.1

Over-tainting Due to Taint-granularity: Observation 5.2.1

The minimum data item that can be labeled as tainted is known as the
taint-granularity. In many applications, the taint granularity is set at the byte-level to
match byte-level memory addressing. This provides good coverage for memory data and
has been effective as evidenced by the numerous published applications of byte-level
tainting. On the other hand, bit-level tainting has also been used. In Memcheck [84] for
example, bit-level tainting is used because the additional precision reduces the false
positive rate for detecting memory errors.
This additional precision can be illustrated using the shift left instruction shl dst,
imm8 that shifts the dst register imm8 positions to the left. In byte-wise tainting, if the
least significant byte of dst is tainted, and imm8 is 1 then the second least significant byte
of dst is subsequently tainted. Alternatively, if only bit 0 of the least significant byte is
tainted, then only bit 1 is tainted under the bit-wise policy. In the byte-wise policy, the
second byte must also be tainted to ensure accuracy.
While there are many more examples and the relationship seems intuitive, a proof for
the general case is provided below. Theorem 5.3.1 states that given two machines M byte
and M bit with the only difference being the composition of the state S, the byte-level
golden policy will strictly over-taint the bit-level golden policy.
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Theorem 5.3.1. Tbit ⊆ Tbyte , i.e., the golden policy for byte-wise tainting strictly
over-taints the golden policy for bit-wise tainting.

Proof The details of the two machines are skipped over for brevity. It is simply assumed
that the commands, inputs and initial states of the two machines are equivalent. Also,
subscripts are used to distinguish between the two machines only when necessary. For
example, they are not used for C ∗ since the set is common to both machines.
To prove that Tbyte strictly over-taints Tbit , two functions are defined first: a function
bits(x) that maps a byte x ∈ Ŝbyte to the corresponding set of bits X 0 ⊆ Ŝbit and the reverse
function byte(x0 ) that maps a bit x0 ∈ Ŝbit to its corresponding byte x ∈ Ŝ byte such that
x0 ∈ bits(x). It then follows that given s = byte(s0 ) and r = byte(r0 ), to show Tbit ⊆ Tbyte , it
must be shown that

∀s0 , r0 ∈ Ŝbit , (s0 , r0 ) ∈ Tbit =⇒ (s, r) ∈ Tbyte

(5.1)

By Definitions 5.2.1 and 5.2.3, (s, r) ∈ Tbyte if and only if ∃w ∈ C ∗ s.t. ∃i, j ∈ Ssbyte
where [[w]]r,s0 (i) 6= [[w]]r,s0 (j) . Then, since bytes x and y are different if and only if at least
one of their bit values differ, the inequality can be rewritten and Equation 5.1 becomes:

∀w0 ∈ C ∗ , ∃w ∈ C ∗ s.t.
[∃i0 , j 0 ∈ Ss0 , [[w0 ]]r0 ,s0 (s0 ,i0 ) 6= [[w0 ]]r0 ,s0 (s0 ,j 0 ) ] =⇒
[∃i, j ∈ Ss , ∃b0 ∈ bits(byte(r)) s.t.
[[w]]b0 ,s0 (s,i) 6= [[w]]b0 ,s0 (s,j) ]

(5.2)
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Equation 5.2 is true since one can always choose w = w0 , b0 = r0 and i and j where the
s0 bit of the byte s is assigned values of i0 and j 0 .

The same logic can be used to prove that, in general, coarse-grained taint policies will
strictly over-taint finer-grained policies. The underlying intuition is similar to Observation
5.2.3. In order to maintain accuracy, the coarse-grained policy must propagate taint if any
of its finer-grained counterparts propagate taint. Once again, the union and existential
quantifiers are over-cautious and lead to false-positives.

5.3.2

Analysis-granularity and Over-tainting: Observation 5.2.2

Similar to taint-granularity above, there is also evidence that suggests
analysis-granularity affects false-positives. Take the following C statement for example: y
= x & ˜x;. It is evident that there is no information flow from x to y since y is always
equal to 0. This result is reflected if the statement is analyzed as a whole. On the other
hand, if the ˜ and & operations were analyzed sequentially, then y becomes tainted if x is
tainted, a false-positive.
Understanding the fundamental over-tainting relationship between instruction-level and
basic-block-level information flow tracking is the focus of the following discussion. By
definition, a basic block is a block of instructions with a single entry and a single exit. It is
a single linear sequence of inputs c1 , c2 , c3 , ..., cn .
In the per-instruction case, s0 is defined as the initial state before the sequence of
inputs is processed, si as the intermediate state of the machine after inputs c1 through ci
are processed, sn as the final state after it is processed and Tci as the taint propagation
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policy for instruction ci . To analyze the information flow between s and r using
intermediary data items ri assume that there is information flow between s and r if and
only if there is a sequence of intermediary flows through ri .

(s, r) ∈ Tc ⇐⇒ ∃(r1 , r2 , r3 , ..., r) s.t.
(s, r1 ) ∈ Tc1 ∧ (r1 , r2 ) ∈ Tc2
∧ (r2 , r3 ) ∈ Tc3 ∧ ... ∧ (rn−1 , r) ∈ Tcn

(5.3)

Intuitively, this is true since the taint must propagate from data item s to data item r
through intermediary data items ri . Furthermore, since there are ni different paths through
different intermediary items, with n being the number of data items in S, there is
information flow as long as a single path exists. Once again, information flow can be
over-cautious. The following theorem states that the golden policy based on per-instruction
tainting strictly over-taints the one based on basic block tainting.
Theorem 5.3.2. Tbb ⊆ Tc , i.e., per-instruction tainting strictly over-taints basic block
tainting.

Proof Induction is used to prove this theorem.
Basis: The base case with only one single instruction is clear since the two policies are
equal.
Induction: For the induction case, assume that the relationship holds for i instructions i.e., (s, ri ) ∈ Tbb and Equation 5.3 is true. What is left is to show that it also holds for i + 1
instructions by contradiction.
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The i + 1 case being false means that (s, ri+1 ) ∈ Tbb but there is no sequence such that
Equation 5.3 is satisfied. Given that the i case is true, this means that for all possible
sequences, only the final case of (ri , ri+1 ) ∈ Tci+1 is false. It being false means that ri+1 is a
constant, and thus (s, ri+1 ) ∈
/ Tbb since Definition 5.2.1 is no longer satisfied. This is a
contradiction and therefore the original implication must hold. In general, analyzing
information flow at the instruction-level will strictly over-taint as compared to analyzing at
the basic block level.

Since in the best case scenario, a single basic block of IR is used to emulate a single
instruction, this theorem also implies that propagating taint through the IR strictly
over-taints propagating taint through the basic block and equivalently the instructions
being emulated. Thus, if the IR level policy is accurate, there will only be false-positives.
In the case where the emulation code includes control flows (e.g., the bsf instruction),
Theorem 5.3.2 together with Volpano’s result [112] indicate that IR level tainting not only
contains false-positives, but it can also contain false-negatives as summarized in Lemma
5.3.1.
Lemma 5.3.1. IR level tainting both over-taints and under-taints instruction level
tainting.
As a result, if precision is desired, care must be taken to verify that the information flow
patterns of the two different designs are the same (at least for the operations of interest).
In other words, TA and TB are tainting equivalent if TA = TB . Verification is discussed next.
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5.3.3

Other Sources of Over- and Under-tainting

The previous section presented fundamental results on how the design decisions of
taint- and analysis-granularity affect precision. Unfortunately over-tainting can still be a
problem even between policies using the same taint- and analysis-granularities due to the
initial state agnostic nature of dynamic taint analysis. These are commonly identified as
special cases and handled by defining special taint propagation or sanitization rules.
There are two types of special cases: concrete values and identity relationships.
Concrete value special cases were outlined in Observation 5.2.3 and result from the practice
of pre-calculating the initial state agnostic taint propagation policy SB (Definition 5.2.2).
Whereas identify relationships are special cases due to specific relationships between
operands for a particular operation irrespective of the value assignments themselves.
Identity relationships are sets of concrete values with special properties.
The mul rm32 instruction, where edx:eax = eax * rm32, can be used to illustrate
over-tainting due to a concrete value. In general, both eax and edx will be tainted after
execution if eax was tainted before. Thus, this is likely to be the generalized taint
propagation rule. An exception to this generalization is if rm32 = 0 though. That is, if the
initial state s0 has rm32 = 0 then the condition in Definition 5.2.1 will be unsatisfiable for
s ∈ Ŝeax and r ∈ Ŝeax . eax always equals 0. This special case is only valid for this
particular value assignment of rm32. On the other hand, xor eax, eax will always result
in eax being 0 irregardless of what the initial value of eax is. It is an example of an
identity relationship.
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Verifying Special Cases Special cases are often identified manually and then
incorporated into taint propagation policies as special rules (e.g., sanitization rules) to
reduce over-tainting as the need arises. These rules are then verified manually or simply
left unverified due to the difficulties of manual verification. For example, Memcheck has
the most special case rules, but according to its project suggestions webpage, formal
verification of the rules is still needed [133]. The concepts for formal verification are
introduced in this section.
The special rules in Memcheck, like many others, are defined as functions on shadow
taint variables and thus verification is discussed in this specific context. These shadow taint
variables are encapsulated in a shadow state S t (with a corresponding alias set Sˆ t = Ŝ)
that is used to label whether the data items in S are tainted. In this way, S t is a bitvector
with length equal to the number of data items in S. The taint propagation policies can
then be thought of as rules or functions that transform the shadow state. A rule is therefore
a relation rule : S × S t × C ∗ → S t. Effectively, these rules summarize the set SB .
For r ∈ Ŝ, the transformation can be defined as:

S tr =





1 ∃s ∈ Ŝ s.t. S ts = 1 ∧ (s, r) ∈ T



0 otherwise

The above equation states that data item Sr tainted if and only if information flowed
from a tainted data item Ss to it. It then follows that special case analysis based on the
transformations of the shadow taint variables can be formally verified by ensuring that for
every bit r of S t that is zero after the transformation, the value of Sr must be a constant
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for all assignments of tainted data items Ss without changing the non-tainted items. In
other words, if a data item r is not tainted after processing a sequence, then all of the
tainted items before processing the sequence are noninterfering with Sr .
Based on this logic, the condition for checking for false-negatives is presented in
Equation 5.4 and the definition in Definition 5.3.1. Similarly Definition 5.3.2 and Equation
5.5 can be used to check for false-positives. The notation in these definitions are changed
so they are closer to instruction level taint analysis, which is discussed in the next section.
x ∈ S and y ∈ S are used as the machine states before and after processing an instruction
or operation, op, where y = op(x). x t and y t represent the corresponding shadow taint
states and y t = rule(x, x t, op) is the transformation function.
Definition 5.3.1. A rule y t = rule(x, x t, op) is accurate (i.e., does not contain
false-negatives), if for all assignments of x and x t the following condition is true.

∀ r ∈ Sˆ t, [(y tr = 0) =⇒
∀ j, k ∈ S, [ op((x & (∼ x t))|(j & x t))r =
op((x & (∼ x t))|(k & x t))r ] ]

(5.4)
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Definition 5.3.2. A rule y t = rule(x, x t, op) does not contain false-positives if for all
assignments of x and x t the following condition is false.

∃ s ∈ Sˆ t, [ (y tr = 1) ∧
∀ j, k ∈ S[ op((x & (∼ x t))|(j & x t))r =
op((x & (∼ x t))|(k & x t))r ] ]

(5.5)

Definition 5.3.3. The transformation function y t = rule(x, x t, op) is precise if for all
assignments of x and x t Equation 5.4 is true and Equation 5.5 is false (i.e., Definitions
5.3.1 and 5.3.2 are both satisfied).
It follows that given two rule transformations, y t1 = rule1(x, x t, op) and y t2=
rule2(x, x t, op), that do not have any false-negatives, rule1 over-taints rule2 if there is a
bit in y t1 that is 1, but 0 in y t2 (Equation 5.6).
Definition 5.3.4. Given two accurate rules y t2 = rule1(x, x t, op) and
y t2 = rule2(x, x t, op), rule1 over-taints rule2 if the following condition is true.

(y t1 & (y t1 ⊕ y t2)) 6= 0

(5.6)

Note that these rules are initial state agnostic. They can be changed to support
analyzing the flows between data items (i.e., a subset of the initial states), xi and yj by
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assuming that only the bits in the state that corresponds to xi can be tainted. All other
bits are not tainted.

5.4

Generating an Accurate Policy for x86

In this section, a case study is used to illustrate how the foundation set in the previous
sections can be applied. The case study involves first using the definitions to generate an
accurate policy for x86 and then comparing it to previously published taint trackers with
regards to accuracy and precision. While the focus is on x86, the results are applicable to
all bitvector based implementations. The methodology for generating the policy is
presented in this section and interpretation of the results is left to the next.
The implication, s B0 r =⇒ (s, r) ∈ T , is used to ensure that the generated policy is
accurate. That is, the policy is defined by analyzing the information flows. As discussed in
Section 5.2.3, applying this implication ensures that every (s, r) ∈ TG must also ∈ T and
thus the policy T does not contain any false-negatives (Definition 5.2.4).
A two-step process is used to identify the information flows in common x86
instructions. First, the behavior of each instruction is specified using bitvector semantics.
The output of this stage is a collection of SMT-LIB Version 2 [134] or SMT2 files. Second,
the condition in Definition 5.2.1 is tested on the behavioral definitions to obtain a general
portrait of the bit-wise information flow relationships between the instruction operands.
The output of this stage is a collection of directed graphs depicting the bit-wise
information flows, which are subsequently interpreted manually to obtain the conservative
accurate taint propagation policy.
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5.4.1

Stage 1: Behavioral Definitions

Similar to previously published information flow trackers, the case study target the
general purpose x86 instructions that fall into the data transfer, arithmetic and logical
categories. Data transfer instructions have simple semantics with obvious bit-wise
information flow relationships. Thus, only the arithmetic and logical instructions are
studied. Then, in an effort to reduce redundancy, the analysis is limited to the 32 bit
instruction formats. The different mnemonics (e.g., add eax,imm32 vs. add r/m32, imm32
vs. add r32, r/m32) where the only difference between them are the operand types, are
ignored. The bsf, bsr and cmpxchg instructions are included since they include conditional
behavior and will be used to illustrate over-tainting when propagating taint through an IR.
The first step is to determine all of the input and output parameters, including flags by
referring to the developer’s manuals. This is done for each instruction. These parameters
constitute the state S. Only flags whose behaviors are well defined are included. Flags that
are unchanged or undefined are assumed not to exhibit information flow and are excluded
from the state.
Since the accuracy of the behavioral definitions is paramount, the definitions are cross
referenced with both BAP [135] and the developer’s manuals. Given an instruction,
assembly code to exercise different aspects of the it are written and compiled into an
executable. BAP 0.4 was then used to translate the executable into BAP’s internal IR. The
generalized behavior, expressed in SMT2, was then extrapolated from the IR for different
instruction instantiations as well as the manuals. Godefroid and Taly [136] presented
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(define-fun f_ror_32 ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 32)
(bvor
((_ extract 31 0) (bvlshr (concat (rm32 S) #x00000000)
(concat #x00000000 (f_shiftcount S))))
((_ extract 63 32) (bvlshr (concat (rm32 S) #x00000000)
(concat #x00000000 (f_shiftcount S))))
)
)
(declare-const f_cf_const (_ BitVec 1))
(define-fun f_cf ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 1)
(ite (= (f_shiftcount S) #x00000000)
f_cf_const ; undefined or unchanged
((_ extract 31 31) (f_ror_32 S))
)
)
(declare-const f_of_const (_ BitVec 1))
(define-fun f_of ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 1)
(ite (= (f_shiftcount S) #x00000001)
(bvxor ((_ extract 31 31) (f_ror_32 S))
((_ extract 30 30) (f_ror_32 S)) )
f_of_const; undefined or unchanged
)
)

Fig. 5.1.: SMT2 Definition for ror dst, imm8
T_32t0_250:u32} = R_EAX:u32
T_32t6_256:u32 = T_32t0_250:u32 << pad:u32(0x1e:u8)
T_32t8_258:u32 = T_32t0_250:u32 >> pad:u32(2:u8)
T_32t5_255:u32 = T_32t8_258:u32 | T_32t6_256:u32
R_CF:bool = low:bool(T_32t5_255:u32 >> 0x1f:u32)
R_OF:bool = R_CF:bool ^ low:bool(T_32t5_255:u32 >> 0x1e:u32)

Fig. 5.2.: BAP IL for ror %eax, $0x2

algorithms to automatically generate these behavioral specifications. Implementation of the
algorithms is left as future work.
The ror dst, imm8 instruction is used as an example. According to the manual, ror
has two operands, dst (the 32-bit operand to right rotate) and imm8 (the number of bit
positions to rotate). Since ror affects the overflow and carry flags, S is 42 bits in length.
Figure 5.1 shows the SMT2 definitions for the ror %eax, $0x2 instruction and Figure 5.2
shows the corresponding BAP IL; output for other instantiations are not shown. Note that
f ror 32 uses an alternative logic but the flags calculations are based on BAP and the
documentation.
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(define-sort STATE () (_ BitVec 70))
(define-fun dst ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 32)
((_ extract 69 38) S)
)
(define-fun f_add ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 32)
(bvadd (dst S) (src S))
)
(define-fun f_of ((S STATE)) (_ BitVec 1)
((_ extract 31 31)
(bvand ( bvxor (dst S) (src S) #xFFFFFFFF )
( bvxor (dst S) (f_add S) )
) ) )
;;;Other function definitions
(declare-const DST (_ BitVec 32))
(declare-const SRC (_ BitVec 32))
(declare-const ZF (_ BitVec 1))
;;;Other declarations
(assert (exists ( (i (_ BitVec 32)) (j (_ BitVec 32)) )
(not (= (dst (add (concat DST i ZF OF SF AF CF PF) ) )
(dst (add (concat DST j ZF OF SF AF CF PF) ) )
)
) )
)
(check-sat)

Fig. 5.3.: SMT2 Definition and Test for add dst, src

As another quick example, a portion of the SMT2 definition for add is shown in Figure
5.3. The figure shows that add has an SMT2 equivalent operation bvadd meaning it is a
basic operation. The flags calculation logic was extracted from BAP.

5.4.2

Stage 2: General Information Flow

The goal of this stage is to take the SMT2 files from stage 1 and obtain a base set of
taint propagation policies. For each file and for each possible combination of input and
output bits of the state S, Z3 3.2 was queried for the satisfiability of the condition in
Definition 5.2.1. An example query can be found at the bottom of Figure 5.3. The query is
used to determine whether there are two values i and j of src such that the values of dst
are different after add. The bit-wise query is more involved, however, it follows the same
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pattern. For example, ror has dst and imm8 as inputs totaling 40 bits and dst, imm8, of,
cf as outputs, totaling 42 bits. This results in 1680 separate queries.
The resulting statistics for all the instructions are summarized in the first five columns
of Table 5.1. The instructions are presented in the first column, the input operands, both
implicit and explicit, in the second, output operands, both implicit and explicit, in the
third, the total number of input-bit to output-bit combinations in column four and the
time it took for Z3 to return “sat” or “unsat” results for the condition in Definition 5.2.1 is
shown in column five. A new instance of Z3 is used for each test case and thus the results
include process creation overhead.
As expected, logical operations return results extremely quickly whereas signed
multiply and divide takes the most time. Overall, it took less than 14 hours on an Intel
Core-i7 860 to automatically identify all information flow relationships for 26 arithmetic
and logical instructions. However, the multiply and divide operations, especially the signed
versions, took the longest time by far. This indicates that the same technique will have
limited use for FPU and MMX instructions unless theorem provers improve. Further
analysis is left as future work.

5.5

Results

This results section is separated into four parts that illustrate the different aspects of
the formal foundations laid out in Sections 5.2 and 5.3: 1) the sat/unsat results generated
from stage 2, as described in the previous section, are interpreted; 2) previously published
taint analysis platforms are compared against the automatically generated policy; 3) the

Inputs
dst,src,cf
dst,src
dst,src
dst
edx,eax,rm32
edx,eax,rm32
eax,rm32
dst,rm32
rm32,imm32
dst
eax,rm32
dst
dst,src
dst,imm8,cf
dst,imm8,cf
dst,imm8
dst,imm8
dst,imm8
dst,imm8
dst,src,cf
dst,imm8
dst,src
dst,src
src
src
eax,rm32,r32

# Cases
4550
4480
4288
1184
9216
9216
6272
4224
6272
1184
6272
1024
4288
1722
1722
1680
1680
1840
1840
4550
1840
4480
4288
2080
2080
9792
102064

Runtime
1m19s
1m13s
1m05s
20s
95m48s
307m04
289m51s
52m37s
53m56s
19s
16m02s
15s
1m05s
42s
42s
41s
41s
35s
34s
1m21s
35s
1m17s
1m05s
31s
31s
2m39s
13h52m48s

DroidScope
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
N
N
N

Flow Type
U
U
I
U
D
A
U
U
U
U
U
I
I
A
A
A
A
U
D
U
D
U
I
A
S
S

A
A
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
A
A
E

Cat1

Table 5.1: Flow Type Results for x86 Instructions

Outputs
dsr,src,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,src,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,src,zf,sf,pf
dst,zf,of,sf,af,pf
edx,eax,rm32
edx,eax,rm32
edx,eax,rm32,of,cf
dst,rm32,of,cf
dst,rm32,imm32,of,cf
dst,zf,of,sf,af,pf
edx,eax,rm32,of,cf
dst
dst,src,zf,sf,pf
dst,imm8,of,cf
dst,imm8,of,cf
dst,imm8,of,cf
dst,imm8,of,cf
dst,imm8,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,imm8,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,src,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,imm8,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dst,src,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf
dsr,src,zf,sf,pf
dst,src,zf
dst,src,zf
eax,rm32,r32,zf,of,sf,af,cf,pf

libdft [95]
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
N
N
N
N
N
N
I*
N
I*
I*
I
I
E

Minemu [103]
A
A
A
A
N
N
N
N
N
A
N
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A*
A
A*
A*
N
N
N

Cat2
A
A
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A*
A*
A
A
E

S
A
I
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
I
A
A
A
A
S
S
A
S
A*
A*
A
A
E

TEMU [16]

Flow Types: (U)p, (D)own, (I)n-place, (A)ll-around, (S)pecial, (N)ot-Supported, (S)pecial, (E)ax is tainted in cmpxchg,
* - Zeroing Idiom, Boldface - Generated Policy is more precise

Instruction
adc dst, src
add dst, src
and dst, src
dec dst
div rm32
idiv rm32
imul1 rm32
imul2 dst, rm32
imul3 dst, rm32, imm32
inc dst
mul rm32
not dst
or dst, src
rcl dst, imm8
rcr dst, imm8
rol dst, imm8
ror dst, imm8
sal dst, imm8
sar dst, imm8
sbb dst, src
shr dst, imm8
sub dst, src
xor dst, src
bsf dst, src
bsr dst, src
cmpxchg rm32, r32
TOTAL

Cat3
S
A
S
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
I
S
A
A
A
A
S
S
A*
S
A*
A*
A
A
E

U
S
S
U
A
A
U
U
U
U
U
I
S
A
A
S
S
S
S
A
S
S
I
A
A
E

Memcheck [84]

Previously Published Taint Trackers

Refined
S
S
S
U
D
A
U
U
U
U
U
I
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
I
S
S
S
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Fig. 5.4.: Information flows of dst in the or instruction

special rules in Memcheck are verified; and 4) previously published taint trackers are
compared based on taint- and analysis-granularity.

5.5.1

Interpretation of Results

The sixth column of Table 5.1 indicates the general flow type for each instruction. The
sat/unsat results from Z3 were first graphed to increase understandability, and then
interpreted to determine the flow types. In particular, one directed graph was generated
per input bit. The nodes are bits of the state S and edges signify the potential for
information flow from the source bit to the destination bit. As an example, the 32 graphs
from the 32 input bits of dst in or were combined to produce Figure 5.4. The bit to bit
in-place information flow relationship is evident.

Information Flow Types

There are four distinct information flow patterns between the source and destination
operands. Despite the fact that information flow was analyzed at the bit-level, the patterns
are the same for a byte-level taint-granularity. There are no patterns of interest for the
flags. In other words, the results match the definitions and are therefore expected.
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dst_IN
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Fig. 5.5.: Information flow of bits 7, 20 and 31 of dst in sbb

1. In-place: Information can only flow from bit i of the source to bit i of the destination.
The Memcheck equivalent is UifU.
2. Up: Information can only flow from bit i of the source to bits j of the destination
where j >= i. Figure 5.5 depicts this particular behavior. It is the combination of
the information flow graphs for bits 7, 20, and 31 of dst to dst. It is evident from
the figure that information only flows from bit 7 of the source operand to bit 7 and
higher of the destination. The same applies to bits 20 and 31, where bit 31 of the
source only flows to bit 31 of the destination. The Memcheck equivalent is Left.
3. Down: Information can only flow from bit i of the source to bits j of the destination
where j <= i. While Memcheck does not have an equivalent operation, it is trivial to
see that, if there was, it would be Right.
4. All-around: Information can flow from bit i of the source to any bit of the
destination. The Memcheck equivalent is Lazy.

It is possible for an instruction to exhibit multiple flow types at the same time. The
flow types listed in Table 5.1 only shows the most descriptive type. The divide instructions
are good examples of this. In divide, edx:eax is divided by rm32, the quotient placed into
eax and remainder into edx. Intuitively, division is similar to shift right and thus the flow
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31 … 9

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

31 … 9

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

31 … 9

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

bsf_dst_OUT

bsr_dst_OUT

Fig. 5.6.: Comparison between bsf and bsr

type for edx:eax to eax should be down. On the other hand, the flow type for edx:eax to
edx is all-around since nothing definitive can be said about the relationship between the
divisor and the remainder without conrete value analysis. Also in practice, the actual taint
propagation policy will either be the OR of the individual flow types between the input
operands and the output operands or special rules defined per case. All in all, the flow
types identified in this step are conservative and are used to define the accurate taint
propagation policy.

The bsf, bsr and cmpxchg Instructions

bsf and bsr are two instructions that iterate through bit positions to find the first
1-bit. If these instructions do not have native IR counterparts, then it must be emulated.
Since the software developer’s manuals describe the instructions using while loops, they
both have control flow behaviors. The resulting flows for input bits 1, 5 and 8 are depicted
in Figure 5.6. Since bsf tests the lowest bits first, all subsequent iterations of the loop
depend on the lower bits being ‘0’ and thus the flow behavior is equivalent to all-around.
For example, if only bit number 5 of src IN is 1, then bits 0,1 and 2 of dst OUT are set.
However, if bit number 1 is also set, then only bit 0 of dst OUT is set. Thus, the setting of
bits 1 and 2 depend on the fact that bit 1 of src IN is 0. bsr scans from the highest bit
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1. cmpxchg (rm32, r32) {
2.
if (eax == rm32 ) then
3.
rm32 = r32;
4.
else eax = rm32;
5. }

Fig. 5.7.: Pseudocode for cmpxchg (flags are omitted)

position down, thus the flow pattern is much more direct and is special, not all-around.
These complex behaviors can also be identified as control flow dependencies using the
technique proposed by Ferrante et al. [137]. Both Dytan and DTA++ uses this technique;
however, control flow dependency does not immediately reveal the special bit-level
relationships of bsr as shown in Figure 5.6. Consequently, their policies are classified as
all-around. All other policies are assumed to support these instructions using all-around
unless evidence to the contrary was found.
cmpxchg (Figure 5.7) is a special x86 instruction that can be used to show how IR
tainting can lead to false-positives. Applying Definition 5.2.1 on the instruction as a whole
shows that there is no information flow from eax to eax because the output value of eax is
fully dependent on the input value of rm32. On the other hand, if information flow was
analyzed line-by-line, and thus mimicking the behavior of IR based tainting where each line
is a corresponding IR, eax will be tainted if eax was tainted before the instruction. This is
because eax was unchanged in the equals branch (line 3) and thus retains its taint. The
case for simple control flow dependencies is even worse. Since eax is used in the
comparison on line 2 and also as an l-val on line 4, it will remain tainted in the not-equals
branch. In the end, care must be taken to ensure that IR level tainting does not introduce
false-positives or false-negatives.
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5.5.2

Comparing With Previously Published Policies

In practice, many taint propagation policies are manually defined using domain
knowledge and expertise. This naturally leads to the questions of whether these manually
defined policies are accurate and if so how precise, and is automatic synthesis necessary?
These questions can be answered using the definitions presented in Section 5.2.3 and the
accurate policy generated in the previous section.
While the automatically generated policy was defined for the x86 instruction set, the
bitvector semantics are common to other platforms as well. However, not all taint analysis
implementations use the same bitvector operations and therefore the comparison is limited
to those that do.
Bit-vector based policies are separated into three broad categories. Cat1 includes all
policies that rely on simple l-val r-val relationships [88, 94, 103, 105, 108, 111]. Effectively,
these policies consists of in-place and all-around flow types only. There are three special
cases in this category that are discuss in more detail.
First, RIFLE [105] is a hardware implementation that associates taints with operands
and relies on the join operation, which is essentially an OR. Since taint is assigned per
operand, the propagate up and down flow types are meaningless. Thus, they are simplified
into all-around to maintain accuracy.
Then, the published policy for arithmetic and logical operations in GLIFT [108] is
equivalent to all-around. This is strange since the paper used an AND gate to illustrate the
special case where if the untainted input is 0 then the output is always 0, and thus taint at
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the output should be cleared. Yet, the final policy presented does not handle this special
case. For consistency, GLIFT was placed into Cat1. It is likely Cat3 though.
Finally, in Raksha [111], Dalton et al. limited the taint propagation policies to three
operations, no propagation, AND the taint values and OR the taint values. These
operations are then defined for instruction classes (e.g., arithmetic), instead of individual
instructions (e.g., add and sub). Raksha does provide support for defining special rules for
up to four operations though. Since the comparison is between base policies, Raksha is
categorized into Cat1, although in practice is is most likely between Cat1 and Cat2.
Similarly, Dytan [94] and Minemu [103] allows users to define they own propagation
policies as well.
Cat2 and Cat3 include all policies with special cases support. Cat2 includes simple
special cases due to zeroing idioms like xor eax, eax [59, 95–97, 106, 107] and Cat3
includes more precise policies that handle many special cases including the shift
operations [16, 56, 102, 109, 110].
The results are shown on the right side of Table 5.1. Since taint propagation policies
can be updated after publication, all of the taint propagation implementations that has
source code available has their own column with the policy defined in the source. The
policies are ordered by precision with the least precise on the left (column 7) and the most
precise on the right (column 14).
As the results show, many of the default policies used in previous publications are not
as precise as the automatically generated policy. In fact, none of the policies used the
propagate up flow type of sbb. Another interesting point is that the default policies for
libdft and Minemu are not accurate (i.e., has false-negatives). Either some of the
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instructions were not supported, or in the case of libdft, the default use of union or OR
leads to false-negatives in instructions such as add where taint should propagate up.
Finally, the results indicate that Memcheck has the most special rules and therefore could
be the most precise taint analyzer surveyed. The accuracy and precision of Memcheck’s
rules are verified in the next section.

5.5.3

Refining Memcheck’s Special Rules

In order to verify Memcheck’s rules, Memcheck’s operations (e.g., UifU) were first
defined in SMT2 and then used to define rules from both the original paper [84] as well as
the Memcheck source code. These taint transformation rules are then analyzed for
false-negatives and false-positives based on Equations 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.
Furthermore, to maintain consistency, the rest of the discussion is framed using
Memcheck’s operations and nomenclature. In particular, data operands are labeled using
d* where * is the operand number (e.g., d1 for the first operand), and the shadow taint
variables are labeled as v* where * is the operand number of the operand it shadows (e.g.,
v1 is the shadow taint variable for d1).
As an example, Figure 5.8 shows the logic for accurately calculating the resulting taint
v3 for the AND(d1, d2) instruction with 32bit operands as declared in SMT2. The original
definition from the Memcheck [84] is shown in comments (i.e., lines that start with ‘;’). To
determine whether the rule is accurate, a simple query to the SAT solver is used to
determine whether Equation 5.5 holds for all input values of d1, v1, d2 and v2. This is
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;Declaration for AND
(define-fun OP ( (d1 (_ BitVec 32)) (d2 (_ BitVec 32)) )
(_ BitVec 32)
(bvand d1 d2)
)
;Original Memcheck logic
;v3 = DifD( UifU(v1,v2),
;
DifD( ImproveAND(d1,v1),
;
ImproveAND(d2,v2) ) )
(define-fun rule ( (d1 (_ BitVec 32)) (d2 (_ BitVec 32))
(v1 (_ BitVec 32)) (v2 (_ BitVec 32)) )
(_ BitVec 32)
(DifD (UifU v1 v2)
(DifD (ImproveAND d1 v1)
(ImproveAND d2 v2)
)
)
)

Fig. 5.8.: Comparison between Memcheck logic and SMT2 code for verifying AND

achieved by asserting that it is not true, such that an unsat result will signify that it must
hold.
The results are summarized in Table 5.2. The xor instruction was included as a test of
the Z3 theorem prover. Memcheck does not have any special rules for xor. Runtime
numbers are not included since the false-negative tests all returned quickly, within a few
minutes, and most of the false-positive tests timed out (i.e., Z3 did not return sat or unsat
within 24 hours). The instruction, SAT solver result for the false-negative test and the
result for the false-positive test are presented in that order. The table is also separated into
two sections, the first contains the rules defined in Memcheck and the second contains
additional refined rules.
The results indicate that all of the Memcheck rules are accurate and in fact two of
them, and and cmp, are precise. Furthermore, the initial results for the false positive tests
for the shift and rotate instructions returned models (i.e., variable assignments that
satisfies the query) highlighting the fact that the result is tainted if the shift amount is
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Instruction
add
and
cmp
or
rol
ror
sal
sar
shr
sub
xor

False-Negatives
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat

False-Positives
timeout
unsat
unsat
timeout
sat, timeout*
sat, timeout*
sat, timeout*
sat, timeout*
sat, timeout*
timeout
timeout

New Rules
adc
rcl
rcr
sbb
bsf
bsr

unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat
unsat

timeout
sat, timeout*
sat, timeout*
timeout
sat*, unsat
sat*, unsat

Table 5.2: Summary of refined policies
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tainted. Since this result is of limited use, the natural question is whether the only source
of false-positives is from the shift amount. Hence, the search space was limited so that the
shift amount is never tainted. This new test resulted in a timeout, noted by the *.
Despite the fact that Z3 timed out for some false-positive tests, conclusions about a
rule’s precision are not drawn. This is mainly because when the same queries were issued
in Z3 4.0, “unknown” was returned. According to the Z3 documentation this is likely due
to the use of quantifiers, which Z3 is not optimized for. This is, at least for now, a
limitation of the proposed approach. On a more promising note, Z3 returned unsat in
about 40 minutes for 4-bit xor and in about 664 minutes for 8-bit xor. It might be possible
to manually extend these lower-bit count results to larger operands. This is left as future
work.
There are similarities between the addition and shift operations, and the addition with
carry and rotate operations. Thus, it was natural to attempt to define new rules for the
latter operations based on the prior and verify their accuracy and precision. The list of new
rules are presented in Table 5.3 with the instruction on the first column and a description
of the new rule in the second. The rules for rcl and rcr are natural extensions of the shift
and rotate rules identified in Memcheck. The taint value for the carry flag, vcf, is included
in the calculations. UifU is a function that bitwise ORs the operands and PCastYX, the
pessimistic cast, returns 0 if the operand is 0 and 1s in all bit positions otherwise.
The rules for adc and sbb are also natural extensions of the add and sub rules. The
min terms represent the value where all tainted bits are set to 0 (e.g., d1 min = d1 & ˜
v1), and the max terms represent the value where all tainted bits are set to 1 (e.g., d1 max
= d1 | v1).
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Insn
adc

sbb

rcl
rcr
bsf
bsr

Refined Rule
(bvor
(bvor v1 v2)
(bvxor
(bvadd d1 min d2 min cf min)
(bvadd d1 max d2 max cf max)) )
(bvor
(bvor v1 v2)
(bvxor
(bvsub d1 min (bvadd d2 max cf max))
(bvsub d1 max (bvadd d2 min cf min))) )
( UifU (PCastYX v2) (rcl v1 d2 vcf) )
where vcf is the taint value for the carry flag
( UifU (PCastYX v2) (rcr v1 d2 vcf) )
where vcf is the taint value for the carry flag
Destination is tainted if (bvule (bsf v1) (bsf d1))
Destination is tainted if (bvuge (bsr v1) (bsr d1))

Table 5.3: Summary of new rules using SMT2 prefix notation

The bsf and bsr rules are similar to the Memcheck rule for cmp where short-circuiting
is used. The intuition is that if an untainted bit is already 1, then it doesn’t matter what
the value of the tainted bit is as long as the tainted bit is scanned after the untainted bit.

5.5.4

Taint- and Analysis-granularity

Section 5.2.2 discussed how taint- and analysis-granularity may affect taint propagation
precision. As an illustration, those definitions are used to compare the precision of
previously published taint trackers.

Taint-granularity Much research has been conducted to propagate taint through
bitvector operations. Policies have been defined at the operand level [87, 105], 32-bit word
level [59, 111], byte-level [56, 59, 88, 95–97, 106, 107, 109, 110], and bit-level [84, 108].
According to Theorem 5.3.1 the taint-granularities have been ordered with increasing
precision.
Other taint analysis applications, such as the ones on Java String objects, can be
compared analogously as well. Like how bitvectors consists of bits or bytes, Java Strings
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consists of UTF-16 characters or full String objects. Therefore, theorem 5.3.1 indicates
that the Java String propagation policies defined at the character level [91, 92] may be
more precise than those defined at the object level [93, 99]
Analysis-granularity: The range of analysis-granularity designs matches well with the
different levels of programming languages. Researchers have defined propagation policies
for high-level languages such as C [87] and Java [91–93, 99], scripting languages such as
PHP [89], PERL [101] and JavaScript [90, 100], low level languages such as x86
assembly [56, 84, 94, 103, 104] and even at the gate level [108].
It is also common practice to implement taint propagation through an intermediate
language [56, 59, 84, 94, 104] with simpler semantics and reduced instruction set than
through the language or instruction set (e.g., x86 and ARM), they emulate. The emulation
code can range from a single instruction, to a basic block of instructions to whole functions
that contain multiple execution paths. Consequently, Theorem 5.3.2 indicates that this
design choice may increase false-positives and reduce precision. Similar to Memcheck, the
presence of false-positives and negatives can be verified.

5.5.5

ARM and Dalvik Level Tainting in DroidScope

Similar to how DroidScope limited fine-grained analysis support to Dalvik bytecodes
emulated using mterp, the discussions on the precision of analyzing Dalvik level taint using
only ARM instructions is also limited to the mterp interpreter. As discussed in Section
4.4.2, each bytecode in mterp is associated with a set of native instructions that is used to
emulate the bytecode’s functionality. Since the native code is optimized for individual
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

%default {"preinstr":"", "result":"r0", "chkzero":"0"}
/*
* Generic 32-bit binary operation. Provide an "instr" line that
* specifies an instruction that performs "result = r0 op r1".
* This could be an ARM instruction or a function call. (If the result
* comes back in a register other than r0, you can override "result".)
*
* If "chkzero" is set to 1, we perform a divide-by-zero check on
* vCC (r1). Useful for integer division and modulus. Note that we
* *don’t* check for (INT_MIN / -1) here, because the ARM math lib
* handles it correctly.
*
* For: add-int, sub-int, mul-int, div-int, rem-int, and-int, or-int,
*
xor-int, shl-int, shr-int, ushr-int, add-float, sub-float,
*
mul-float, div-float, rem-float
*/
/* binop vAA, vBB, vCC */
FETCH(r0, 1)
@ r0<- CCBB
mov
r9, rINST, lsr #8
@ r9<- AA
mov
r3, r0, lsr #8
@ r3<- CC
and
r2, r0, #255
@ r2<- BB
GET_VREG(r1, r3)
@ r1<- vCC
GET_VREG(r0, r2)
@ r0<- vBB
.if $chkzero
cmp
r1, #0
@ is second operand zero?
beq
common_errDivideByZero
.endif
FETCH_ADVANCE_INST(2)
$preinstr
$instr
GET_INST_OPCODE(ip)
SET_VREG($result, r9)
GOTO_OPCODE(ip)

@
@
@
@
@
@

advance rPC, load rINST
optional op; may set condition codes
$result<- op, r0-r3 changed
extract opcode from rINST
vAA<- $result
jump to next instruction

Fig. 5.9.: ARM Emulation code for basic mterp operations (binop.S)

architectures, the discussions are focused on ARM v5 architecture, which is widely
supported.
In the ARM v5 implementation of mterp, all of the arithmetic operations are generated
using macros. The basic emulation code for 32-bit binary arithmetic opcodes is defined in a
file named binop.S and is depicted in Figure 5.9. As the figure shows, mterp first loads the
Dalvik virtual register numbers into scratch registers r2 and r3 (lines 20 and 21), then
loads the operands from the stack using the GET VREG macro into scratch registers r0 and
r1 (lines 22 and 23), operates on the registers using the $instr macro (line 31), and finally
loads the result back into the corresponding virtual register (line 33). For example, the
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ADD INT mterp opcode effectively replaces line 31 with add r0, r0, r1 and DIV INT
replaces line 31 with bl

aeabi idiv, the call to the native function that performs

division since some ARM architectures, v5 included, do not support division natively.
Since the only non-data-transfer instruction in the emulation code is the actual
arithmetic operation (e.g., add), the taint propagation policy for tracking taint at the
ARM instruction level is the same as the logic for tracking taint at the Dalvik opcode level.
The lines of interest are 22, 23, 31 and 33 and in fact are no different than a basic block of
code that loads memory operands into registers for processing and then stores the result
from the register back into memory.
The only caveat is that the Dalvik opcodes are assumed not to be tainted. If they are
tainted, then the instructions used to decode and interpret the bytecode (lines 18-21) will
blindly propagate the taint through. This might or might not be the desired behavior since
these details do not exist in Dalvik level taint propagation. The advantage of propagating
taint through ARM instructions is the added control over how taint is to be propagated
through the decoding process. On the other hand, the and and lsr (lines 19-21) need to be
precise in order to avoid over-tainting. Special rules for these operations were discussed in
Section 5.4 and are likely to be precise.
Unary operations are emulated similarly and thus for all practical purposes,
propagating taint at the native instruction level is equivalent to propagating taint at the
Dalvik opcode level for the arithmetic instructions.
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5.6

Discussion

SMT Solvers The ability to show accuracy and precision is wholly dependent on SAT
solvers such as Z3. As the timing results show, even queries to determine whether simple
rules, such as xor, is precise do not return within 24 hours. This is mainly due to the use
of quantifiers in the definitions and equations, which Z3 is not optimized for. On the other
hand though, it should be stressed that the proofs for accuracy return quickly and thus, in
the minimum, it is feasible to ensure that policies do not have false-negatives. Other
solvers can be used to solve the same queries. This is left as future work.

Other Design Considerations The comparisons have focused on the design parameters
that can be effectively measured with the proposed approach. There are other extremely
important design constraints such as performance and generality. That is, while the refined
policies decrease false-positives, and therefore the over-tainting problem, the overhead
needed for applying the rules can greatly affect system performance. Similarly, while a
finer-grained taint-granularity increases precision, it also requires more resources to
maintain the additional taint tags.
Overall, the final decision on how to balance the trade-offs between accuracy, precision,
performance and other factors is application dependent. There are already indications that
the trade-offs mentioned above can be successfully managed though. This means that
precise policies can be used in practice.
Symmetric multi-threading [107], unused extension processing units, (e.g.
FPU/MMU) [103], special hardware [111] and mixed static and dynamic analysis [138]
have been and can still be used to improve the performance of calculating taints. This is
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especially true for the complex refined policies. To reduce taint label storage requirements,
researchers have used mixed granularities [59, 96] and complex page table like
structures [87, 95].
There is also precedence in pairing taint analysis with SMT solvers at runtime [9, 139],
mixing analysis-granularities by using function summaries [56, 96], adjusting
analysis-granularity at runtime [104] and dynamically selecting what to analyze [40, 97].
Additionally, the concept of Secure Multi-Execution [140] has been shown capable of
determining whether a program is “noninterferent” with little overhead in the JavaScript
engines of Chrome and Firefox [141]. These previous efforts indicate that calculating
precise information flows at runtime might be feasible, even for larger analysis-granularities
such as functions.

Automatic Synthesis Both the behavioral models and the refined special rules were
manually defined, which can still introduce errors. To achieve the highest precision, the
policies as well as the special rules should be completely automatically generated. To this
extent, Godefroid and Taly presented a ”Smart” algorithm that uses function templates to
automatically synthesize the behavioral models of the same x86 instructions (excluding adc
and sbb) used in the tests [136]. The same algorithm can be used to synthesize the refined
rules as well as the special sanitization rules. It can be seen that the rules for adc, sbb, add
and sub follow a similar template and so do the sanitization rules. This problem is left as
future work.
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5.7

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to develop the fundamental understanding and
methodology for analyzing the accuracy and precision of dynamic taint propagation
policies. This was achieved by deriving the noninterfering data model and using it to make
four main observations on the fundamental sources of false-positives and false-negatives in
dynamic taint analysis implementations. It was proven that byte level tainting strictly
over-taints bit level tainting and that basic block level tainting, and in essence IR level
tainting, strictly over-taints instruction level tainting. The model was also used to formally
define previously used terms and to define definitions for verifying accuracy and precision.
The merit of the more formal approach was shown through a case study for generating
precise taint propagation policies for common bitvector operations. The automatically
identify information flow based policy combined with the refined rules were verified to be
more precise than previously published taint trackers. The implementation of a new more
precise taint tracker is left as future work.
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6. SUMMARY
The original thesis was that transparent malware analysis platforms with precise taint
tracking rules can be realized using virtualization technologies. This thesis has been
validated in this dissertation.
V2E showed that heterogeneous record and replay can be used to record a sample’s
execution in a hardward virtualized environment that is transparent, followed by a replay
in an emulated environment. By changing the emulator to precisely replay the log as
recorded, the emulation based malware analysis platform, TEMU, was able to successfully
analyze real-world malware samples that previously evaded its analysis.
DroidScope showed that the two levels of semantic gaps in Android malware can be
bridged. Furthermore, it showed that two levels of semantic information can also be
seamlessly bound together such that a single emulation based malware analysis platform
can be used to analyze Android malware with colluding Java and native components.
Both V2E and DroidScope are emulation based malware analysis platforms and thus
benefit from the advantages of flexibility and efficiency for analysis plugin development.
They both have instruction tracer plugins and support taint analysis as well.
The accuracy and precision of the taint propagation policies in both of these
implementations as well as other previously published taint analysis platforms were
analyzed and compared using the methods presented in Chapter 5. The results showed
room for improvement.
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In conclusion, while transparent and precise malware analysis is feasible using
virtualization, future work (as mentioned throughout this dissertation) is needed to extend
these initial results.
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